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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines relations between the United States and Great Britain in South 
America between 1939 and 1945. It does so in the broader context of the economic 
planning for the post-war world undertaken by the US and Britain during the Second 
World War. Traditional interpretations of Anglo-American post-war economic 
planning have tended to focus on a process whereby the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration advocated a multilateral system, based on equality of access to markets 
and raw materials. Doubting Britain’s ability to compete successfully in such a 
system, the British government baulked at the US proposal and clung to its autarkic 
structures constructed during the interwar years. This thesis argues that relations 
between the US and Britain in South America followed a different and more complex 
pattern. In this region it was in fact Britain that eventually took the lead in advocating 
multilateralism. This policy was adopted following a lengthy evaluation of British 
policy in Latin America, which concluded that multilateralism represented the surest 
means of protecting British interests in South America. The US, on the other hand, 
demonstrated exclusionary tendencies in its policy toward Latin America, which 
threatened the successful implementation of a global economic system based on 
multilateralism. In explaining this divergence from multilateralism in the Roosevelt 
administration’s post-war economic planning, this thesis pays particular attention to 
the influence of different factions, both within the administration and in the broader 
US political and business establishment. By exploring Anglo-American relations in 
this previously neglected region, this thesis contributes toward a greater understanding 
of the broader process of post-war economic planning that took place between the US 
and Britain during the Second World War.  
  
 
iii
Contents 
 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations iv 
Acknowledgements v 
Author’s Declaration vi 
Chapter 1. Anglo-American Post-War Economic Planning: A New Perspective 7 
Chapter 2. US Criticisms and British Mollification 34 
Chapter 3. British Suspicions and Attempts at Cooperation 66 
Chapter 4. Challenges to Multilateralism and the Return of British Suspicions 102 
Chapter 5. The Quest for a Self-Denying Ordinance 133 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 169 
Bibliography 180 
  
 
iv
List of Abbreviations 
The full name is given on first reference, abbreviations thereafter. They are all listed 
together here for convenience. 
 
BEW  Board of Economic Warfare 
CIAA  Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEA  Foreign Economic Administration 
IACHC Inter-departmental Advisory Committee on Hemispheric 
Communications 
IADC  Inter-American Development Commission 
ITT  International Telephone & Telegraph 
MEW  Ministry of Economic Warfare 
OLLA  Office of Lend-Lease Administration  
USCC  United States Commercial Company 
WPB  War Production Board 
 
Abbreviations in source references 
CAC  Churchill Archive Centre 
CFR  Council on Foreign Relations 
CUL  Cambridge University Library 
DAFR  Documents on American Foreign Relations 
FDRL  Franklin D. Roosevelt Library   
FRUS  Foreign Relations of the United States 
LSE  London School of Economics and Political Science 
MOD  Ministry of Defence  
NARA  United States National Archives and Records Administration 
OARA  Office of American Republic Affairs 
OIIA  Office of Inter-American Affairs 
RAC  Rockefeller Archive Center 
RFA  Rockefeller Family Archives 
RSC  Roosevelt Study Center 
TNA  The National Archives of the United Kingdom 
  
 
v
Acknowledgements 
Completing a PhD, particularly one involving research on both sides of the Atlantic, is 
rarely possible without the support of many institutions and individuals. I am grateful 
to Brunel University for awarding me a 3-year studentship to undertake this project. 
Research trips to the US were only made possible by generous grants from the Centre 
for American, Transatlantic and Caribbean History in the Politics and History 
Department at Brunel; the European Association of American Studies; and the British 
International Studies Association. Funding was also gratefully received from the 
Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, where a productive research trip was made all 
the more enjoyable by the organisational skills of Leontien Joosse.  
A good many archivists have aided my research throughout this project. In 
particular, I am grateful for the efforts of Hans Krabbendam at the Roosevelt Study 
Center; and the archival staff at Cambridge University Library; the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library; the Rockefeller Archive Center; the Library of Congress; the 
Seeley G. Mudd Library of Princeton University; the Butler Library of Columbia 
University; the Robertson Library of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science; the Churchill Archive Centre; and the National Archives, in both Britain and 
the US.  
I have had the good fortune throughout the course of researching and writing 
my PhD to meet and often befriend many other historians working in similar research 
areas to my own. Several of these individuals have greatly aided the progress of this 
thesis by reading various drafts of different sections of it, and offering more general 
encouragement and advice. For their time and effort I am grateful to Bevan Sewell, 
Jason Colby, Jeffrey Engel, Marco Mariano, Spencer Mawby, Tony McCulloch, J. 
Simon Rofe, and Charlie Whitham. Staff in the Politics and History Department at 
Brunel have offered similar guidance. In particular, I am grateful to Jay Kleinberg, 
Kenneth Morgan, Niall Palmer, and Ian Thatcher. My research supervisor, Martin 
Folly, has aided the completion of this thesis immensely by offering advice and 
guidance with unswerving enthusiasm and good humour.  
I have similarly been incredibly lucky to be able to depend upon the support 
and benevolence of my family and friends throughout the process of completing this 
PhD. In particular, I am grateful for the various ways in which completion of this 
project has been aided by my parents, Colin and Sally Mills; my grandparents, Jim 
and Anne Rostron; and my brother, Simon Mills. Finally, completion of this PhD 
would not have been possible without the support of my fiancée, Anna Clague. She 
has witnessed its development from the closest quarters and has provided inspiration 
and encouragement throughout. For doing this with unceasing patience and love, I am 
deeply grateful. 
  
 
vi
Author’s Declaration 
Sections of this thesis have previously been published in the following article: 
Thomas C. Mills “Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy During the Second World 
War and the Electrification of the Central Brazilian Railway”, Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, vol.20, no.1 (2009), pp.69-85.
  
 
7
Chapter 1 
 
Anglo-American Post-War Economic Planning: A New Perspective 
 
A major subplot to the alliance between the United States and Great Britain during the 
Second World War was the ongoing diplomacy concerning the economic shape of the 
post-war world. Negotiations took place both at the highest levels of government over 
the general principles that would shape the post-war global economy and throughout 
the lower rungs of governmental bureaucracy concerning specific geographic regions 
in which both countries had significant economic interests.  
 Inevitably, Anglo-American post-war economic planning took place within the 
broader context of the changing balance of power between the two countries during 
the Second World War. A widespread assumption among US officials, and in the 
country’s business and political establishment more generally, was that the end of the 
war would see the US emerge as the leading international economic power.1 In this 
context it was the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration that shaped the general 
contours of post-war economic planning and took the lead in seeking to implement 
these plans.  
 The underlying reality for British officials during the war, on the other hand, 
was dependence on the US for aid and, during the latter part of the war, for manpower 
and resources.2 This meant that while British officials were by no means passive 
spectators to the process of post-war economic planning, they did have to undertake 
this task with constant reference to the ambitions of their wartime ally.3 But while the 
Second World War may have stacked the balance of power in favour of the US, 
Britain remained a prominent international power. In particular, the country still 
controlled large swathes of the world’s trade by the time of the war. Anglo-American 
relations were therefore central to the Roosevelt administration’s economic plans for 
the post-war world.4 
                                               
1
 Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, 
8th edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), p.xii; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 
1988), pp.459-465, 484.   
2
 Keith Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.10-
11.   
3
 Michael F. Hopkins, Oliver Franks and the Truman Administration: Anglo-American Relations, 
1948-1952 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.5. 
4
 Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the Crisis of 1943-1945 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), p.280; Randall B. Woods, “FDR and the New Economic Order” 
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The most prominent aspect of those plans was an attempt to install a 
multilateral economic system. Multilateralism was never a precisely defined term and 
its meaning tended to vary somewhat depending on the circumstances. But at its core 
multilateralism entailed an economic system based on free and equal access to global 
markets and resources.5 Such a system stood in stark contrast to the closed trade 
regime, based on the sterling bloc and the imperial preference system, constructed by 
Britain during the inter-war years.6  
It was therefore to the task of breaking open Britain’s closed trade regime and 
replacing it with its own multilateral model that the Roosevelt administration applied 
itself in negotiations with its wartime ally. The Churchill government resisted this 
attempt for fear that the loss of export markets provided by Britain’s closed trading 
system would deny the country the means of achieving a healthy balance of payments 
in the post-war era. But British dependence on the US for aid meant that concessions 
with regard to post-war economic planning were inevitable.  
This process began in August 1941 when point four of the Atlantic Charter 
declared that the US and Britain would endeavour to ensure future equal access, for 
all countries, “to trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their 
economic prosperity”.7 The Master Lend-Lease Agreement, signed the following 
February, further pledged that the US and Britain would work toward “the elimination 
of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade”.8 In the years following this agreement 
US officials sought to implement its provisions to ensure future US access to the 
British Empire and the sterling bloc.9 Similarly, US officials sought to challenge 
Britain’s traditional dominance in the Middle East in order to facilitate US 
                                                                                                                                       
in David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball and David Reynolds eds, FDR’s World: War, Peace, 
and Legacies (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), p.178. 
5
 G. John Ikenberry, “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony”, Political Science Quarterly, 
vol.104, no.3 (1984), p.382; Dick Steward, Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy 
and Reciprocal Trade (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975), p.12; Randall B. Woods, 
A Changing of the Guard (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), pp.9-32. 
6
 Frederick Benham, Great Britain Under Protection (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp.90-102; 
Woods, “FDR and the New Economic Order”, p.178.   
7
 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1941, vol.1 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1958), 
pp.367-369. For Anglo-American negotiations concerning point four of the charter, see FRUS, 
1941, vol.1, pp.360-373.  
8
 Department of State Bulletin, 28 Feb. 1942 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1942). For the negotiations 
leading to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, see FRUS, 1942, vol.1, pp.525-537. 
9
 Harley A. Notter, Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation (Washington DC: USGPO, 1949), pp.190-
194.    
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commercial penetration – again in the name of promoting multilateralism.10 These 
efforts were furthered during the principal wartime international conference on 
economic matters, held at Bretton Woods in July 1944. The final text of the 
agreements reached at the conference recorded the US desire “to bring about further 
agreement and cooperation among nations ... on ways and means which will best 
reduce obstacles to and restrictions upon international trade”.11 This process reached a 
conclusion with the Anglo-American financial agreement of December 1946, which 
granted Britain a loan of $3.75 billion on the condition that it be used by Britain “to 
assume the obligations of multilateral trade”.12  
Despite a small number of recent studies, the dominant tendency in the 
existing literature, both on US economic planning and Anglo-American relations 
during the Second World War, has been to focus exclusively on this process whereby 
the US promoted multilateralism against British opposition. The hypothesis of this 
paper is that relations between the US and Britain in South America during the 
Second World War failed to conform to this pattern. Examining relations between the 
wartime allies in this previously neglected region will therefore provide a new 
perspective on Anglo-American economic planning during the Second World War.  
 
The Emergence of Economic Planning 
Economic planning for the post-war world did not feature heavily in the early 
historical literature on wartime diplomacy.13 In this respect these initial interpretations 
tended to reflect the picture presented in the early collections of published documents 
that they were largely dependent on for sources.14 Another valuable source for these 
                                               
10
 Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, 2nd edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971), pp.217-236; Kolko, The Politics of War, pp.294-313.  
11
 “Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944”, Department of State Publication 2866 (Washington 
DC: USGPO, 1948). 
12
 “Financial Agreement Between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom”, 
Department of State Publication 2439 (Washington DC:USGPO, 1946), p.7. For the negotiations 
leading to the financial agreement, see FRUS, 1945, vol.6, pp.1-204. 
13
 Examples include Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace 
They Sought, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) [first published 1957]; 
John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1963); Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964); Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-
1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 
14
 These include Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper 
& Bros., 1948); Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate 
History, 2 vols (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948); Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private 
Papers of Senator Vandenberg (London: Victor Gollancz, 1953); Nancy H. Hooker ed., The 
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authors was the memoirs published by officials involved in wartime diplomacy. The 
most important of these was the account of the war provided by the British wartime 
leader, Winston Churchill.15 
Churchill’s history of the war was equally influential on early representations 
of Anglo-American wartime relations. When Churchill came to pen his six-volume 
history of the war in the late 1940s and early 1950s, among his contemporary 
concerns was the necessity of maintaining a united Anglo-American front vis-à-vis 
the perceived communist threat from the Soviet Union. He therefore consciously 
strove to create a picture of the war that emphasised the solidarity and partnership 
between the US and Britain and downplayed any issues that had caused disagreement 
and acrimony between the two countries.16 Anglo-American economic diplomacy, 
which had divided the two powers, was therefore largely neglected from Churchill’s 
account. When Churchill did deal with post-war economic planning, he tended to 
gloss over any disagreements raised by these issues.17  
Churchill’s account of the Second World War echoed loudly in subsequent 
historical enquiries into the topic.18 Issues such as economic planning for the post-war 
era were therefore similarly absent from early accounts. Instead, they tended to 
reinforce the image of a ‘special relationship’ between the US and Britain that 
Churchill had been at pains to portray.19 Producing their works in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, the authors of these early studies can be grouped 
                                                                                                                                       
Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).  
15
 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols (London: Cassel & Co., 1948-1954). Feis, 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin is particularly dependent on Churchill’s account.  
16
 Churchill, The Second World War. For Churchill’s concerns when writing his account of the war, see 
David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945: 
Towards a New Synthesis” in Roger Louis and Bull Hedley eds, The ‘Special Relationship’: 
Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.17; Ritchie Ovendale, 
Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), p.39; 
Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and America Against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945 
(London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), pp.xxi-xxii. 
17
 Churchill, The Second World War, vol.3, pp.386-388, 392-293, 397. 
18
 For the impact of Churchill’s account on future historians, see Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance”, p.18; John Charmley, “Churchill’s Roosevelt” in Ann 
Lane and Howard Temperley eds, The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1995), p.92; Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.40. 
19
 See, for example, H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American 
Relations, 1783-1952 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1955). For evidence of the durability of the 
‘special relationship’ thesis, see Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941: The 
Partnership That Saved the West (London: WW Norton, 1976). For a critical analysis of the 
‘special relationship’, see Michael F. Hopkins and John W. Young, “The Anglo-American 
‘Special Relationship’” in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones eds, A Companion to Contemporary 
Britain, 1939-2000 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp.499-516.  
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together as part of the ‘first generation’ of scholars to have dealt with Allied 
diplomacy during World War II.20 With the benefit of hindsight, the neglect on the 
part of these authors to consider economic planning for the post-war era, and the 
impact this process had on Anglo-American diplomacy, can be seen as a key factor 
distinguishing their work from that which would follow. This became vividly clear 
with the emergence in the 1960s and early 1970s of a new school of historians in the 
US that came to be referred to as revisionist writers.  
Economic motives were at the heart of the revisionist interpretation of US 
foreign relations generally. The key historical figure that revisionist historians looked 
to when dealing with World War II was the US Secretary of State for the majority of 
the war, Cordell Hull. Economics had long been at the heart of Secretary of State 
Hull’s thinking about international relations. In his memoirs, published in 1948, Hull 
described how the US government had tried during World War II to ensure the 
creation of a global trading system for the post-war world based on economic 
multilateralism. The basis of this system, as understood by Hull, was unfettered access 
on the part of all countries to both markets and raw materials. The means by which 
Hull hoped to achieve such a system was via a multilateral agreement between nations 
committing them to the elimination of restrictions on global commerce, such as 
protective tariffs and quotas, and discriminatory closed trading systems based on 
bilateral agreements between governments.  
The necessity of instituting such a system, according to Hull, went way 
beyond the realm of economics. Rather, he believed that a world trading system based 
on multilateralism could provide the basis for lasting international stability and peace. 
He reached this conclusion by way of his interpretation of the road to war in the 
preceding decades. According to Hull’s analysis, it was the protectionist policies 
adopted by countries after the First World War that had led to the global depression of 
the 1930s. The economic hardships endured by populations during the depression 
years had in turn allowed the rise of dictatorial regimes pursuing an aggressive form 
of economic nationalism. It was these regimes that were responsible for taking the 
world to war. Under an alternative economic system based on multilateralism, Hull 
believed the freer trade achieved by nations would lead to greater prosperity for all. 
                                               
20
 Mark A. Stoler, “A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of US World War II Diplomacy” in 
Michael J. Hogan ed., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations 
since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.70 has characterised these writers 
in this way. 
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Such prosperity, so the argument went, would eliminate the economic dissatisfaction 
that had bred war. Thus, economic planning for the post-war world was being put to 
the service of a broader scheme to secure lasting prosperity and peace on a worldwide 
basis.21 
In the first major revisionist work, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, by 
William Appleman Williams, Hull’s description of economic planning for the post-
war world was taken up as the major theme of US diplomacy during World War II.22 
Williams fully accepted Hull’s contention that the aim of US officials in the Second 
World War was to institute a multilateral global trading system that would facilitate 
greater access to markets and resources. But Williams crucially pointed out that such 
a system would, by way of the country’s superior economic strength by the end of the 
Second World War, principally act to guarantee US access above all else. He therefore 
differed with the Hullian thesis that described the motivation behind US economic 
planning in World War II as the creation of the economic basis for international 
peace.  
Williams’ central thesis was that US leaders in the twentieth century came to 
believe that an essential prerequisite for the country’s economic and political well-
being was a need to continually expand foreign markets. It is in this light that he 
interpreted US attempts to shape the contours of the post-World War II global 
economic order. US commerce would need to gain far greater access to foreign 
markets and resources in the post-war period, so they believed, if the country were to 
avoid the kind of economic overproduction that had led to the depression of the 
1930s. Instituting a multilateral global trading system for the post-war period would 
achieve this goal by ensuring an “open door” for US economic expansion.23 In the 
                                               
21
 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol.1, pp.81-86, 
363-365. For further examples of this thesis by officials who participated in wartime diplomacy, 
see Herbert Feis, The Sinews of Peace (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), ch.3; E. F. Penrose, 
Economic Planning for Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), ch.1. In the sole 
early historical account of Anglo-American economic planning for the post-war world, Richard 
Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of 
Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956) largely echoed Hull’s interpretation of 
multilateralism and did not substantially challenge Churchill’s ‘special relationship’ thesis when 
describing the cooperation between Britain and the US in their attempts to install such a system. 
22
 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 3rd edition (New York: WW 
Norton & Co., 1972) [first published 1959], ch.5. 
23
 Ibid. Further revisionist examples of Williams’ ‘open door’ thesis include, Walter LaFeber, America, 
Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1992 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), ch.1; Barton J. Bernstein, 
“American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War” in Barton J. Bernstein ed., The 
Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp.15-
61; Thomas G. Paterson, “The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism 
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revisionist thesis, then, it was US domestic prosperity, rather than a desire to create 
the economic conditions necessary for world peace, that constituted the principal 
motivation behind the country’s plans for the post-war world.   
Clearly influenced by Williams, Gabriel Kolko applied much the same open 
door thesis to his 1968 study of wartime diplomacy, The Politics of War.24 Lloyd C. 
Gardner also adopted the open door thesis in his analysis of the Roosevelt 
administration, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy.25 These authors built upon 
Williams’ work by examining how US economic plans for the post-war world 
factored in Anglo-American relations. The general paradigm presented by these 
authors was one whereby the US economic system’s need for post-war markets and 
resources compelled officials to relentlessly try to break open the closed trading 
system operated by Britain in the interwar years and replace it with its own 
multilateralist model. Britain in turn baulked at this effort in order to try to preserve 
its closed trading system, which British officials believed would serve the country’s 
vital interests in the post-war era.26  
The sources available to revisionist historians in the 1960s and early 1970s 
were to a large degree the same materials accessible to the first generation of World 
War II historians. But revisionists also made the deliberate choice to pay more 
attention to the memoirs and contemporary utterances of Hull and the economic 
multilateralists he had led in the State Department.27 They also made use of the 
Congressional records concerning economic planning for the post-war world and the 
views expressed in business journals and magazines. These choices reflected the 
central place given to economics in the revisionist conception of how US foreign 
policy was formulated.28 As such, the new interpretation offered by revisionist 
historians reflected more an altered perception of the fundamental precepts guiding 
US foreign policy, as opposed to revelations brought about by the release of new 
                                                                                                                                       
and the Marshall Plan” in Thomas G. Paterson ed., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American 
Foreign Policy in the Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp.78-112. 
24
 Kolko, The Politics of War, pp.242-266. 
25
 Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy. 
26
 Kolko, The Politics of War, ch.12; Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy, p.275-288. 
See also, LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, p.11.  
27
 Kolko, in particular, as well as drawing on Hull’s memoirs, makes use of Feis, The Sinews of Peace. 
See Kolko, The Politics of War, pp.253, 258, 183.  
28
 For expansion on this conception, see William Appleman Williams, “The Large Corporation and 
American Foreign Policy” in David Horowitz ed., Corporations and the Cold War (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1969), pp.71-104; Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An 
Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
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documents. New documentary evidence did, however, become available as the 1970s 
progressed, altering both understandings of economic planning and the nature of 
Anglo-American relations during the Second World War. 
 
Post-Revisionism and Anglo-American Rivalry  
Partly in response to these newly available US government documents, but also as a 
reaction against what some perceived as the new ‘revisionist orthodoxy’, a new 
generation of World War II scholars writing in the 1970s sought to correct what they 
saw as the overly narrow open door thesis offered by the revisionists.29 Placing their 
focus principally on Soviet-American relations during the war – largely to the 
exclusion of Anglo-American relations – these scholars did not wholly ignore 
economic issues. In fact, John Lewis Gaddis claimed to have incorporated the 
revisionist thesis into his work, and produced what he later called, a “post-revisionist 
synthesis”.30  
But economic planning for the post-war world was sidelined in these works. 
One justification offered for this was that revisionist scholars had put too much 
emphasis on economic goals by way of ascribing too prominent a role to Hull. For 
although Hull certainly was predominantly concerned with economic goals, these 
authors did not see him as being greatly influential in wartime diplomacy.31 Ironically, 
when economic planning for the post-war world was considered in these works, it was 
usually presented in the Hullian terms of contributing to the greater political end of 
securing post-war peace.32 In this sense, the post-revisionists represented both a return 
to the older interpretations of economic planning for the post-war world, while at the 
same time seeking to diminish the importance of the issue. Other authors writing in 
this period sought to challenge the revisionist treatment of US economic planning in a 
more direct fashion. Basing his work principally on the newly released diaries of 
Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., the US Treasury Secretary during the war, Alfred E. Eckes 
                                               
29
 Principal works of this group include John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Daniel Yergin, Shattered 
Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (New York: Penguin Books, 
1989). For the claim that the revisionist thesis constituted the new orthodoxy, see John Lewis 
Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History”, Diplomatic History, vol.17, no.1 (1993), pp.1-16. 
30
 See John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War”, 
Diplomatic History, vol.7, no.3 (1983), pp.171-190. 
31
 Yergin, Shattered Peace, p.422n. made this point explicitly in response to Kolko’s conclusions. See 
also, Alfred E. Eckes, “Open Door Expansionism Reconsidered: The World War II Experience”, 
Journal of American History, vol.59, no.4 (1973), p.917. 
32
 Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p.18-23; Yergin, Shattered Peace, p.8-9.  
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refuted each of the revisionist contentions and instead offered a full endorsement of 
the Hullian thesis.33  
Despite such efforts both to sideline and refute the revisionist thesis, other 
authors began to build upon the foundations laid by revisionist scholars. Along these 
lines, Michael J. Hogan employed a ‘corporatist’ interpretive model in order to offer a 
more nuanced and detailed account of how US political and business elites came to 
formulate the plans for a multilateral world trading system that were pursued during 
the war years.34 
Moreover, studies that focused specifically on Anglo-American relations 
during the war were beginning to pay more attention to the effect economic planning 
had in fact had on negotiations between the two countries. This inclusion was part of a 
more general trend, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, of 
recognising the various tensions and rivalries that had existed between the two 
countries throughout the war.35 This realisation was facilitated by the opening, 
throughout the 1970s, of new documents detailing wartime correspondence between 
the US and Britain. These documents, including Churchill’s own voluminous 
correspondence with Roosevelt, revealed that the image of the special relationship 
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previously created by the British wartime leader had obscured much tension and 
disagreement between the two countries.36 
The general realisation of the rivalry that had existed between the US and 
Britain during the war allowed for further exploration of issues between the two 
countries that related to economic planning for the post-war world. One avenue was to 
consider the role played by a specific enterprise. This was the approach adopted by 
Alan P. Dobson in his study of Anglo-American wartime negotiations over the future 
of the civil aviation industry.37 Similarly, Michael B. Stoff examined Anglo-American 
competition for oil reserves during World War II.38 Another approach was to consider 
how Anglo-American economic planning for the post-war era factored with regard to 
a specific region. Charlie Whitham adopted this approach in his study of Anglo-
American relation in the West Indies.39 In a similar vein, Robert Vitalis examined 
Anglo-American economic rivalry in Egypt during the war.40  
These enterprise-based and regional paradigms provide us with useful 
frameworks within which to explore further areas of Anglo-American relations during 
the war. Further probing of this subject along these lines will aid us in our 
understanding of the more general process of Anglo-American economic planning for 
the post-war world. This goal seems particularly germane, as our comprehension of 
this topic has to a large extent failed to advance beyond the initial parameters posited 
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in Hull’s interpretation and later debated between revisionist and post-revisionist 
scholars.  
 
Questioning Multilateralism 
The debates surrounding US economic aims during World War II discussed above 
centred on the motivations behind these aims. Whereas Hull and his contemporary 
followers argued that the impetus behind US plans for a multilateral global economic 
order was to create the necessary conditions for world peace, a revisionist 
interpretation like Williams’ challenged that the true motive was to secure the 
country’s own domestic prosperity. Post-revisionists, while conceding that US self-
interest was a factor, essentially restated Hull’s argument that the attempt to 
implement a multilateral economic system in the post-war world was part of a broader 
attempt to ensure future international stability and peace.  
Similarly, when focused specifically on Anglo-American economic 
diplomacy, the memoir of E. F. Penrose, an official in the US embassy in London 
concerned with economic planning during the war, presented the process as a 
mutually beneficial venture aimed at ensuring future prosperity and peace for both 
countries.41 In a revisionist interpretation of the same process, such as that provided 
by Kolko, on the other hand, US officials employed multilateralism as a lever with 
which to break open Britain’s closed trading regime and thereby advance US 
commercial interests.42 Underpinning the different positions, then, was a general 
agreement over the US commitment to installing a multilateral economic system in 
the post-war world; the differences were only concerning the motivations behind this 
aim.43  
Revisionists did occasionally question the US commitment to multilateralism. 
For example, Thomas G. Patterson pointed to the reluctance of Congress to sanction a 
reduction in US trade barriers.44 Likewise, Kolko questioned US adherence to 
multilateralism in its negotiations with Britain over access to Middle Eastern oil.45 But 
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these caveats did not alter the basic revisionist thesis that rested on the US 
commitment to an ‘open world’ in its negotiations with Britain.  
The same acceptance that US officials were guided by an attempt to institute a 
multilateral world system in their negotiations with Britain was incorporated into 
subsequent studies of Anglo-American relations which detailed the rivalry between 
the two countries. Indeed, it was the very fact of the US commitment to the principles 
of multilateralism, posed against a British desire to retain its closed trading regime 
constructed during the inter-war years, which caused division between the wartime 
allies in these studies.46   
But was the Roosevelt administration ever fully committed to the 
multilateralist doctrine prescribed by Hull? Similarly, was the British government 
implacably opposed to multilateralism in its wartime negotiations? Questioning these 
shared assumptions provides one possible way in which to advance beyond the initial 
interpretations of Anglo-American economic planning for the post-war world. 
Some provisional answers to these questions were provided in studies from 
both sides of the Atlantic, published in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and therefore 
able to make use of the newly available archives released during the 1970s. 
Employing a ‘bureaucratic politics’ interpretive model, Randall B. Woods’ study, A 
Changing of the Guard, offered a new interpretation of Anglo-American economic 
negotiations during the war.47 Focusing on the inter-agency rivalry in the Roosevelt 
administration, Woods demonstrated that multilateralists in the wartime State 
Department and White House competed with a combination of Congressional 
conservatives serving special interests, and bureaucratic imperialists within the 
Treasury, who wished to commit the country to a programme of economic 
nationalism, rather than the internationalist model advanced by multilateralists. The 
result, Woods argued, was the advocacy by the Roosevelt administration of “modified 
multilateralism”, which in fact failed to provide Britain with the necessary reserves to 
successfully participate in a post-war economic order based on multilateralism.48 In 
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his consideration of the Churchill government, Woods described a similar split 
between those sympathetic to multilateralism and its opponents, such as the “Empire 
Isolationists”.49 
Similarly, Dobson, in his study of US wartime aid to Britain, demonstrated 
that Britain’s ability to compete in a multilateral system in the post-war era was 
constrained by the US Treasury’s wartime policy of limiting British reserves.50 While 
the majority of British officials may have agreed with the policy of multilateralism, 
therefore, they disagreed with the US position of how to achieve such a goal.51 
Dobson also explored other previously neglected aspects of Anglo-American relations 
during the war. In his discussion of the wheat negotiations that took place between the 
US and Britain, Dobson described how US officials deviated from liberal conceptions 
of post-war trade and instead advocated the implementation of price controls.52  
These works have demonstrated that the process of Anglo-American post-war 
economic planning was a far more complex one that cannot be characterised by a 
simplistic portrayal of the US promoting a multilateral model against British 
opposition. But despite these important studies, there has in recent times been a dearth 
of works focused on issues explicitly related to post-war economic planning between 
the wartime allies. This is despite the fact that there are a multitude of subjects with a 
direct bearing on Anglo-American economic planning during World War II which 
have yet to be explored.53 This lack of further exploration of Anglo-American 
economic diplomacy during World War II has meant that when the topic has been 
discussed it has tended to be the established pattern of the US promoting 
multilateralism against British opposition that has been presented.54  
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One possible reason for this continuing trend is the fact that when Anglo-
American relations have been explored in a particular region these have tended to be 
areas previously dominated by Britain – both through its official and unofficial empire 
– where the US previously lacked a substantial presence.55 In these regions it was only 
natural that diplomacy between the US and Britain would centre on dismantling 
Britain’s closed trading regimes. Exploring Anglo-American relations in a region 
where both countries had established interests is one way of providing more insight 
into the nature of Anglo-American economic planning. An obvious region to explore 
in this respect is South America. 
 
South America in the Existing Literature 
In 1942, during the midst of an exchange with colleagues concerning the Roosevelt 
administration’s attitude toward Britain in South America, Victor Perowne, the head 
of the South American department in the British Foreign Office, noted that “volumes 
could, and will be written on the theme of Anglo-U.S. relations in respect to Latin 
America”.56 This prediction has not turned out to be the case. Although largely 
ignored in the existing literature, South America has previously been touched upon in 
studies of Anglo-American relations during the war; likewise, relations with Britain 
have been briefly addressed in considerations of US-South American relations during 
the war years.57 But aside from a small number of studies specifically focused on 
Argentina, Anglo-American economic negotiations concerning South America have 
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not received much attention.58 A comprehensive study of relations between the two 
countries in the region in the light of post-war economic planning is wholly absent. It 
is this gap in the current literature that this paper will fill.   
For some the failure of the historical literature to focus on South America is a 
wholly correct reflection of the significance of the region in Anglo-American relations 
at the time. For example, Warren F. Kimball has suggested that there was insufficient 
attention paid to South America during the war by US and British officials to warrant 
any such study.59 But this view reflects the low importance attributed to economic 
concerns by Kimball generally, as well as a tendency to focus primarily on the 
Churchill-Roosevelt relationship, rather than Anglo-American governmental relations 
as a whole.60 Contrary to this view, David Reynolds has pointed to the need for 
further research in the area of Anglo-American wartime economic relations in South 
America.61  
When Anglo-American relations in South America have been addressed the 
importance of the issue has tended to be downplayed. For example, Stanley E. Hilton 
has suggested that the US lacked any desire to achieve economic hegemony in South 
America and Britain’s economic interests in the region were therefore not considered 
of any great importance.62 Conversely, David Green, in his 1971 book, The 
Containment of Latin America, did indeed perceive a US policy to achieve economic 
dominance in South America. But the threat posed to this goal by Britain was not 
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considered a significant one in his study, and Anglo-American relations in the region 
were therefore not subject to any in depth discussion.63 
Working along the same lines as his contemporary revisionist scholars, Green 
instead argued that the US employed the principle of the open door in order to ensure 
US economic expansion in the hemisphere would not be hampered by the 
indigenousness political forces of economic nationalism.64 When US attempts to 
check British competition in the region were considered by Green – which would 
appear to contradict the US commitment to multilateralism in Latin America – they 
were downplayed and characterised merely as an attempt by US officials to “hedge 
their bets”.65 In this sense, Green’s book, while offering many valuable insights, both 
reaffirmed the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to implementing a multilateral 
economic system for the post-war world and dismissed the importance of Anglo-
American relations in South America.  
This paper demonstrates that previous studies have been too quick to dismiss 
the importance of Anglo-American relations in South America during the Second 
World War. Far from being irrelevant to the wartime alliance there was, 
notwithstanding intermittent attempts at cooperation between the two powers in the 
region, continuous rivalry between the US in Britain in South America concerning the 
post-war commercial prospects of the two powers. By examining this new arena for 
conflict between the US and Britain during the war, this paper contributes an addition 
to the existing literature on Anglo-American rivalry during the Second World War. 
Moreover, as this paper demonstrates, examining relations between the two countries 
in South America contributes a new perspective to the broader process of post-war 
economic planning that took place between the two countries during the war.  
 
A New Perspective 
One obvious reason why South America has been neglected in previous discussions of 
Anglo-American economic planning during the war is the fact that, to a large extent, 
this region was peripheral to the global conflict. This tendency is wholly 
understandable, but limiting the study of Anglo-American relations to those regions 
most immediately affected by the war fails to reflect the truly global nature the post-
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war economic planning that took place. The very fact of South America’s isolation 
from the principal theatres of conflict in Europe and Asia provides a novel forum in 
which to examine Anglo-American relations in the light of post-war economic 
planning. Strategic concerns were by no means wholly absent from Anglo-American 
diplomacy concerning this region. The danger of a German invasion launched from 
North Africa on the ‘bulge’ of Brazil was considered a real enough danger by US 
officials to warrant the construction of a series of military bases there during the early 
years of the war.66 But in comparison to regions like North Africa and South-East 
Asia, South America was largely free from immediate strategic concerns throughout 
the war years. This freedom allowed issues relating to the post-war era, such as the 
commercial prospects for Britain and the US in the region, to receive greater attention. 
But above all else, it is the relative status of the US and Britain in South 
America which means that studying this region provides an alternative picture of 
Anglo-American relations to that presented in previous studies. Notwithstanding 
President James Monroe’s famous assertion of US supremacy in the Western 
Hemisphere in 1823, it was Britain, to a much greater extent than the US, which made 
commercial inroads into the region throughout the nineteenth century.67 There was a 
flurry of British investment in South America immediately following the 
independence of the region in the 1820s.68 Aided by dominance of the shipping lanes 
to South America, Britain also established important markets in the region, most 
prominently in Brazil and Argentina.69  
It was not until the First World War that the US seriously began to challenge 
British domination of the region.70 With its European competitors largely prevented 
from trading with South America following the outbreak of war in 1914, the US was 
bound to gain a comparative advantage in the region.71 But beyond this casual change 
in conditions, there was a concerted programme of economic expansion in South 
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America, both by private US concerns and the ruling administration of Woodrow 
Wilson. This took the form of an expanded government bureaucracy to aid investment 
and trade in the region.72 Similarly, there was a concerted effort by US private 
interests to develop US banking facilities, alongside telecommunications and shipping 
lines to the region, in order to end the previous dependence on the British providers of 
these services.73 These efforts produced great dividends. The percentage of South 
American imports supplied by the US rose from 16 percent in 1916 to 44 percent in 
1917. Similarly, the US received just 18 percent of South America’s exports in 1916 
and 42 percent the following year.74 
Competition from Britain, as well as other European nations, inevitably 
returned to temper these gains following the end of World War I.75 But US expansion 
in South America continued throughout the 1920s, fuelled to a large degree by 
continued private investment in the region.76 This was matched by British investment 
in Venezuelan oil, but overall British investment in South America declined following 
World War I.77 Britain also failed to compete successfully in the supply of goods to 
the region. Following the partial modernisation of South America brought about by 
foreign investment, Britain’s exports were increasingly outdated and were replaced by 
US and German competition.78   
The Great Depression of the 1930s contracted trade and investment generally, 
but it also increased the trend toward growing US predominance in South America. 
Britain’s response to the depression was to impose barriers to trade with countries 
outside the British Empire under the imperial preference system. This, along with 
similar protectionist measures implemented by the South American states, led to a 
gradual decline in commerce between Britain and South America during the 1930s.79 
Although US trade with South America similarly shrank as a result of the depression, 
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there was also a trend as the 1930s progressed for the US to try to strengthen inter-
American trade links to counteract the loss of European markets.80 Begun during 
Herbert Hoover’s administration, this process came to fruition with the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements established between the US and several South American states, as 
part of the Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbour policy.81 The trade agreements 
were backed up by the granting of loans to South American countries by the newly 
created Export-Import Bank, which aimed to provide South America with the 
necessary purchasing power to participate in inter-American trade.82 
By the late 1930s, then, the US had surpassed Britain as the principal foreign 
commercial power in South America. On the eve of war in 1938 the US supplied 27 
percent of South America’s imports, compared to 14 percent from Britain.83 With 
regard to individual countries, it was only in Argentina and Uruguay that Britain 
supplied a slightly higher proportion of the country’s imports than the US. In Brazil 
the US supplied 24 percent and Britain 10 percent. A similar ratio was to be found in 
Chile, whereas in the remaining countries the US tended to dominate. With regard to 
exports from the region the picture was more mixed, depending on the principal 
product supplied by the individual country.84 For example, in Bolivia, where the 
principal export was tin, Britain received 63 percent of the country’s entire exports 
and the US only 4 percent. In Colombia, on the other hand, which primarily exported 
coffee, the US received 59 percent of exports, whereas Britain received virtually none. 
In other countries, such as Paraguay and Peru, Britain and the US received a roughly 
equal share of exports.85 
In this respect South America offers a stark contrast to previous studies, which 
have focused on regions like the British Empire and the Middle East where the US 
sought to expand into new areas and challenge British dominance. In South America, 
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while Britain retained a substantial commercial presence, it was the US that had the 
edge in controlling the commerce of the region.  
This difference in the relative status of the two countries meant that the pattern 
presented in previous works, whereby the Roosevelt administration sought to promote 
multilateralism against the opposition of the British government, failed to come to 
fruition in South America. Britain lacked the dominance and the preferential position 
in South America that it sought to defend in other parts of the world. A multilateral 
system based on free and equal access, therefore, represented its best chance of 
maintaining commercial footholds in the region. As this paper demonstrates, it was 
therefore Britain that insisted on a multilateral system in South America. The US, on 
the other hand, lacked the same motivation to promote a multilateral system that it 
pursued in other regions and in general negotiations with its wartime ally. Rather than 
uniting around the promotion of multilateralism in its wartime diplomacy with Britain 
concerning South America, then, the Roosevelt administration was instead divided 
between different factions, each with their own ambitions.  
Chapter 2 of this paper considers the effect on British interests in South 
America of exclusionary elements in the Roosevelt administration and the broader 
political and business establishment during the period of US neutrality. In particular, 
it argues that criticisms of British trade practices in South America – combined with 
British mollification of these criticisms – resulted in the partial exclusion of British 
interests from the region between 1939 and 1941.  
Beginning with Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent entry of the US into the war, 
chapter 3 argues that the initial failure of elements within the Roosevelt 
administration to cooperate with British attempts to forge a new activist role for the 
country in Latin America resulted in the British government forming suspicions that 
the Roosevelt administration wished to exclude its interests from South America. 
Internationalists in the State Department, led by Hull, subsequently sought to counter 
these suspicions by promoting multilateralism in the region. In so doing they ensured 
that a degree of cooperation in South America existed between the two countries by 
the autumn of 1942.  
However, as chapter 4 demonstrates, various other factions within the 
Roosevelt administration and the broader US establishment continued to pursue 
wholly different agendas from the internationalists in the State Department. 
Temporary government agencies and Latin Americanists in the State Department had 
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little concern with attempts to win British support for a multilateral economic system 
for the post-war era. Similarly, US business interests also were unconvinced of the 
wisdom of preserving a major competitor’s interests in South America. Cumulatively, 
it is argued that these groups pursued policies throughout 1942 and into 1943 that had 
the effect of excluding British economic interests from South America on a permanent 
basis.  
In response to these developments, as chapter 5 demonstrates, Britain sought 
to formally commit the Roosevelt administration to a policy whereby the State 
Department would restrain those elements endangering British interests in South 
America, by pledging its commitment to multilateralism in the region and requesting 
US assistance in achieving this outcome. But while the State Department agreed to 
this policy in theory, the subsequent actions of the Roosevelt administration 
demonstrate that it failed to adhere to it in practice. 
This paper therefore demonstrates that in South America Anglo-American 
relations failed to conform to the pattern whereby the US promoted multilateralism 
and Britain opposed such a system. On the contrary, in this region it was Britain that 
took the lead in promoting multilateralism and the US that demonstrated exclusionary 
tendencies. This paper therefore constitutes an addition to the existing scholarship of 
Dobson and Woods by furthering our understanding of Anglo-American post-war 
economic planning during World War II. 
 
The Methodological Approach  
As with Woods’ work, this paper explains the divergence from multilateralism in the 
Roosevelt administration partly by reference to competing factions within the 
government bureaucracy and the differing objectives that they sought to achieve. But 
while this approach is a valid and indeed necessary advance in understanding the 
formulation of policy in the Roosevelt administration, Woods generally adopts a 
bureaucratic politics approach to the exclusion of considering business interests in the 
formulation of policy. In this sense, Woods rejects the primacy of business interests in 
the formulation of foreign policy, which was central to revisionist interpretations of 
the 1960s and 1970s.86 The problem with this approach is that without the central 
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component of the requirements of the US capitalist system the reader is often left 
unsure as to what caused the divergence between different factions of the government 
bureaucracy. Without business interests providing the broad parameters of US 
interests, the assumption is that US policy was dictated solely by the personalities of 
the individuals involved.87 
This paper seeks to avoid this shortcoming and therefore rather than wholly 
follow Woods’ example proceeds from the basis that business interests were indeed 
vital to the formulation of US foreign policy. As such, trade journals, as well as 
government interactions with business interests recorded in official archives, are a 
valuable source in this paper. Rather than seeking to diminish the importance of 
business interests, this paper assumes their importance in the formulation of US 
foreign policy, but also acknowledges that different factions in the government 
bureaucracy were influenced by business interests in different ways. Similarly, the 
business community itself was guided by different motives when it came to assessing 
its interests in different parts of the world. In this sense, the interpretive approach of 
this paper represents a combination of revisionism and bureaucratic politics, making 
use of the most valuable insights from each model.     
Beyond this interpretive approach, the contribution to existing scholarship 
claimed by this paper is in part due to the use of documents previously neglected by 
scholars, and in part due to a new interpretation of documents used previously in 
different contexts. One notable shortcoming of existing studies of Anglo-American 
economic planning during World War II – particularly by US scholars – has been to 
neglect the available British archives. In one sense this archival bias is justified by the 
fact that, given the changing balance of power between the wartime allies, the US was 
the chief protagonist in constructing a new economic world order, whereas Britain’s 
actions were chiefly responsive. However, studying British concerns and policy can 
provide an added depth to our understanding of Anglo-American post-war economic 
planning, lacking in previous studies. More specifically, by exploring the formulation 
of British policy in South America, and British engagement with US economic 
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ambitions in the region, this paper will shed new light on US economic plans in South 
America and Anglo-American post-war economic planning more generally.   
The general approach to research for this paper has been to identify the major 
themes and topics from government documents in the British National Archives, most 
commonly in the Foreign Office’s General Correspondence. While some of these 
documents have been referred to in previous studies, no work has yet been produced 
based on a thorough reading of these documents.88 In this sense, this paper makes use 
of new documentary material in order to make an original contribution to the current 
scholarship. Among the strengths of the Foreign Office’s General Correspondence 
Series is the fact that it contains much correspondence – and therefore the viewpoints 
of – other government departments.89 By making use of these documents, as well as 
those found in the interested departments’ own records, this paper considers the 
differing perspectives of the various government departments involved in the 
formulation of British policy.      
Having identified key issues in the British National Archives, these have been 
further explored, both in the US National Archives and the voluminous collections of 
private papers available in the US. In this way subjects not immediately obvious from 
the US archives – as they are not often explicitly defined as distinct topics in this 
setting – have been explored. By employing this approach, documents previously 
interpreted in one way by US scholars have been re-interpreted through the lens of the 
British archives.  
Beyond State Department documents – mainly those contained in the Central 
Decimal File – this paper also makes use of the documents produced by other 
government agencies. Previous studies have tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
State Department when considering Anglo-American economic planning during 
World War II.90 While this is perhaps appropriate when considering other parts of the 
world, in South America there was a plethora of other agencies that competed with the 
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State Department for control of policy, and therefore influenced the attitude toward 
British interests in the region. Documents produced by the Office of the Coordinator 
for Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), the Export-Import Bank, and other pertinent 
agencies, then, are a vital part of the source material for this paper. By utilising these 
documents from other government agencies, this paper considers the differing 
perspectives within the Roosevelt administration, as with the British government.  
 
The Scope of this Work 
The specific topics explored in this paper are dictated on the one hand by those issues 
which preoccupied British and US officials concerned with South America at the 
time, and on the other by the pertinence of those topics to the broader theme of post-
war economic planning. Most prominently these include the Lend-Lease Export 
White Paper and its effects on British exports to South America; economic warfare 
policies, such as blacklisting and the Axis replacement programme; particular 
industries which had a strategic value, as well as commercial importance, like 
telecommunications; as well as certain enterprises which took on importance beyond 
their intrinsic worth, as they were employed as test cases in Anglo-American relations 
in the region, in particular the central Brazilian railway. All of these issues had a 
contingent, wartime aspect to them. But they are also of relevance to post-war 
economic planning. When interpreting the documents, it is the post-war implications 
of the topics that have been emphasised. In a similar vein, many of the topics explored 
had a strategic or explicitly political aspect to them. While these dimensions have not 
been ignored, it is the economic aspects of the topics that are the focus of this paper.    
What this study certainly does not claim to be is a comprehensive exploration 
of Anglo-American relations in South America in their entirety. Instead, only those 
issues between the two countries in the region that are relevant to the broader process 
of post-war economic planning are considered. This has meant the exclusion of 
several important topics, which while certainly not insignificant, have no real 
relevance to this paper. For example, the extensive diplomacy between the two 
countries concerning the attitude of Argentina toward the Axis powers is only 
addressed tangentially when the topic is relevant to post-war economic planning. 
Neither does this study make any attempt in all but the most superficial sense to 
address the topic from the perspective of the South American countries themselves. 
While there is clearly a danger in this omission of accentuating an image of the South 
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American states merely as pawns in a broader international struggle – which is indeed 
how they were often viewed by the US and Britain – this paper is a study in Anglo-
American relations, and makes no claim to be anything more.91  
The geographic focus of this study is dictated by the realities of the time. 
There was little rivalry between the US and Britain in the Caribbean or in Central 
America, as British interests had, by the time of World War II, largely vacated these 
areas.92 It is for this reason that this paper focuses on South America, as opposed to 
Latin America as a whole. Although geographically located in South America, this 
paper does not include discussion of British Guiana. This omission is justified on the 
basis that to include a British colonial possession in the study would distract from the 
general themes. This decision reflects the exclusion of British Guiana by officials 
involved with South American affairs in both the British and US governments. 
Discussions concerning British Guiana were dealt with by the Colonial Office of the 
British government, and fell within relations with the British Empire when dealt with 
by US officials. 
While primarily a regional study – by which is meant an examination of the 
formulation of policy toward the region as a whole – diplomatic issues and particular 
enterprises in specific countries are addressed in places.93 The majority of these focus 
on the two biggest countries in South America: Argentina and Brazil. This bias is 
reflective of the attention paid by US and British officials to these two countries 
during the war. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Argentina and Brazil 
constituted the largest economies in the region.94 On the other hand, it was in these 
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countries that Britain retained its most significant commercial interests by the time of 
the Second World War.95 It was only natural, then, that these countries should be the 
locus for Anglo-American rivalry. Indeed, competition between the US and Britain in 
these countries to a large extent shaped the policies of both governments toward the 
region as a whole.     
The time period covered by this paper is similarly dictated by 
contemporaneous factors. The fact that US and British officials were free to consider 
post-war issues to a greater extent in South America than in regions directly affected 
by the fighting meant also that post-war issues were considered at a much earlier stage 
in this region. Well before Pearl Harbor, officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
considered the post-war commercial prospects of both Britain and the US. Reflecting 
this fact, this study begins with the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, 
much earlier than most studies of post-war economic planning, which tend to begin 
with the granting of Lend-Lease or the Atlantic Charter declaration some two years 
later.96  
 For similar reasons this study ends at the beginning of 1945, whereas, again, 
most studies of Anglo-American post-war economic planning tend to continue until 
1946 and the granting of a loan by the US to Britain for post-war reconstruction.97 
This earlier conclusion is justified when studying Anglo-American relations in South 
America, as many of the issues that shaped relations between the two countries in the 
region during the war had ceased to have any significant impact by this point in time. 
Similarly, a general shift of focus away from South American affairs had taken place 
by the beginning of 1945. 
 While the war was in progress, however, South America was indeed 
considered an important region for US and British officials concerned with Anglo-
American relations. Moreover, the issues that arose in this region have a direct 
bearing on the broader wartime theme of post-war economic planning. Studying 
Anglo-American relations in South America will therefore contribute toward a greater 
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understanding of the process of economic planning carried by the wartime allies. This 
goal is a worthwhile endeavour, given that it is still, to a great extent, the negotiations 
carried out during the Second World War that shaped the world in which we live 
today.   
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Chapter 2 
 
US Criticisms and British Mollification 
(Autumn 1939 – Winter 1941-1942) 
 
During the period when the US was officially neutral there was substantial criticism 
of British trade practices in South America from a variety of sources both within the 
Roosevelt administration and in the US political and corporate establishment. The 
recurring theme of this criticism was that Britain was following policies ostensibly 
aimed at advancing the Allied war effort that in fact harmed US commercial interests 
in South America, while advancing Britain’s own. This criticism took a number of 
forms, each relating to the policies exercised by Britain toward South America. 
British censorship in the Western Hemisphere; measures of economic warfare, such as 
blacklisting; and Britain’s export policy toward the region, particularly following the 
advent of the Lend-Lease bill, were all policies that elicited criticism from within the 
US.     
These criticisms were not without foundation. It was always a long-term aim 
of the British government to retain commercial footholds in the region, and the 
distinction between attaining this goal and pursuing policies of more immediate 
concern in the region were not always clearly defined. But while on one level the 
criticisms of Britain in South America were a legitimate response to British 
connivance in the region, various groups within the US inflated these criticisms to 
advance their own agendas. The US business community sought to defend its long-
term interests in South America, and saw in criticism of Britain in the region, an 
opportunity to reduce their major competitor’s standing. Anglophobes in Congress 
sought to draw attention to British misdeeds in South America in order to try to 
pressurise the Roosevelt administration into taking a tougher stance toward British 
interests in the region. In addition, influential officials within the Roosevelt 
administration focused on Latin America regarded British commercial activities in 
South America as an intrusion into their territory and sought to minimise British 
influence in the area. Combined, these groups represented early indications from 
within the US political establishment of a wish to exclude Britain from South America 
in the post-war period. 
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Others in the US harboured no such ambition and were far more sympathetic 
toward Britain. Roosevelt and those closest to him generally accepted that the 
criticisms against the British were largely exaggerated for ulterior motives. However, 
this did not mean that they were willing to ignore the accusations. On the contrary, 
they viewed such criticisms as a dangerous threat to their central policy in this period 
of aiding the Allies while remaining officially neutral. Consequently, they were 
willing to allow elements hostile toward Britain to take prominence with regard to 
South America in order to maintain control over the core elements of US foreign 
policy. Moreover, they encouraged Britain to placate those elements in South America 
that were seeking to exclude British interests from the region.  
Many in the British government were loath to do this and the Board of Trade 
in particular sought to retain British interests in South America, regardless of the 
effect on relations with the US. However, defence of Britain’s economic interests in 
South America in this period was overshadowed by the imperatives of Anglo-
American relations. During the opening months of the war this largely took the form 
of a necessary respect for US neutrality. Following May 1940, when Churchill came 
to power, winning the goodwill of the Roosevelt administration became an overriding 
aim of the British government. Such a goal was deemed necessary not only to achieve 
Churchill’s long-term ambition of bringing the US into the war on the side of the 
Allies, but also to facilitate more immediate US aid and cooperation, which was vital 
to the British war effort.  
As criticisms of British trade practices in South America became an 
increasingly prominent political issue in the US they were consequently viewed as a 
threat to ensuring the benevolence of the Roosevelt administration. The British 
government therefore took a variety of steps to pacify US criticisms of British 
commercial activities in South America. The result of these efforts was a contraction 
of British economic interests in the region. In this sense, this chapter shows that 
factions within the US were successful in partially excluding British interests from 
South America in the period prior to US entry into the war.  
 
Early Exclusionary Elements 
When Latin America has been addressed in previous discussions of US policy during 
the period of neutrality it has usually been presented as an arena in which 
internationalist principles were advanced. In this sense US policy in Latin America 
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prior to Pearl Harbor acted as a precursor to the broader embrace of internationalism 
following US entry into the war.1 But while this may have been true in the political 
domain, when viewed through the prism of economic concerns – and more 
particularly, the attitude toward British interests in South America – US policy toward 
Latin America in this period was shaped in large part by exclusionary elements. 
  One source of this exclusionary sentiment was the anti-interventionists seeking 
to keep the US out of the war. In response to the spread of Nazism in Europe, this 
group advocated the creation of a closed economic bloc in the Western Hemisphere, 
which would free the US from any dependency on trade with Europe.2 This, anti-
interventionists believed, would both lessen the chances of the US being drawn into 
the European conflict and compensate for the loss of trade brought about by the war.3 
Such autarky in the Western Hemisphere would be necessary, moreover, regardless of 
the outcome of the war in Europe. If Germany were triumphant, the Nazi regime 
would doubtless create a closed trading bloc in Europe, which would necessitate a 
competing bloc in the Western Hemisphere. If the Allies won, on the other hand, it 
was widely predicted that this would not happen for many years, again making self-
sufficiency in the Western Hemisphere at least a temporary requirement.4   
 Such sentiments were not however confined to anti-interventionists. The 
Council on Foreign Relations was the leading foreign policy think tank in the US and 
generally internationalist in its outlook and supportive of US intervention in the war.5 
However, given the likely prospect of a Nazi victory in the summer of 1940, the 
council produced a detailed report on the trade of the Western Hemisphere and the 
implications of implementing a “Pan-American Trade Bloc”.6 Similarly 
interventionist in outlook was the Foreign Service officer George S. Messersmith.7 
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Messersmith had gained first-hand experience of Nazi Germany while serving in the 
US consulate in Berlin in the early 1930s. Writing to the State Department in June 
1940 from his new post in Cuba, Messersmith cautioned that “unless we build … a 
wall around the Western Hemisphere as Germany will build around … Europe, … our 
principle measure of defence will be gone”. Expanding on this, Messersmith 
counselled that it was necessary “to work out a system through which the American 
States will act as an economic unit” if US security from the war in Europe were to be 
ensured.8 Such avocations to take measures to defend the Western Hemisphere from 
the war in Europe were indeed heeded by the Roosevelt administration.          
An early, relatively subtle means of excluding European interests from Latin 
America was demonstrated by the Export-Import Bank. Loans to aid development in 
Latin American countries more often that not came with strings attached to ensure that 
the contracts funded by the loans went to US companies, where previously they may 
have gone to German and Italian ones.9 German commerce with Latin America, in 
particular, was viewed as a serious threat to hemispheric security. Following an 
intensive trade drive in the region throughout the 1930s, Germany supplied 16 percent 
of South America’s imports and received 9 percent of its exports during 1936 and 
1937.10   
But while the motivation behind the Export-Import Bank’s loans may have 
been the threat posed by the Axis powers in Latin America, the loans failed to 
differentiate between these countries and European nations generally. US officials 
were well aware of the exclusionary ramifications of the loans. However, in a memo 
written for Harry Dexter White, the official in charge of international economic affairs 
in the Treasury, the exclusionary tendencies were rationalised. “It would be politically 
unwise”, explained the memo, “to allow American capital to be used to the detriment 
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of American exporters”.11 So while the loans may have been a blunt instrument that 
would exclude European interests from Latin America, they were a necessary evil.  
A far more direct attack upon British interests in South America came in 1940 
during discussions over the granting of aid to Britain in order to facilitate continued 
munitions purchases. By the summer of this year Britain had already sold much of its 
overseas assets in order to generate much-needed liquidity.12 It was in this context that 
Sir Frederick Phillips, representing the British Treasury, visited Washington in July 
1940 to discuss the granting of aid with US officials. But while many in the Roosevelt 
administration were sympathetic to this request there was also widespread suspicion 
that Britain was overstating the scarcity of its reserves.13 In particular, US officials 
believed that British assets in South America – most prominently in Argentina – could 
be sold before aid from the US would be necessary.14 When Roosevelt met Phillips on 
17 July he made this suggestion bluntly. “How about selling some of these securities 
you have in the Argentine?” the President asked.15  
Requests such as this continued in the months that followed, and in the autumn 
of 1940 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, informed the Foreign 
Office that prior to any aid being granted, proof that British assets in South America 
had in fact been exhausted would be needed.16 The Roosevelt administration often 
justified this hard-line stance as necessary to ensure Congressional support for any 
legislation granting aid to Britain.17 While there was undoubtedly some truth in this 
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reasoning, the targeting of British interests in South America as a precondition to 
Britain receiving US aid was also representative of exclusionary tendencies within the 
Roosevelt administration. In a memorandum prepared for Roosevelt in November 
1940 it was suggested that the US acquire Britain’s South American assets in return 
for any possible aid.18 Similarly, in a deal proposed by CIAA, British assets in 
Argentina would be transferred to US control in exchange for aid. “There are some 
good properties in the British portfolio”, noted the CIAA memo, “and we might well 
pick them up now”.19 
The presence of exclusionary tendencies within the administration was again 
confirmed following the eventual granting of US aid to Britain in the form of Lend-
Lease in March 1941. An early suggestion as to how Britain should repay the aid 
granted by the US was for British assets in South America to be transferred to US 
ownership. Eventually this suggestion was abandoned, given that the Latin American 
experts in the State Department believed that the trend toward nationalisation in the 
region would make ownership of the British assets more trouble than they were 
worth.20 But nevertheless, the fact that such a proposal was seriously discussed is 
indicative of the exclusionary elements within the Roosevelt administration during 
this period.  
Cumulatively, the presence of such exclusionary elements in the US during the 
period prior to US entry into the war offers an alternative picture of the region to that 
presented by previous studies. Moreover, these elements constituted the source of 
criticism of British activities in the South America in the era of US neutrality.    
 
British Censorship 
Criticisms of British trade practices in South America first came to the fore via 
Britain’s colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Pan-American Airlines 
used these strategically placed islands as refuelling stations when carrying 
international mail. Since the outbreak of war Britain had been examining letters and 
parcels from the US to Germany carried by these planes, in the hope of gaining 
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military intelligence and intercepting contraband.21 This practice was the occasion for 
much criticism. Inspection of US mail touched a sensitive nerve in the country’s 
political tradition, inciting fears of an infringement upon individual privacy rights. For 
this reason Britain agreed to cease censorship of US mail in the British West Indies in 
October 1939.22  
Meanwhile, censorship of US mail by the British authorities continued on the 
North Atlantic island of Bermuda, where US planes and ships stopped en route to 
Europe. This ensured that the criticisms from the US continued.23 On 2 January 1940 
Hull issued an official protest to Britain, claiming that the examination of US mail at 
Bermuda violated the Hague convention of 1907 concerning the right of capture in 
naval warfare. The State Department and the Foreign Office eventually agreed to 
disagree on their respective interpretation of international law regarding this matter 
and cooperated in measures to ensure that British censorship caused as little 
disruption to US correspondents as possible.24  
However, in February Senator Melvin J. Mass (Rep.-Minn.) made far more 
sinister accusations against the British. The real reason Britain was examining US 
correspondence with Europe, Mass claimed, was to steal cost data and other business 
information contained in commercial correspondence. This, Mass contended, would 
allow British firms to undercut their US competitors.25 No evidence was ever 
produced to substantiate these claims, but the British government was well aware of 
the potential danger such allegations presented to relations with the US.26 It was with 
these concerns in mind that Sir John Reith, the Minister of Information, publicly 
repudiated the allegations. During a session of Parliament on 4 March 1940 Reith 
stated unequivocally that the allegations of British abuse of censorship for commercial 
gain had “no foundation in fact”.27 For a while the Foreign Office considered going 
beyond these verbal denials and inviting a US official to observe British censorship at 
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Bermuda, in the hope that this would quieten accusations of British abuse of the 
process.28 This idea never came to fruition, and while Britain was clearly not 
indifferent to the criticisms emanating from the US, by the spring of 1940 concern 
over this criticism was overshadowed by evidence of German circumvention of 
censorship in the Western Hemisphere.  
British officials had become increasingly aware by this time that Germany was 
actively taking advantage of the lack of censorship on the British-ruled West Indian 
island of Trinidad in order to escape the censors at Bermuda. In particular, it was 
believed mail and contraband were being sent via Trinidad from the US to Brazil 
where they could be flown by Italian-owned airlines to Europe. This view was re-
enforced by a report that the German government had informed its officials abroad 
that Trinidad could be considered a safe route for correspondence to pass through. 
Given that Britain had no hope of getting the Italian airlines to submit to British 
censorship, the only way to intercept the suspected traffic in correspondence and 
contraband was to re-instate censorship in Trinidad and examine the contents being 
carried between the US and South America by Pan-American Airlines.29 
Arguing that “an organised traffic in contraband” between the Western 
Hemisphere and Germany had created a new set of circumstances, Lothian requested 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles’ support for the restoration of British 
censorship in Trinidad in June 1940.30 Unwilling to give an immediate reply, Welles 
foretold the kind of criticism likely to be provoked by British examination of US 
correspondence with South America. Based on past experience, he predicted that the 
process would “raise the gravest kind of disquiet in the United States on the ground 
that the British authorities censoring American mail would utilize trade secrets to the 
detriment of United States commerce with the other American republics”.31  
Such a forewarning of criticisms from the US caused the British government 
to maintain its ban on censorship in Trinidad for the time being. However, the British 
belief that the island was being used to facilitate correspondence between Germany 
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and its allies continued to increase, as advertisements in the US press openly offered 
to send mail to Germany via South America, thereby escaping the British censors.32 It 
was such blatant circumvention of British censorship that Lord Halifax, the new 
British ambassador in Washington, sought to impress upon Hull during a meeting on 
31 March 1941. Britain had “refrained for as long as possible from examining mail 
transiting Trinidad”, stated Halifax, but it was now of “vital necessity” to the British 
war effort to resume censorship of inter-American mail.33  
 
John Bull’s Wandering Eyes 
Unsurprisingly, the criticisms foretold by Welles did indeed transpire. Initially the 
principal complaint against British censorship in Trinidad was that it severely delayed 
the passage of commercial correspondence between US export firms and their South 
American clients. As a US survey of South American industry in May 1941 reported, 
inter-American correspondence that should normally take five days could now take up 
to two weeks. Such delays, the author commented, did nothing to “help the South 
Americans love us”.34  
The Foreign Office sought to counter these criticisms by detailing cases to the 
State Department where the delay to the passage of mail had occurred not at Trinidad, 
but at a later stage of the carrier’s journey to South America. The British censors in 
Trinidad, London claimed, worked throughout the night while planes stopped over, in 
order that in most cases no delay was caused at all. While accepting that short delays 
of three days may be inevitable in some cases, the Foreign Office sought to reassure 
the State Department that the British censors in Trinidad were alive to the importance 
of performing “their task with the least possible inconvenience to correspondents or 
delay to mail services”.35      
But the criticisms of British censorship became more cutting as the year went 
on. In July the Chicago Tribune, a leading organ of anti-British sentiment, reported a 
story of a Montevideo-based firm that had negotiated the purchase of firebricks from a 
US company. Following negotiations for the sale, the representative of the US firm 
sent an airmail to his head office. Three days later the Uruguayan company was 
apparently approached by the Commercial Secretary of the British embassy in 
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Montevideo offering the services of British firms to fulfil the order sought in the US. 
The US representative later claimed to have discovered that the British censors in 
Trinidad had intercepted his correspondence and forthwith passed it on to the British 
embassy in Uruguay in order to try to promote British commercial interests.36  
US business backed up these allegations. In September Clarence Wisely of 
National City Bank complained to the State Department that US business 
correspondence with South America was regularly delayed by several weeks in 
reaching its intended recipient. Such a delay indicated, so he believed, that the letters 
had been intercepted by the British censors in Trinidad and sent to London for the 
information of the British government.37  
Anglophobes in Congress latched on to these allegations and ensured that the 
criticisms of British censorship continued into the autumn of 1941.38 In November, 
following a tour of South America, Everett M. Dirksen (Rep.-Ill.) accused British 
censors of seizing US money en route to South America. Perhaps less scurrilous, but 
of more importance, Dirksen contested that the British censors were copying US 
commercial correspondence and passing it on to British industry in order to aid their 
competition with US business in the region. “If a South American sends an order to 
New York”, stated Dirksen, “the British are immediately aware of it”. He went on to 
claim that “in many cases British salesmen are sent to the writer of the letter in an 
effort to induce him to make the order in Britain rather than in the United States”.39 
No solid evidence to suggest that British censors in Trinidad were indeed 
using their access to US-South American commercial correspondence for the 
advantage of British private interests was ever produced. So while the criticisms 
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fuelled suspicion of British trade practices in the region, the issue never became a 
serious factor in the diplomacy between the US and Britain concerning South 
America. The same cannot be said of the major plank of British economic warfare 
policy in South America during this period: blacklisting.  
 
Defining British Blacklisting Policy  
Announced in 1939 as part of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the British statutory 
list was an inventory of companies and individuals deemed an asset to Nazi Germany. 
By barring British firms from trading with concerns on the list the aim was to harm 
Germany’s economy and thereby advance the Allied war effort.40 Since its conception 
the British embassy in Washington had been encouraging US authorities to follow its 
lead in South America and ban US traders from doing business with firms on the 
British statutory list.41 However, while the State Department, along with CIAA, did 
advise US firms against trading with ‘anti-American’ concerns in South America, 
adherence to this advice remained voluntary.42 On the whole, then, British hopes that 
the US would mirror its blacklisting policy in the region went largely unfulfilled until 
the summer of 1941.43  
 In light of this failure the British Board of Trade tended to adopt a ‘go slow’ 
attitude toward blacklisting in South America. The logic behind this was that if the 
British blacklisted a firm without parallel action from the US, the effect would be 
simply to divert the business away from Britain and into the arms of their US 
competitors.44 For a while the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) protested 
against the board’s attitude, arguing that they were putting commercial concerns 
ahead of wartime needs. In reply the Board of Trade pointed out that the export trade 
was itself a vital component of the war effort, in terms of generating much needed 
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revenue to purchase supplies.45 Eventually, British government departments 
converged their policy toward blacklisting in South America by way of a test case in 
Venezuela.  
Imports to this country were controlled by a group of large concerns, known 
collectively as the ‘big five’.46 The two most powerful of these firms, Gustavo Zingg 
& Co. and Blohm & Co., were German-owned and widely believed to have 
connections with, and sympathies toward, the Nazi regime.47 On this basis MEW 
advocated their inclusion on the statutory list.48 The Board of Trade, on the other 
hand, argued that to put them on the statutory list would only divert their business to 
the US. Until the US authorities instigated a parallel blacklist to operate alongside 
Britain’s in South America, severing British trade with the Venezuelan companies 
would merely harm British commerce without achieving any commensurate damage 
to Germany.49 In an inter-departmental meeting held in April 1941 the Board of 
Trade’s view won out. So long as US companies were free to trade with the ‘big five’ 
in Venezuela, the British government would allow British firms to trade with them 
also. 50  
The dilemma faced by the British authorities in Venezuela, noted one Board of 
Trade official, had raised “a political question of the first importance”.51 The 
conclusion reached concerning this country – and more importantly the reasoning 
behind that conclusion – would therefore provide a template to guide future British 
blacklisting policy in South America. As Lord Farrer of MEW explained to the British 
embassy in Washington, “in placing before the State Department … the case of 
Venezuela, you should I suggest, indicate that exactly similar problems, although 
usually in a less acute form, arise throughout Latin America”.52 British policy, then, as 
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defined by this case, would be to refrain from blacklisting hostile concerns when such 
action would cause greater harm to British commerce than that which it would inflict 
upon the enemy. So while the advancement of British private interests was clearly a 
factor in British blacklisting policy, their importance in raising revenue needed for 
wartime purchases meant that the promotion of such interests could not be wholly 
separated from the war effort. In this sense it was not so much that the British 
government was seeking to advance private British interests at the expense of the war 
effort, but that it saw the two goals as mutually compatible.53  
 
The Grey Edges of Blacklisting 
Problems arose when this policy was pursued in conjunction with the attempts of the 
British embassy in Washington to convince the State Department to force US 
companies to stop trading with pro-Axis companies in South America. Americans 
correctly charged Britain with advocating a tough blacklisting regime for US firms, 
while operating a lenient policy for its own concerns. Whereas British officials 
believed this policy was the only one available to them until their blacklisting efforts 
were mirrored by the US authorities, many Americans interpreted British blacklisting 
policy as a cloak with which to dupe them into losing out to Britain in the realm of 
South American trade.54  
Such suspicions were not altogether new. Spruille Braden had long been 
involved in the commercial and political affairs of Latin America. Originally gaining 
experience of the region while working for his father’s Chilean-based copper 
company, he went on to be appointed ambassador to Colombia in 1939.55 One of 
Braden’s first forays into public affairs was his service on the Allied Commercial 
Committee in Chile during World War I. This body was charged with administration 
of the blacklist in South America. Reflecting on this experience many years later, 
Braden recalled how the British delegates on the committee were “more dedicated to 
their commerce than to winning the war”. Whether this was the product of a failure to 
comprehend the new realities of total warfare, or the result of a traditional dependence 
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on foreign trade, Braden’s early experience of the British in South America convinced 
him that they were “a nation of merchants” to be constantly viewed with suspicion.56      
Braden’s knowledge of blacklisting in South America gained during World 
War I made him an obvious candidate to take responsibility for the role when war 
once again broke out in Europe in 1939.57 Operating from his post in Colombia, 
Braden subsequently took on primary responsibility for the application of blacklisting 
matters on the ground in South America. In his new post Braden retained the same 
suspicions of British involvement in these affairs that he had first acquired during 
World War I.58 Braden believed that whereas US officials operated the blacklist in a 
wholly patriotic and altruistic manner, the British “appeared to regard the black list as 
a way to eliminate competitors and to favour clients they might later want to sell 
[to]”.59  
Many other Americans shared Braden’s views. In late 1940 and early 1941 the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported a number of instances of British 
companies failing to adhere to the statutory list, while British officials in Washington 
simultaneously advocated a US boycott of the companies blacklisted by Britain.60  
Reports such as these made it difficult for British officials coordinating 
economic warfare in Washington to gain the support of the US authorities for a 
tougher blacklisting policy in South America. In December 1940 Warren F. Pierson, 
President of the Export-Import Bank, informed British officials of his willingness to 
coerce US firms in to breaking connections with companies on the British statutory 
list. However, this eagerness was diminished, Pierson stated, by the perceived 
leniency of the British government in its own blacklisting policy.61  
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The Washington embassy was keen to gain Pierson’s support and therefore 
advised MEW to at least take action against the more flagrant instances of non-
compliance with the blacklist by British companies in South America. Along these 
lines they suggested that MEW prevent the British rubber giant, Dunlop, from 
employing agents in South America with links to the Nazi regime. Enlisting Pierson’s 
support for the blacklist in South America, they noted, would be made all the more 
harder if “our hands are not clean as regards British firms, and important British firms 
in particular”.62 These arguments did not fall entirely on deaf ears in London. Indeed, 
the Colombian-based agents of Dunlop were subsequently placed on the statutory list 
following the appeals of the Washington embassy.63 But on the whole, the consensus 
in London by the end of 1940 remained that without gaining parallel action from the 
US, a more stringent blacklisting policy in South America would only act to harm 
British commercial interests without substantially advancing the war effort.  
It was again with reference to Dunlop that the different prerogatives of MEW 
and the British embassy in Washington were starkly highlighted. MEW had 
approached the embassy about getting a South American firm removed from the 
statutory list so that Dunlop could resume trade with them. Replying to this request in 
May 1941, the British embassy noted that while the opportunity for Dunlop to sell “a 
good many tyres” was not wholly irrelevant, it was “not an argument which would 
carry much weight” in the US. To the contrary, to pursue such an argument with the 
US authorities, the embassy went on, “would in fact do infinite damage for it would 
confirm an impression which is already about that we use the Statutory List for our 
own trade purposes and not necessarily for damaging Germany”. Emphasising the fact 
that “this particular line is the one about which the Americans are more suspicious 
than any other”, the Washington embassy concluded by stating bluntly that “the whole 
of this question is just dynamite”.64      
British embassies in South America were similarly cautionary in warning 
MEW that Britain’s blacklisting policy in the region was eliciting harsh criticism from 
their US counterparts. The US embassy in Caracas, reported the British ambassador to 
                                               
62
 Washington to Foreign Office, 4 Dec. 1940, FO371/28740/W1896, TNA. 
63
 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol.2, p.33. 
64
 Washington to MEW, 21 May 1941, MEW Records, FO837
  
 
49
Venezuela, neither understands nor approves of British blacklisting policy in the 
country, but views it as “purely mercenary”.65 
 
Berger & Co. 
One case that elicited particularly intense criticism of British blacklisting policy 
involved the Buenos Aires-based firm, Curt Berger & Co. It is worth examining the 
case of Berger and Co. in Argentina in some detail, as it sheds light both on US 
criticisms of British blacklisting policy in South America and on the gradual change 
in the British response to this censure. Berger & Co. was originally a German 
company, but was registered as an Argentine concern in 1937.66 During the inter-war 
years the leading directors of the firm gained Argentine citizenship and largely 
divested the company of its German connections.67 However, having been included on 
the blacklist operated by the British in the First World War, the company again 
appeared on the statutory list when war broke out in 1939.68  
Immediately after the British announced the statutory list, British companies 
that had previously conducted trade with Berger & Co. began petitioning government 
departments to remove the ban on trading with the firm. They argued that trade with 
the concern was of great value to British industry and blacklisting it would do more 
harm to British industry than any damage that might be inflicted upon Germany.69 
These arguments were backed up by a protest from the Argentine government that the 
company could no longer be fairly described as an asset to Germany and its inclusion 
on the statutory list was therefore unjustified.70  
Initially the Board of Trade was discouraging as to the likelihood of removing 
Berger & Co. from the statutory list. Taking such a step, the board argued, would 
undermine attempts to secure the cessation of trade with enemy firms by neutral 
countries, such as the US.71 However, as British companies persisted in making the 
case that blacklisting Berger & Co. was seriously harming British industry, 
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government departments began to change their attitude.72 Eventually Whitehall 
accepted these arguments and the inter-departmental blacklist committee approved the 
removal of Berger & Co. from the statutory list in January 1941.73 “It seems clear”, 
the committee concluded, “that to treat … Berger as an enemy would damage us more 
than the enemy”.74 The decision was taken, then, both “in the interests of British 
trade” and with a view to advancing the war effort.75  
Having originally been placed on the British statutory list, the firm was one of 
the concerns that the State Department had advised US companies against trading 
with. It was not surprising, then, that news that the British authorities had removed 
Berger & Co. from the statutory list for the benefit of private interests caused a 
barrage of criticism from US business interests in Argentina.76 They were “so 
convinced of German control of the firm” reported the British embassy in Buenos 
Aires, that nothing but returning Berger & Co. to the statutory list could “persuade 
them that the list cannot be manipulated to our advantage when required”.77 The 
removal of the firm from the statutory list also drew criticism from the State 
Department. They argued that the move only undermined their attempts to convince 
US companies not to trade with firms deemed an asset to Germany.78  
These criticisms increasingly highlighted the residual differences between the 
Board of Trade and MEW. The Board of Trade continued to assert the importance of 
Berger & Co. to British industry and surmised that to re-list the firm would only 
divert that trade to US companies, losing Britain “many thousands of pounds of 
valuable exchange”.79  MEW, on the other hand, argued that criticisms from the US, 
elicited by the removal of Berger & Co. from the statutory list, hampered efforts 
aimed at winning US cooperation in blacklisting matters. As one MEW official put it, 
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the suspicion that Britain was using blacklisting for its “own trade purposes” could 
“seriously jeopardise our growing prospects of cooperation from” the US 
government.80 
In June 1941 the criticisms from US business concerning the case were 
reported by the New York Times. In this version of the story the British government 
had removed the company from the statutory list solely in order to provide British 
companies the opportunity to fulfil a large order for printing equipment.81 In August, 
following this “temporary accommodation” by the British authorities, it was reported 
that Berger & Co. had subsequently been reinstated on the statutory list. US traders 
were motivated in their complaints over such apparent connivance on the part of the 
British company and authorities, the story asserted, not by Anglophobic political bias, 
but solely by commercial considerations.82  
When the accusations that the British had removed Berger & Co. from the 
blacklist for commercial reasons became public this tilted the internal debate within 
the British government in favour of MEW and those who advocated re-listing the 
firm.83 Berger & Co. was subsequently returned to the blacklist, then, not on the basis 
of any aid the firm might provide to Germany, but to appease the criticisms from the 
US. While this decision may have been detrimental to British commercial interests in 
South America, concluded the blacklist committee on 10 July 1941, the need to 
quieten criticism of British trade practices from the US now outweighed this 
consideration.84  
 
Coordinating Blacklisting Policy  
Remaining criticisms of British blacklisting policy in South America were further 
quietened when Roosevelt announced a US blacklist to operate in Latin America on 
17 July 1941.85 This went some way toward aligning US and British goals in the 
region and therefore removed the basis of previous criticisms. However, there 
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remained a number of firms on the British statutory list that were not on the US 
proclaimed list. MEW believed that inclusion of a firm on the British statutory list 
should prima facie be reason for the US authorities to add the firm to the proclaimed 
list.86 But the US authorities continued to insist on freedom of action in compiling 
their own blacklist.87 
Moreover, greater discrepancies between the two lists existed where firms 
were included on the US proclaimed list, but were absent from the British statutory 
list. This created the impression that the US government was enforcing a much stricter 
blacklisting policy in South America than were the British.88 In August Dean G. 
Acheson, US Assistant Secretary of State, highlighted this concern in a meeting with 
Halifax. The State Department was anxious to know, stated Acheson, what steps were 
being taken by the British authorities to discourage British traders from doing 
business with firms included on the US proclaimed list, but absent from the British 
statutory list.89 Wisely of the National City Bank put things more bluntly when 
expressing the frustration of US business, telling Christian M. Ravndal, Chief of the 
Division of Exports and Requirements in the State Department, that “the Americans 
are trying to be more British than the British” in the application of the blacklists in 
South America.90  
There was no denying that once the US set upon a course of blacklisting in 
South America, it was vigorous in its execution of the policy. If the British continued 
to be more lenient in their parallel enforcement of blacklisting, they would indeed be 
putting US commerce at a disadvantage. In order to prevent the issue becoming a 
danger to securing US goodwill, it was therefore necessary, as one British diplomat 
put it, to “stifle incipient criticism that we are not prepared to go as far as the United 
States in listing enemy firms”.91 The British government took concrete steps toward 
achieving this goal by coordinating the two government’s blacklists. This would 
remove any grounds for the charge that Britain was not applying blacklisting policy in 
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South America with the same enthusiasm as the US.92 This process finally came to 
fruition in October 1941 when the British agreed to add all firms on the US 
proclaimed list to the British statutory list.93        
Further evidence of British attempts to quell US criticisms is revealed in the 
attitude taken toward enemy firms once they had been blacklisted. The crux of US 
criticisms concerning British blacklisting was that the policy was being used to 
advance British commercial interests in the region at the expense of US commerce. 
The British sought to counter this claim by ensuring that British commercial interests 
were not seen to benefit from blacklisting. As one MEW official put it, the British 
were always “careful in using the statutory list, particularly in Latin America, to 
avoid, wherever possible, the accusation that we were using a legitimate wartime 
weapon in order to benefit our peace-time commercial interests”.94  
This attitude was manifested by the government’s action regarding the ‘big 
five’ Venezuelan-based German firms once they had been placed on the statutory list. 
Based on previous experience, MEW believed that the Venezuelan government could 
be persuaded either to nationalise the firms or to transfer their business to existing 
friendly concerns. The only firms of sufficient standing in the country that would be 
able to take on the business of the blacklisted concerns were a Dutch firm and a 
British company, Boulton & Co. However, the Foreign Office advised against 
encouraging the Venezuelans to award the business to the British firm in order to 
avoid criticism from within the US that blacklisting was advancing the interests of 
British companies in South America.95 In this way the Foreign Office sought to 
sacrifice British commercial interests for the sake of avoiding further US criticisms.  
The British attempts at placating US criticisms of its blacklisting policy in 
South America were reasonably successful and a degree of cooperation between the 
two countries in the prosecution of economic warfare against Nazi interests in the 
region was evident by the summer of 1941.96 However, by this time, US criticisms 
regarding blacklisting had been usurped by new concerns over British use of Lend-
Lease materials in South America.     
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Abusing the Sprit of Lend-Lease 
The Lend-Lease Act, passed by Congress on 11 March 1941, represented a huge 
victory for the Roosevelt administration in its attempts to provide greater assistance to 
the British war effort.97 However, the aid also had the paradoxical effect of 
intensifying the criticisms of British trade practices in South America. Britain’s export 
trade to the region had previously been justified as a wartime necessity on the basis 
that it generated revenue to purchase war supplies. Once the US was supplying aid to 
Britain the country’s need to retain an export trade in South America was seemingly 
removed in the eyes of many Americans. However, Britain did still continue to export 
a limited amount of goods to South America following the passage of Lend-Lease. 
This was deemed necessary both to acquire materials not readily available from the 
US and to retain established British markets in the region. When British exports did 
arrive in South America following the passage of the Lend-Lease bill they elicited 
fierce criticisms from within the US.  
These criticisms originally came from US businessmen based in South 
America who accused Britain of re-exporting materials received under Lend-Lease in 
order that British firms might compete with their US counterparts in the region.98 In 
particular, US manufacturing firms claimed that their British rivals were shipping 
steel products to South America, obtained under the Lend-Lease programme.99 In a 
variation of this allegation, Britain was accused of substituting materials supplied 
under Lend-Lease in order to free up exports to South America that would otherwise 
have been used for war purposes.100 Such use of Lend-Lease for commercial gain, 
rather than the intended purpose of contributing to the war effort, was obviously 
deemed misuse of the aid.101  
 But beyond viewing such practices as an abuse of the spirit of the Lend-Lease, 
US business also held far more self-interested concerns over British exports to South 
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America. Throughout 1941 the US economy was gradually converted to war 
production. This entailed the creation of a number of government agencies, including 
the Office of Production Management in January and the Supply Priorities and 
Allocations Board in August. These agencies controlled access to strategically 
important raw materials and issued export licenses.102 Partly as a result of 
organisational flaws in these agencies, US exporters increasingly found it difficult to 
obtain the raw materials and export licenses necessary to supply the South American 
market.103 Moreover, in April Roosevelt issued an Executive Order recommending 
priority treatment for strategically vital goods to Latin America.104 US exporters 
wishing to provide the market with consumer goods, therefore, were at a distinct 
disadvantage. At the same time, they believed the same restrictions were not being 
applied to British traders, allowing them to undercut the US export trade in the 
region.105 
While the majority of US business may have been happy to contribute to the 
Allied war effort, the impression that those efforts were being abused by the British to 
gain commercial ground in South America at the expense of their own interests was 
clearly a cause for concern. One anecdote that became notorious in business circles in 
Colombia told how a representative of the renowned US company, International 
General Electric, received a request for a large motor base but lost the sale on account 
of not being able to promise delivery within a reasonable period. Subsequently, a 
British firm gained the order and shipped the product to the Colombian customer. 
When it arrived at the port and was unpacked, it was marked: “Made in the United 
States”.106  
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While many stories such as this one were no doubt embellished for dramatic 
effect, they did betray a real concern on the part of US exporters in South America, 
fuelled by the continuing flow of British exports to the region following the passage 
of the Lend-Lease bill. US officials in the region shared this concern. Vernon L. 
Fluharty, the US Vice Consul in the Medellín region of Colombia, reported his belief 
that British manufacturers were supplying the South American market with goods that 
US exporters were barred from exporting. The unfortunate consequence of this 
situation was to engender on the part of local customers, a “deep resentment toward 
the United States”, while Britain developed a “strong commercial sympathy for 
herself”. In the longer-term Fluharty feared that “this resentment may well result, 
upon the termination of the war, in a certain loss of American trade, with a 
corresponding gain for English commerce”.107  
 
The Climax of US Criticism 
The accusations relating to Britain’s alleged abuse of Lend-Lease in South America is 
the facet of US criticisms of British trade practices in the region that has received the 
most attention in the existing literature.108 But while usually viewed solely through the 
prism of the debates over Lend-Lease, these attacks on Britain were in fact the climax 
of a concerted censure of British activities in South America.  
These accusations began circulating publicly in the summer of 1941. 
Following a seven-week tour of South America James S. Kemper, former president of 
the US Chamber of Commerce, reported his findings. Kemper believed that while the 
US was pouring all its industrial efforts into war production, the British, on the other 
hand, were “pursuing business vigorously wherever it could be found in this country’s 
neighbor nations to the South”.109 The influential National Research Council 
pronounced a similar verdict following a two-month tour investigating South 
American industry. Summarising the mission’s findings, Dr. Harold Vagtborg 
delivered a damming verdict on the conduct of British traders in the region. “There 
can be no doubt”, he claimed, “that … British trade are doing all possible to maintain 
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old and seize new customers in South America regardless of how this affects the 
United States”. While the US had sought to assist Britain in its war effort, war had 
seemingly done nothing to temper traditional British avarice. “The spirit of English 
businessmen”, suggested Vagtborg, “has not changed a whit”.110  
Embittered opponents of the Lend-Lease bill focused on this issue in order to 
try to discredit Lend-Lease, following their failure to defeat the granting of aid to 
Britain. The Chicago Tribune, which had campaigned against Lend-Lease, concluded 
from reports of British misuse of the aid that “American commerce with South 
America is suffering severely”, while “English export houses are giving American 
firms the stiffest sort of competition”.111 Criticisms of Britain in South America also 
found political representation in Congress. James Francis O’Connor (Dem.-Mont.), a 
long-time Anglophobe, took up the cause in July when he introduced a resolution into 
the House of Representatives calling for an investigation into British trade practices in 
South America.112 Employing colourful language, O’Connor depicted the British 
“stooping to a practice beneath the cheapest double-dealing that is capable of being 
imagined”.113  
That the Chicago Tribune and Congressmen like O’Connor would latch onto 
British trade activities in South America as another stick with which to beat Britain is 
unsurprising.114 More concerning for British officials, though, was the way in which 
elements usually sympathetic to Britain and US intervention in the war joined the 
chorus berating Britain for its perceived misuse of Lend-Lease in South America. In 
July the generally Anglophile New York Times ran a story repeating the accusations 
that the British were exporting goods received under Lend-Lease in order to advance 
their commercial interests in South America.115 In August the accusations raised 
sufficient public interest for Time magazine to publish an account of them. Pointing to 
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British abuse of US generosity in South America, the article wondered whether Uncle 
Sam had not become “Uncle Sucker”?116 Henry Luce, the editor of Time, was among 
the best known internationalists and Anglophiles in the US.117 With the accusations 
that Britain was abusing Lend-Lease in South America coming from sources like this, 
the issue was sure to attract the attention of British officials.  
 
The Climax of British Mollification 
Initially the reaction provoked within the British government was to regard the 
accusations that it was misusing Lend-Lease aid to promote its export trade in South 
America merely as hostile propaganda that could be counteracted by some publicity in 
the US.118 But following a warning from Halifax in July 1941 that the accusations 
were part of a more serious campaign, the proponents of which were willing “to use 
all possible means to besmirch [the] Lend-Lease Act and [Britain] in particular”, 
officials in London gave the matter further thought.119 They eventually deemed it 
necessary to investigate the allegations coming out of South America and to clarify 
Britain’s export policy toward the region.120  
The conclusion reached was that the accusations being made by US 
businessmen were largely without foundation. It was pointed out that Lend-Lease 
supplies had only just begun to reach Britain by the summer of 1941, making it 
physically impossible for them to have been re-exported to South America by the time 
the criticism began. Furthermore, once Lend-Lease aid had been secured from the US, 
exports to South America had in fact been drastically curtailed. While a small amount 
of exports were continuing to reach the region it was argued that these were necessary 
in order to obtain raw materials from these countries, essential to the war effort.121  
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Leading figures in the Roosevelt administration generally accepted that the 
complaints against the British were largely unfounded.122 They tended instead to view 
such accusations principally as a political weapon being deployed by the domestic 
opponents of the aid program.123 However, Lend-Lease was subject to annual renewal 
by Congress, so the maintenance of US public support for the aid was a top priority.124 
In this respect accusations of British misuse of the aid were a cause of great anxiety 
and seen as a threat to the continuation of the aid program.125 Harry L. Hopkins, 
Special Assistant to Roosevelt, and Oscar Cox, General Counsel to the Lend-Lease 
administration, became particularly concerned that the accusations against the British 
had the potential to derail the appropriation bill for Lend-Lease soon to be put before 
Congress.126 
It was with these concerns in mind that Hopkins advised British officials in 
Washington that it may be wise to cease all exports to South America containing steel 
while these materials were being received under Lend-Lease.127 British officials 
accepted this advice and stated such a policy in a memo to the State Department by 
Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council in the British War Cabinet.128 A few 
days later Anderson gave a more general assurance to John G. Winant, the US 
ambassador in London, that goods received under the Lend-Lease programme would 
not be “diverted to the furtherance of private interests”.129  
Perhaps more importantly, British officials sought to make their stance clear to 
the US public. On 10 July Sir Kenneth Lee, representative of the British Industrial and 
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Export Council in Washington, explained to a National Foreign Trade Council 
luncheon that the accusations concerning Lend-Lease could hardly be valid, given that 
the Lend-Lease Act was only passed in March.130 A few days later John Maynard-
Keynes, who was visiting Washington as Churchill’s representative in matters 
pertaining to Lend-Lease, made a joint statement with Sir Owen Chalkley, the 
Commercial Counsellor at the British embassy in Washington, outlining British 
export policy to South America. While accepting that there would still be a small 
amount of British exports reaching South American shores, both in order to acquire 
essential raw materials and to supply spares for British-made machinery, they pledged 
that Lend-Lease aid would not be used to compete with US exporters. Furthermore, 
this statement pointed to specific examples of British contracts that had been 
abandoned in South America under government orders.131  
The efforts of the British government to demonstrate that it would not use 
materials received under the Lend-Lease programme to advance its commercial 
interests in South America certainly satisfied some. In an August press conference 
Roosevelt lent assistance to the British propaganda campaign when he dismissed such 
accusations as part of “an organized campaign to spread rumours, distortions of half-
truths, and … falsehoods”.132 Similarly, General Burns, Chief of the Office of Lend-
Lease Administration (OLLA), expressed his belief in response to a complaint over 
British abuse of Lend-Lease in South America “that instances of improper 
competition are now rare and … the British Government is making every effort to 
eliminate them completely”.133 Likewise, Winant informed Morgenthau that “a 
genuinely sincere effort” had been made by the British government to meet the 
criticisms being made of its use of Lend-Lease in South America.134  
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But notwithstanding the appreciation expressed for the steps taken by Britain 
to allay US fears, a more concrete attempt to pacify the criticism of Britain’s alleged 
misuse of Lend-Lease was deemed necessary by officials in Washington. This 
eventually came in the form of the British Export White Paper of 10 September 1941. 
This statement of policy, announced by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 
Parliament, committed Britain not to use material received under Lend-Lease “in such 
a way as to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade 
at the expense of the United States exporters”.135 Furthermore, the Export White 
Paper pledged that “no materials of a type of which is being restricted in the United 
States on the grounds of short supply, and of which we obtain supplies from the 
United States … will be used in exports”. The Export White Paper thus imposed 
formal restrictions on British exports to South America, while Britain was in receipt 
of Lend-Lease aid from the US.  
Moreover, it represented a comprehensive policy response to the criticisms 
aimed at Britain concerning the misuse of Lend-Lease in South America. While 
formally a unilateral British pronouncement, in reality the Export White Paper was a 
bilateral agreement between Britain and the US, and represented the end product of 
several weeks of negotiations between the two governments.136 By agreeing to the 
restrictions on its exports demanded by US officials, Britain had implicitly accepted 
that a measure of its control over export policy in South America would be handed to 
Washington. In this sense, it was indicative of the sacrifices Britain was willing to 
make in South America in order to engender good relations with the US. 
 
Irreconcilable Critics  
The Export White Paper satisfied most in the upper echelons of the Roosevelt 
administration that Britain would not abuse Lend-Lease for commercial gain in South 
America. However, others in the US refused to abandon this belief. Elements of the 
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US political establishment therefore remained focused on British trade practices in 
South America through to the end of 1941. In November the issue gained the attention 
of a Congressional Appropriations Subcommittee that toured Latin America.137 
Having conferred with US officials and businessmen throughout the region, the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, Louis C. Rabaut (Dem.-Mich.), echoed their concerns 
that British exports, subsidised by Lend-Lease, were threatening US interests in the 
region. Speaking before the House of Representatives, Rabaut advised the State 
Department to be “on the lookout for the defense of American business all over South 
and Central America”.138 
There were many in the State Department who needed little encouragement 
along these lines. Ambassador Braden informed Washington in December 1941 of his 
belief that Britain was still delivering materials to Colombia that were restricted in the 
US. He suggested that Britain ought to cease taking orders that had previously been 
refused by US exporters and – in line with the Export White Paper – stop shipping 
non-essential goods to South America.139 Similarly, Fluharty reported from Medellín 
that notwithstanding British declarations to the contrary, British goods continued to 
arrive in South America, which, according to his investigations, left British shores 
after the Export White Paper came into effect.140 In response to these reports Lynn R. 
Edminster, the Vice Chairman of the US Tariff Commission, noted with some 
concern in a memo to Acheson that “it still appears to be true that considerable 
supplies of goods of the same type, or made from materials of the same type, as we 
are lend-leasing to the United Kingdom have been arriving in Colombia since the 
issuance of the British White Paper”.141 
Neither was it just in Colombia that complaints over British misuse of Lend-
Lease continued to be heard. In Brazil John F. Simmons, Counselor of the US 
embassy in Rio, reported in December that a British firm was supplying plastics that 
their US competitors were unable to gain the raw materials for from the US Board of 
Economic Warfare (BEW).142 In Argentina allegations that Britain was still exporting 
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electric cable received under Lend-Lease were similarly fed back to Washington in 
January 1942.143   
More general criticism of British misuse of Lend-Lease in South America also 
remained commonplace in Washington. Edminster complained that the continuing 
flow of British exports to South America would “have the effect of maintaining or 
extending British trade channels in South America while cutting off our own”.144 A 
more biting criticism came from E. F. McDonald, an official in OLLA. Considering 
the necessity of monitoring the use of Lend-Lease goods by recipient countries, he 
believed that Britain was the only country where this would be necessary. “Never for 
a minute”, McDonald mused, “no matter how dire the emergency, do the British fail 
to think of the ultimate future and their position”.145 
By the end of 1941 the main US grievance in South America was the use by 
British traders of a sticker displayed on imports reaching the region that read: “Britain 
Delivers the Goods”. US businessmen and officials reported widespread sightings of 
this label on goods arriving at ports throughout South America.146 The displaying of 
this seemingly innocuous sticker caused serious concern in the State Department. In a 
telegram intended for the US embassy in London the author concluded that “the use 
of the slogan ‘Britain Delivers the Goods’ frequently has the effect of suggesting to 
consumers in the other American Republics that the United States is not delivering the 
goods”.147 The result, therefore, would be to further harm the US export trade in the 
region with a corresponding gain for British repute. One official in the American 
Hemisphere Exports Division hoped that the unilateral declaration of British 
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achievement might be replaced by a united slogan, such as: “The United Nations 
Deliver the Goods” or “The Democracies Deliver the Goods”.148  
The resentment felt in the US against this symbolic gesture of British 
industrial prowess in South America represented a lingering suspicion of British trade 
practices in the region that persisted until the end of 1941. The attempts by US 
officials to remove the sticker were likewise representative of the control the US now 
held over British commercial activities in the region.  
 
Conclusion 
By 1941 British exports to South America totalled £27.3 million, down from a pre-
war figure of £34.2 million.149 It is impossible to tell precisely how much this decline 
was attributable to the response to US criticisms and how much to the inevitable drop 
in British exports brought about by war-induced shortages in manpower and 
resources.150 More insight can be gauged from the export of manufactures containing 
materials such as steel and iron, given that these products were specifically targeted 
by British policies in response to US criticisms. In this case exports to Brazil dropped 
from £40,000 in the first quarter of 1941 to £3,000 in the final quarter of that year.151 
Similarly steep declines were mirrored in Argentina and Chile.152    
What is less quantifiable but still clear are the political decisions made by 
Britain that indicate its retreat from South America in this period. Mirroring the US 
blacklisting policy in South America not only barred British companies from gaining 
as a result of economic warfare in the region, but more importantly, acknowledged 
that the US would take the lead in blacklisting matters in South America.153 Similarly, 
the announcement of the British Export White Paper not only prevented British 
companies from exporting goods when they were willing and able to do so, but more 
significantly, it conceded a large measure of Britain’s export policy in South America 
to the US government.  
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At a time when Britain was fighting for its very survival such issues were 
understandably not of paramount concern. However, when viewed with the benefit of 
hindsight, the process whereby factions within the US began to exclude Britain from 
South America was, in the context of planning for the post-war era, of a more 
significant nature. But even if the implications of this process were appreciated at the 
time, it was perhaps inevitable that Britain would have to concede to US demands in a 
period when the fate of the country was seemingly so bound to winning US support 
for its cause. However, once the US entered the war, and Britain’s need to court the 
US was removed, the sense that Britain was being excluded from South America 
became an increasingly prominent concern for British officials and businessmen.
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Chapter 3 
 
British Suspicions and Attempts at Cooperation 
(Winter 1941-1942 – Autumn 1942) 
 
With the US a fully-fledged belligerent in a global conflict a partnership between the 
US and Britain, unprecedented in the history of Anglo-American relations, ensued. 
Throughout 1942 the unity of purpose between the two countries was accentuated by 
the perilous military threats faced by the Allies. Despite its geographic isolation from 
the European and Asian theatres of conflict, one effect of the new accord between the 
two countries was moves toward cooperation and collaboration in commercial matters 
between the US and Britain in South America. This cooperation came in the form of 
aligning the two countries’ blacklisting policies in South America, and collaborating 
in the supply of essential goods to the region. 
 However, as this chapter shows, cooperation between the US and Britain in 
the commercial affairs of South America was continually hampered throughout the 
first half of 1942 by conflicting trends on both sides of the Atlantic. For Britain the 
new co-belligerent status of the two countries removed the impetus to placate US 
criticisms of British trade practices that had actuated British policy during the period 
of US neutrality. In its place British officials sought to forge a partnership with the 
US, which would entail an active role for Britain in directing the economic affairs of 
Latin America. This, they believed, would best serve immediate wartime needs in the 
region, as well as protecting Britain’s commercial status in South America for the 
longer-term. But British hopes of forging a constructive partnership with the US were 
often dashed, as US officials directing policy in Latin America acted unilaterally in 
the promotion of US interests in the region, and, moreover, sought to consolidate 
inter-American economic solidarity. 
This attitude fuelled suspicions among British officials and businessmen that 
the true aim of their US counterparts was to use opportunities afforded by the war to 
exclude British commercial interests from South America on a permanent basis. They 
detected this motive both in a general resentment shown toward British interests by 
US officials in the region, and in more concrete US policies, most notably the 
application of blacklisting.  
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Such anxieties on Britain’s part were a cause of concern to internationalists 
within the State Department. Led by Hull, this group included prominent members of 
the Roosevelt administration, such as Acheson and Harry Hawkins, Chief of the 
Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.1 Long concerned with the promotion 
of economic multilateralism in negotiations with Britain, this group were at the 
forefront of promoting such a system in Anglo-American negotiations during the 
war.2 Viewed in this context, the suspicions on Britain’s part that the US wished to 
exclude British interests from South America represented a threat to the 
internationalists’ programme of promoting multilateralism. They therefore attempted 
to quell British fears by instructing US representatives in South America to cooperate 
with their British counterparts in the attainment of shared goals in the region. 
Moreover, they advocated multilateralism to US officials and businessmen in the 
region as an alternative to any ambitions to exclude British interests from South 
America.  
In taking these steps US internationalists hoped both to advance the war effort 
and convince the British government that the multilateral trade system that they 
sought to implement in the post-war era would apply equally to South America as to 
British-dominated regions. These attempts at fostering cooperation between the 
wartime allies in South America began to bear fruit during the second half of 1942, 
and there resulted in London, a lessening of suspicions that the US was intent on 
excluding British interests from the region.   
 
A New Role for Britain in Latin America 
The day after the US became a fully-fledged belligerent, one of the British Chiefs of 
Staff suggested to the Prime Minister that a more deferential tone be employed in a 
message to the US. Churchill replied: “Oh! that is the way we talked to her when we 
were wooing her; now that she is in the harem, we talk to her quite differently”.3 This 
new way of talking to the US reflected a widespread belief within the British 
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establishment that a new equality, based on their common belligerent status, now 
existed between the two countries.  
This sentiment was no less felt with regard to South America. It was certainly 
the case for British traders hoping to retain their markets in the region. In a letter to 
Keynes reflecting on British commercial policy in the region, Kenneth C. Robinson, 
Governing Director of Thomas Bell & Co., referred disapprovingly to a lingering 
“tendency to talk as though we must keep friendly with the United States at all costs 
and must suffer any injustice which they seek to inflict upon us”. If such an attitude 
were retained with regard to British export policy in South America, Robinson 
believed, the country’s position would be irreparably damaged in the post-war era. In 
order to remedy this he sought to convey to the government the changed reality which 
he perceived in the post-Pearl Harbor era. “The full entry of the United States into the 
World War has produced a new situation”, Robinson stated. In these new 
circumstances a new attitude was required in British dealings with the US. “We are 
now, or ought to be”, Robinson believed, “frank and avowed allies in the one war 
effort and there is, therefore, no longer any necessity to truckle or cajole 
Washington”.4 
 This view was received sympathetically in the South American department of 
the Foreign Office.5 Perowne referred to the US and Britain as “full and equal 
partners” in a minute written shortly after Pearl Harbor.6 In this context London’s 
mollification of the criticisms of British trade practices in South America that had 
passed over the previous year was no longer deemed appropriate or necessary. 
Instead, the Foreign Office sought to initiate a new spirit of collaboration between 
Britain and the US in Latin America, which would entail an active role for Britain in 
the region as an equal partner. In a telegram sent to Washington and copied to all 
Latin American missions in December 1941 the Foreign Office expressed its wish to 
establish the “fullest understanding with [the] United States Government as regards 
joint policy and co-operation in respect of Latin America”.7 More generally, the 
Foreign Office sought to impress upon the State Department its desire to “afford the 
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greatest measure of assistance to [the] United States … in all matters connected with 
the prosecution of the war” in Latin America.8 
However, initial indications from Washington were that US officials were 
reluctant to engage with their British counterparts in any in depth discussions 
concerning Latin America.9 But British officials refused to be spurned in their offers 
of cooperation, believing that the new co-belligerent status of the two countries 
allowed them to exert some degree of pressure on the US to engage in talks on Latin 
America.10 On 28 December 1941 this persistence paid off and Halifax secured a 
meeting with Welles where he expressed Britain’s desire to play a constructive role in 
the affairs of Latin America. But Welles’ response was vague and noncommittal, 
giving only a brief outline of current US goals in the region that seemingly contained 
no place for Britain.11 
Such a response from Welles was disappointing, if not particularly surprising, 
to the Foreign Office. As Perowne noted on 31 December, Welles “quite naturally 
regards Latin America as his own particular oyster”, and was not particularly inclined 
to share the region with Britain or even discuss policy there.12 Perowne saw no reason 
to believe that in his direction of Latin American affairs Welles would necessarily 
take a hostile attitude toward British interests in the region, but “the question”, as he 
phrased it, was whether the Foreign Office wished “to encourage the benevolent 
despotism which the State Department is apt to exercise where we are concerned, or 
whether we desire rather to make it clear that we regard ourselves as equal partners in 
a common enterprise in Latin America”.13 The fact that British officials subsequently 
adopted the latter course offers an important rebuttal of the common view that the 
Churchill government viewed Latin America as a US sphere of influence.14 However, 
as British officials attempted to forge an active role for the country in Latin American 
affairs its efforts were repeatedly rejected by the US. This, in turn, fed British 
suspicions that the US sought to exclude British interests from South America for the 
post-war era. 
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A ‘Pan-American Customs Union’? 
These suspicions increased in the early months of 1942 as British officials observed 
the first inter-American conference since the US entered the war. The meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was held in Rio de Janeiro 
during the second half of January. During the meeting British hopes of having any 
input on the proceedings were dashed when Welles, who headed the US delegation to 
the conference, failed to find the time to receive Sir Noel Charles, the British 
ambassador in Rio. Britain’s sense of exclusion was heightened further when another 
member of the US delegation, Under Secretary of Commerce Wayne Taylor, 
informed Charles that US officials were fundamentally opposed to seeking assistance 
from Britain in any matter concerning the American states.15 Such rejections of 
British assistance in Latin America led the Foreign Office to the conclusion that State 
Department policy toward Latin America was being actuated “by a feeling that the 
sub-continent falls into their sphere of influence and that, fundamentally, we have no 
business there”.16  
The Rio conference is best remembered for the partially successful attempt by 
the US to secure a unanimous severance of relations with the Axis countries by the 
American states.17 However, another important aim of the conference at Rio was to 
promote greater economic cooperation in the Americas.18 It was potential progress 
toward this latter goal that caused British suspicions of being excluded from South 
America to increase further. The specific instance for these concerns came in the form 
of a press report quoting a high-ranking official from the US Commerce Department 
who claimed that the US delegation to the conference would propose the elimination 
of all trade barriers between the American states and the adoption of a common 
currency. This plan was justified on the grounds that it would facilitate the flow of 
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munitions and war-related materials around the continent.19 But it clearly had 
commercial implications for non-hemisphere countries like Britain of an abiding 
nature. The danger, as far as British interests were concerned, was that a customs 
union would be set up between the American states that would increase inter-
American trade, while excluding that of outside countries. Such a system would in 
effect create an exclusive trade bloc in the Western Hemisphere dominated by the 
US.20 
It was certainly true that schemes such as the one reported during the Rio 
conference had been present in the thinking of influential US officials for some time. 
As far back as November 1939 Adolf A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, had 
presented a plan for a common currency for the American states to the Inter-American 
Financial and Economic Advisory Committee.21 While Berle acknowledged that such 
a system was not attainable at the present time, he believed it was wise for the US to 
“consider the possibility of securing at least some of the advantages of such a 
system”.22  
Berle had a life long interest in the affairs of the American states, which he 
developed over the years into a political philosophy based on ‘continentalism’. The 
basis of this was that the economic unification of the American states in the Western 
Hemisphere would provide a model for the other continents of the world to mirror.23 
This attitude dovetailed with a general scepticism toward the European powers and a 
particular distrust of Britain. Specifically, Berle resented what he regarded as a 
lingering British mercantilism.24 Certainly Berle would have not been troubled if one 
effect of the greater economic unity he sought in the Western Hemisphere would be to 
exclude British interests from South America. 
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The leading members of the US delegation to the Rio conference – Welles, 
Taylor, and Pierson – shared Berle’s attitude toward the Western Hemisphere and 
Britain to varying degrees.25 It was they who had formulated the plan to eliminate 
trade barriers and establish a single currency in the Western Hemisphere at the Rio 
conference.26 However, when presented with this scheme, Morgenthau vetoed it for 
being too far reaching a proposal to be decided at a conference limited to inter-
American participation.27 Consequently, when the Final Act of the Rio conference 
was issued, reference to any kind of Pan-American customs union was absent. On the 
contrary, the signatures to the act pledged allegiance to the principles enshrined in the 
Atlantic Charter, among them a commitment to economic multilaterlaism.28  
Nevertheless, proposals such as that advocated by the US delegation did 
indicate that steps toward greater economic solidarity in the Western Hemisphere 
would be forthcoming. Indeed, one US commentator stated in a report on the 
conference that the themes initiated at Rio, if pursued, “might result in the 
establishment of a more or less closed New World economic bloc”.29 Moreover, in an 
address to mark Pan-American Day shortly after the conference in Rio, Taylor 
indicated that it was precisely such a permanent unified economic system in the 
Western Hemisphere that he desired to see take shape. “The solemn undertakings 
contained in the resolutions” of the Rio conference, predicted Taylor, “would grow 
rapidly in actuality and would remain as the fundamentals of our economic 
association long after the [war] had passed”. “A common Pan-American economic 
policy”, then, was certainly a post-war aim for some US officials.30    
Such contradictory trends ensured that a sense of consternation remained 
prominent in the Foreign Office. In a letter to the Board of Trade, Perowne sought to 
impress the reality that a Pan-American trade bloc may well constitute a tempting 
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prospect to agencies in the US government like the Commerce Department and the 
Export-Import Bank, as well as US business interests in the region. However, he was 
able to take solace in the fact that the proposed scheme for the Rio conference had in 
this instance been rejected by the leadership of the Roosevelt administration and 
would be in direct contradiction to the central tenets of official US economic plans. 
As Perowne explained: 
Such a union would be wholly irreconcilable with Article 7 of the [Lend-
Lease] consideration Agreement, would be inconsistent with efforts to remove 
or reduce incidence of Imperial Preference, and mean the abandonment of Mr. 
Hull’s long campaign on behalf of liberal principles of international trade.  
But while this may be so, Perowne still harboured suspicions that there would 
remain powerful forces in Washington that would try to exclude British interests from 
South America. As he went on to caution: 
There may not be a few in Washington who would like to see Pan-American 
preference put into the scales to balance imperial preference, and there may be 
others too who, while not thinking as Pan-American preference as a quid pro 
quo, would consider it legitimate to aim at achieving the virtual, if not 
complete elimination of British … trade from the markets of South and 
Central America.31  
So while Morgenthau may have prevented attempts to exclude British interests at the 
Rio conference, the British government should remain vigilant for any future 
“startling surprises”, which those hostile to British interests in the region may have in 
store.32 The dichotomy identified by Perowne – between the official US economic 
policy of Hullian multilaterlaism and the dangers of a move toward an exclusionary 
policy in Latin America – represented the first indications from within the British 
government of a perception that it was by promoting multilateralism in South 
America that British interests would best be protected. This idea developed as British 
officials sought to identify the different factions within the US and their 
corresponding attitudes toward British interests in South America.  
 
US Friends and Enemies     
As British officials reflected on the Rio conference they began to develop a thesis that 
identified within the US government those thought to be hostile toward Britain in 
South America and those believed to be sympathetic. This argument was first 
systematically articulated in February 1942 in a paper by R. A. Humphreys, an 
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academic drafted into government service during the war to provide expertise on 
Latin America. Humphreys began his paper by identifying two distinct and opposing 
schools of thought within the US concerning Latin American affairs: 
In the United States the division is between those who may, somewhat loosely, 
be called internationalists and those who tend to look upon the new world 
(with the exception of Canada) as a private hemisphere. The former believe 
that the problems of the western hemisphere cannot be solved in isolation from 
other parts of the world. The latter regard British activities in Latin America 
with much suspicion, and they would like, in extreme circumstances, to turn 
Pan-Americanism into hemispheric isolationism. 
 Humphreys went on to make clear that movements toward greater Pan-
American solidarity during the war need not necessarily translate into “hemispheric 
isolationalism”. Indeed, the picture painted of US intentions toward Britain in South 
America was largely one of ambiguity. But he was keen to warn British officials of 
the dire threat to British interests if US policy in Latin America did in fact turn out to 
be one of an exclusionary nature. A policy of “hemispheric autarky”, noted 
Humphreys, would result “in very severe and very successful competition against 
British commercial interests”. Moreover, Humphreys was keen to impress the broader 
ramifications of a competitive situation arising between the US and Britain in the 
region. There was certainly the “possibility of a serious divergence of opinion 
between the United States and Great Britain over Latin American affairs” noted 
Humphreys. “Such a clash”, he went on, “would be profoundly disturbing to the 
general harmony of Anglo-American relations”.33    
Humphreys’ paper was widely circulated within the American departments of 
the Foreign Office. All who read it largely endorsed the thesis outlining Britain’s 
friends and enemies in the US with regard to British interests in South America. In 
particular, Welles, Pierson, and Taylor were increasingly viewed as the leading 
figures threatening British interests in the region. The head of the North American 
department, Sir Neville Butler, described them as a “formidable trio”, while others 
referred condescendingly to Welles and Pierson as “the two great princes of S[outh] 
American politics and finance”.34 Hull and his fellow advocates of multilateralism in 
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the State Department, on the other hand, were seen as Britain’s allies in ensuring its 
interests in South America were maintained.35  
But while there was general agreement that there were indeed factions present 
within the US that aimed to eliminate British interests from South America, there was 
less accord as to the influence and the pervasiveness of this desire. The South 
American department of the Foreign Office tended to regard exclusionary sentiment 
in the US as widespread and dangerous. Rodney Gallop, assistant to the head of the 
South American department, believed Humphreys’ paper underestimated the 
exclusionary tendencies of the movement toward Pan-Americanism, which had been 
manifest during and since the Rio conference.36 In a similar vein, Perowne believed 
that the State Department itself was “determined to eliminate all alien influences 
(including our own) in Latin America”.37 The North American department of the 
Foreign Office, on the other hand, regarded such views as overly alarmist. Butler 
rejected Perowne’s assertion that the State Department was aiming at the complete 
elimination of all non-American interests from Latin America.38 Similarly, Francis 
Evans, a clerk in the North American department, believed that while there may be 
some in the State Department who harboured ambitions to remove British interests 
from South America, “the weight of evidence does not yet show that it is the 
considered policy of the U.S. Government to exclude us from the South American 
market”.39  
The most forceful rebuttal of the South American department’s fears over 
exclusionary elements in the US came from Chalkley in the British embassy in 
Washington. Chalkley had long experience both in Latin America and in the US. He 
had consequently developed a special interest in the triangular commercial relations 
between the US and Britain in South America.40 Having been sent Humphreys’ paper, 
along with the comments on it by Foreign Office personnel, Chalkley challenged the 
characterisation of Welles, Pierson and Taylor directly. Chalkley had worked 
alongside Welles in Argentina during the First World War and had been acquainted 
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with him in Washington for the last eight years. He acknowledged that there were 
widespread fears that if – as expected at this time – Welles replaced Hull as Secretary 
of State he would abandon the latter’s programme of economic multilateralism in 
favour of a discriminatory “Pan-American Union”. However, having expressed these 
fears himself to Hawkins, Chalkley had been reassured that Welles would continue 
along Hull’s path of multilateralism. This faith was supported by reference to a speech 
by Welles at a World Trade dinner in October 1941 where the latter asserted his belief 
in the principles of multilateralism. 
Regarding Taylor, Chalkley believed that he similarly ascribed to Hull’s 
economic policy. Moreover, he pointed out, even if Taylor were disposed to exclude 
British interests from South America, he lacked the power to do so from his position 
in the Commerce Department. Finally, with regard to Pierson, Chalkley 
acknowledged that the President of the Export-Import Bank was largely hostile 
toward Britain. However, having had several conversations with him, Chalkley came 
away with the impression that Pierson was largely unconcerned with British interests 
in South America. The fears of the South American department, then, according to 
Chalkley, were largely without foundation. Moreover, he argued that it was exactly 
such suspicions – based on rumours, rather than facts – that would make Anglo-
American cooperation in the establishment of multilateral trade for the post-war era, 
all the harder to attain.41 
But Chalkley’s portrait of the US officials and his dismissal of British 
suspicions were greeted with a certain degree of scepticism in London. Christopher 
Steel, First Secretary in the Foreign Office, believed that Chalkley’s long service in 
the US, rather than making him an authority on the subject of Anglo-American 
commercial relations in South America, had led him to become “a bit tinged with the 
Washington point of view”. Consequently, he had come to regard “his American 
friends with less suspicion than he might in consequence”.42  
Similarly, Sir Edward Mather-Jackson, the Foreign Office official in charge of 
commercial affairs in South America, while grateful to hear of Welles’ public pledge 
of allegiance to multilateralism, questioned whether this rhetoric was matched by the 
actions of Welles and Pierson in South America. Indeed, it was precisely the 
divergence between the US advocacy of multilateralism for the rest of the world and 
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their failure to adhere to these principles in South America that had fuelled British 
suspicions. As Mather-Jackson cogently put it on 6 May 1942, British fears had been 
aroused “by a marked difference in Anglo-American relations in that which concerned 
Latin America and that which concerned other parts of the world”. Expanding on the 
motivations that he believed guided US foreign policy, he went onto explain: 
There is always the danger in America that one string of the typical idealistic-
materialistic nexus will be unloosed, and [with regard to South America] we 
were fearful lest the materialistic urge might be set free to achieve its own 
ends … at a time when our own hands were bound by the war effort.43  
From Mather-Jackson’s perspective, then, strong suspicions of a will in the US to 
exclude British interests from South America had been wholly valid. It was with such 
abiding suspicions of US intentions toward British interests in the region that the 
British government developed its policies toward South America throughout 1942.  
 
The Joint Supply of Goods 
In some respects British concerns over the war being used as an opportunity to 
exclude its interests from South America had been present for some time. This had 
certainly been the case regarding the previous year’s allegations that Britain was re-
exporting Lend-Lease goods to South America in order to compete with the US 
unfairly. Whereas Roosevelt and his advisors interpreted these criticisms as a political 
attack on the aid programme and the broader foreign policy goals of the 
administration, many in Britain suspected that these criticisms were merely a cover 
being used to exclude British interests from the region.  
The South American department of the Foreign Office was virtually 
unanimous in this belief. Mather-Jackson noted in June 1941 that following the 
passage of the Lend-Lease Act, US businessmen in the region felt sure that “the 
market was his for the rest of the war, and with any luck for all time”. When British 
exports continued to compete with US business into the summer of 1941, this 
aspiration was therefore challenged. For Mather-Jackson it was more the prospect of 
US monopolistic control of the South American market being threatened, than 
legitimate concerns over the misuse of Lend-Lease, which subsequently led to the 
criticism of Britain.44 Similarly, Perowne believed that the accusations against the 
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British in South America resulted from a “general jealousy of what has formerly been 
our commercial position in that sub-continent”.45  
British businessmen based in South America voiced the same suspicions. In 
Brazil Henry Walter Foy wrote to his head office in London that his US competitors 
in the country had received instructions from the US government to detail all alleged 
abuses of Lend-Lease by the British in order to force British companies out of 
Brazil.46 Similarly, J. J. Soar, an agent for British business in Brazil, believed that the 
US had virtually eradicated the British export trade to that country by the end of 1941, 
under the pretext of Lend-Lease restrictions, but in reality to remove British 
competition for the post-war era.47 
Viewed in the light of these suspicions, the Export White Paper of September 
1941 was regarded as a threat to British interests in South America. Moreover, now 
that the US had entered the war, British officials believed it to be outdated and 
inappropriate for the changed circumstances. Gallop expressed this belief in April 
1942, stating that the current British export policy toward South America was 
“dictated by motives of political [expediency] rather than of logic or justice”.48 British 
officials therefore hoped to change this situation by getting the Export White Paper 
superseded by a system of joint programming between the US and Britain in the 
supply of goods to Latin America.49  
Internationalists in the State Department shared this aspiration. They believed 
that cooperation between the US and Britain in furnishing Latin America with the 
exports it needed would be aided by the changing functions of the US economy 
brought about by the country’s new belligerent status. As the US diverted its 
productive capacities away from normal peacetime trade to an even greater extent, 
and focused predominantly on wartime production, the effect in Latin America, so it 
was hoped, would be to replace Anglo-American export competition with 
collaboration in the supply of wartime needs for the region. Acheson conveyed the 
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new dynamics that should guide US officials and businessmen in Latin America in a 
circular sent to US missions in all Latin American republics on 25 March 1942:  
Basically, the problem is no longer one of competition in the supply of normal 
needs but is one of joint supply of needs out of a pool of materials and 
equipment definitely limited in size and undergoing continuous contraction. … 
In these circumstances, competition must be replaced by collaboration.50 
Moves toward the establishment of joint programming between the US and 
Britain in the supply of goods to Latin America were evident in the early months of 
1942. The establishment of the Combined Raw Materials Board in Washington 
appeared to be a first step toward achieving the kind of joint supply to the region 
envisioned by Acheson.51 However, joint programming failed to materialise. This was 
partly due to the administrative difficulties of working out supply schedules for the 
region.52 But it was also reflective of the reluctance of some in the US to concede 
control to the British over the supply of goods to Latin America.  
This sentiment was expressed in a State Department memo in April 1942 that 
cautioned against the US being “jockeyed into any position where the British will lead 
us around by the nose”. On the contrary, the supply of goods to Latin America during 
wartime, the memo went on, should be based on the premise that “the Western 
Hemisphere is our back yard and we are the ones, like it or not, who are going to play 
a principal role there”. So while Britain may be “given a voice … in the general 
supply situation” the US should “maintain a firm policy that final determinations in 
this Hemisphere are necessarily ours”.53 Sentiments such as these ensured that the 
Export White Paper would remain intact.  
This fact was reaffirmed on the ground in South America by the experience of 
a British company in Brazil. In March 1942 Babcock & Wilcox offered to supply 
combustion engines to a local customer within six weeks, thereby surpassing the 
delivery terms offered by their US competitors in the trade. Such enterprise was 
justified, according to the British trader, as the entry of the US into the war had 
automatically released Britain from the restrictions imposed on its export business by 
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the Export White Paper.54 Unsurprisingly, the US firm competing for the Brazilian 
business failed to share such an interpretation. William Haller, representative of the 
New York-based Combustion Engineering Company, wrote to the commercial attaché 
at the US embassy in Rio expressing his disbelief that British companies were now 
exempt from priority controls in accessing the raw materials needed to facilitate their 
export trade. “We cannot well imagine”, Haller exclaimed, “that such a handicap 
could have been knowingly and intentionally put [up]on American export 
endeavours”.55  
Of course, in reality, no matter how much the restrictions on British exports to 
South America may have seemed unfair to British businessmen and officials once the 
US was a co-belligerent in the war, nothing had in fact altered the restrictions imposed 
on British exports by the White Paper of September 1941.This was reiterated in 
Acheson’s circular to Latin American posts in March 1942. Notwithstanding the 
cooperation being forged between Britain and the US in the realm of export policy in 
South America, Acheson reminded US representatives that “the White Paper remains 
in full effect”.56 OLLA relayed a similarly unequivocal message to Chalkley on 20 
April.57  
 
Rattling the Chains of the White Paper 
It was subsequently to the task of loosening the restrictions on British exports, within 
the constraints of the Export White Paper, that the British government set its mind 
during the spring of 1942. As the embassy in Washington put it, until the Export 
White Paper could be replaced by a system of joint programming, it was necessary to 
make the best of the interim arrangements.58  
In its attempts to alter the restrictions on Britain’s exports to South America 
the Foreign Office was guided by both long and short-term objectives. In the short run 
Britain’s objective was to ensure that the South American countries received the 
equipment they needed to supply Britain with materials essential to the war effort.59 A 
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prominent example was British exports of specialist agricultural equipment to enable 
South American countries to produce foodstuffs that were exported to Britain and 
used to supply the armed forces.60 In the longer-term Britain’s aim was to retain 
important markets in South America for the post-war era.61  
For many in the US Britain’s hopes of retaining South American markets for 
the post-war years was clearly not a valid reason to loosen the restrictions enforced by 
the Export White Paper. British officials, moreover, were well aware of this fact. As 
one Foreign Office official put it, “OLLA is supposed to unsympathetic” and there 
was, in fact, no particular reason “to expect any US Dep[artment] to look with 
sympathy on our exports to S[outh] America”.62 If Britain were to win US approval to 
break free from the restrictions on its exports imposed by the White Paper this would 
have to be justified on the basis of the essential requirements of the South American 
countries, rather than the promotion of the British export trade.63 
It soon became clear to British officials that OLLA would be more likely to 
grant waivers for British exports to South America if the requests came directly from 
the South Americans themselves.64 This would give the impression that the waiver 
was needed not to aid the British export trade, but to meet the requirements of South 
America. The Foreign Office sought to ensure, therefore, that requests for waivers 
appeared as much as possible as spontaneous requests from South America, rather 
than pleas from the British.65   
But this posed a separate dilemma for British officials. By April 1942 progress 
toward loosening the White Paper restrictions on British exports had been made by 
British officials in Washington in the form of an agreement with OLLA that goods 
needed in South America would be regarded as unobtainable from the US if they 
could not be delivered promptly. This would free British exporters to supply goods 
under a waiver from the White Paper if they were able to do so in a shorter timeframe 
than their US counterparts.66 In this context British officials were faced with the 
challenge of formulating the correct response to be given to requests from South 
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American customers for goods that were governed by the White Paper restrictions. On 
the one hand, when the US was able to supply the goods, the Foreign Office was loath 
to direct these enquires to Washington, for fear that such action would be interpreted 
by the South Americans “as a gratuitous abandonment by us of our interest in the 
Latin American market”. On the other hand, when Britain was able to supply the 
goods more promptly, it was desirable that the South American customers should 
approach the authorities in Washington.67    
The Foreign Office therefore suggested to the Board of Trade that requests 
from South American customers should be referred to Washington only when Britain 
was able to supply the goods required.68 But the Board of Trade pointed out to the 
Foreign Office that should British representatives follow such a course of action it 
would soon become clear both to the South Americans and US officials that Britain 
was “endeavouring to adopt a non too subtle circumvention of our obligations under 
the White Paper”.69 The Foreign Office conceded this point and the policy finally 
settled upon was to direct all enquiries from South American customers to OLLA in 
the hope of waivers being granted where Britain could supply the goods more 
promptly.70 A similar pattern of British suspicions and limited cooperation emerged 
with regard to blacklisting policy in Latin America. 
 
The Uses and Abuses of Economic Warfare 
When US blacklisting policy has been discussed in the existing literature the focus has 
usually been on the tensions between the US and the Latin American states caused by 
the policy.71 But US application of the blacklist in Latin America also resulted in 
rivalry with Britain. Originally, British officials welcomed the announcement of the 
US proclaimed list in July 1941 as a contribution to their own existing efforts to 
eradicate Nazi interests in South America. However, once the US entered the war and 
began executing its blacklisting policy with much greater vigour, this appreciation 
was soon tempered by fears that the US would use blacklisting to try to advance its 
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own commercial interests for the longer-term. This fear hinged on the suspicion that 
the US would seek to replace ousted Nazi concerns in South America with US 
interests, and thereby gain a predominant position in the region.  
In a telegram to MEW in February 1942 Halifax expressed these suspicions 
bluntly:  
Americans make no secret of the fact that their objective is not merely to 
thwart the enemy’s war activities in Latin America, but to stamp out his 
influence for good. His firms are to be put right out of business and there can 
be no doubt that the dream is that they should be entirely supplanted by 
Americans.72 
Private US interests, or representatives of companies serving the government 
for the wartime era, were centrally involved with the prosecution of blacklisting in 
South America.73 It is not surprising that these figures did indeed harbour hopes that 
blacklisting would benefit US commerce in the post-war era. Pan-American Airways 
for one, which was centrally involved in US efforts to eradicate Italian airlines from 
South America, openly sought a monopoly of the aviation industry in the region for 
the post-war era.74 Similarly, representatives of International Telephone & Telegraph 
(ITT) who worked on blacklisting matters in Latin America during World War II 
sought to advance the corporation’s standing in the region by replacing Nazi 
concerns.75  
Many US officials shared these ambitions. As early as 1940 the Chief of the 
Chemicals Division of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce informed 
members of the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association that “it is 
logical to assume that much of the medicinal and pharmaceutical business that Latin 
American countries have been giving to [the belligerent countries] will be, for some 
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time to come, diverted to the United States”.76 Similarly, Braden predicted more 
generally that the blacklisting of Nazi firms “will benefit American commerce after 
the war”.77 British suspicions regarding US ambitions in its blacklisting policy, then, 
were clearly not without foundation. 
Acting on these suspicions, the British government sought to ensure that it was 
not sidelined by the US in the application of the blacklists in the region. The British 
feared that if they allowed the US sole jurisdiction in blacklisting matters they would 
lose valuable commercial connections in the region, with a corresponding gain for US 
commercial penetration. Halifax explained this reasoning when he warned that the 
British would “lose ground in South America if in each important centre we do not 
play our full part in listing work, thus maintaining our contact with and influence over 
[the] local business world”. In practical terms, Halifax counselled that the “effective 
association of our missions with Americans seems essential if we are to safeguard our 
interest”.78  
Halifax’s advice was followed and during the early months of 1942 British 
officials attempted to collaborate with their US counterparts in the prosecution of 
economic warfare, both in Washington and throughout Latin America. The first step 
toward this goal was achieved in January when British officials reached agreement 
with the State Department to ensure British participation on the proclaimed list 
committee in Washington that directed blacklisting policy in the Western 
Hemisphere.79 The State Department sought to ensure the effective collaboration of 
Anglo-American blacklisting policy in Latin America by reminding its missions 
throughout the region that the effective coordination of the blacklists in Washington 
could only be possible if augmented by similar cooperation with British 
representatives on the ground in Latin America.80 The following month MEW agreed 
to mirror the instructions given to US representatives in the region by the State 
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Department when instructing Britain’s representatives in the application of the 
blacklist in Latin America.81  
However, while this successful cooperation did take place, British efforts to 
collaborate with the US in blacklisting matters again exposed the limitations of US 
cooperation in the region. This limitation stemmed from a desire within the US to 
maintain independence from Britain when it came to blacklisting in Latin America. 
Joseph C. Rovensky was an international banker and an important shareholder in 
Bolivian mining companies who served in CIAA during the war.82 He expressed this 
unilateralist tendency within the Roosevelt administration, stating in January 1942 
that it was inevitable that US blacklisting policy in the region would continue to 
operate independently of Britain. US interests in Latin America were so complex “and 
so preponderant”, believed Rovensky, “that we are practically obliged to take our own 
point of view on” these issues.83 The contradiction between this attitude and attempts 
at cooperation in the coordination of blacklisting with Britain eventually came to a 
head in Brazil. 
 
A Breakdown in Cooperation in Brazil 
Application of the blacklists had been a particular grievance of the Brazilian 
government for some time.84 Along with many other Latin Americans, the Brazilians 
viewed the lists as an unjustified infringement upon their sovereignty and as 
potentially damaging to the national economy.85 Following Brazil’s severance of 
relations with the Axis powers in January 1942 it increasingly demanded more 
authority over blacklisting policy within its own borders and attempted to wrest 
control of the process from the proclaimed list committee in Washington.86 On the 
whole, British and US officials were in agreement that the Brazilians were not up to 
the task of administering the blacklists, lacking the objectivity to apply them 
effectively.87 However, unlike the British, the US was highly dependent by this time 
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on Brazilian cooperation in supplying vital resources and facilitating US bases on its 
soil.88 These imperatives made the Roosevelt administration more likely to grant 
Brazil concessions on blacklisting policy.89  
 By April 1942 such concerns compelled the US embassy in Rio to inform the 
Brazilian government that consultations would take place in order to remove Brazilian 
interests from the blacklist. Crucially, insofar as Anglo-American relations were 
concerned, negotiations toward this end would take place in Rio and be conducted on 
a bilateral basis between the US embassy and the Brazilian government.90  
Such a prospect immediately caused alarm in London. MEW alerted the 
British embassy in Washington that if consultations concerning the blacklist between 
the US and the Brazilians in Rio were allowed to supplant the established committee 
in Washington this would effectively eliminate British participation from the process. 
Moreover, MEW believed that any agreement reached with the Brazilians along the 
lines suggested would act as a precedent for blacklisting policy throughout Latin 
America in the years to come. If Britain were to remain active in the blacklisting 
process – and thereby sustain its best chance of maintaining its interests in South 
America – it was of paramount importance for British officials to approach the State 
Department and ensure that the negotiations proposed by the US embassy in Rio were 
quashed.91   
 However, when Acheson met with British officials at the end of May he 
informed them, “with considerable embarrassment”, that the “machinery for United 
States-Brazilian condominium on Black List matters was now developed”. Acheson 
justified this bilateral arrangement by claiming that the US need for strategic and 
economic cooperation from Brazil was so great that concessions to the Brazilian 
government on the blacklist were inevitable. While British officials were sympathetic 
to this argument, Noel Hall, representative of MEW at the British embassy in 
Washington, pointed to the embarrassment that the unilateral US action would cause 
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British representatives in Rio and stressed the need for “Anglo-American unity on all 
matters connected with the conduct of the war”. Acheson assured Hall that authority 
for blacklisting in Latin America would remain with the proclaimed list committee in 
Washington, thereby retaining British participation in the process.92   
 
Reflections on the Brazilian Imbroglio 
British officials in Washington welcomed this assurance from Acheson. But the 
events concerning blacklisting in Brazil left lasting impressions of a disconcerting 
nature, both in South America and London. In the midst of the crisis in Brazil Charles 
sent a telegraph to MEW that was copied to all other British missions in Latin 
America. In his message the British ambassador described what he saw as the driving 
force behind US attempts to exclude Britain from the blacklisting procedures in that 
country. US actions were motivated, stated Charles, “by the determination to remove 
British influence and enterprise from Brazil”.93 In this sense, British officials viewed 
the sidelining of Britain from blacklisting affairs in Brazil as a symptom of a boarder 
drive to exclude British interests from that country. One important question for 
officials in London was to what extent this drive was mirrored throughout South 
America.  
In general it was felt that the attempt to use blacklisting as a cover to exclude 
British interests was strongest in Brazil, which the US seemed to regard as their own 
“special preserve”.94 It was certainly true that US officials during World War II 
viewed Brazil, in particular, as their own domain. The US had long had closer ties 
with Brazil than with the rest of the South American countries. In part this was due to 
the cultural affinity between the two countries – both being non-Spanish speaking.95 It 
was also a product of the complementary nature of the two countries’ economies. 
While US trade with South America was largely insignificant for much of the 
nineteenth century, it did establish strong trade links with Brazil toward the turn of the 
century.96  
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Moreover, a general desire in the US to encourage the industrialisation of 
Latin America during the war – and thereby create a new market for US exports and 
capital – was focused most prominently on Brazil.97 In October 1940 Eugene P. 
Thomas, President of the National Association of Manufacturers, urged that “Brazil’s 
vast area and natural resources should be a new frontier for United States 
enterprise”.98 In 1942 this ambition was given expression in a high profile US 
technical mission to Brazil led by Morris L. Cooke to explore the potential for the 
country’s development.99     
The notion that the Roosevelt administration thought of Brazil as their own 
exclusive territory was reinforced within the Foreign Office by various off-hand 
comments by US officials regarding that country. In January 1942 Pierson reportedly 
told an official in the British embassy in Rio that the US would happily leave the 
commercial field to the British in Argentina, but were determined that the British 
should leave them Brazil in return. Similarly, Welles once compared the US position 
in Brazil with that of Britain’s in Egypt.100 
But while Brazil may have been a special case, fears that blacklisting was 
similarly being used to exclude British interests throughout the region were expressed. 
In Uruguay the British ambassador reported nascent “signs of a desire on the part of 
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the United States to oust British interests and influence” from the country. In Bolivia 
the ambassador pointed to indications “that the policy of the United States 
Government is aimed at [the] long-term object of eradicating British interests”. 
Similarly, in Chile the ambassador judged that US ambitions to exclude Britain from 
the country, while “by no means so obvious” as in Brazil, were nevertheless “possibly 
latent”.101  
These reports fuelled the belief in London that the flow of events in Brazil was 
the beginning of a broader movement across South America to exclude British 
interests. Lord Drogheda of MEW expressed this belief to Under Secretary of State 
David Scott, noting that the breakdown of Anglo-American cooperation in Brazil was 
not a matter solely of blacklisting policy, but pertained to commercial relations 
generally. “The question”, stated Drogheda, “is really one of the protection of British 
interests and influence in Latin America against American aggression”.102  
The Foreign Office was of the same mind. Scott agreed with Drogheda that 
whereas Britain was pursuing the limited goal in the prosecution of economic warfare 
in Latin America of damaging the Axis war effort, US policy was aimed at the 
eradication of “all Axis connections and interests, … with a view to commercial 
domination after the war”. It was clear, Scott went on, that “we have almost as little 
place in this post-war scheme as the Germans”. In order to try to check US intentions 
it was therefore deemed necessary to again draw attention in Washington to the US 
breach of the Anglo-American arrangements for consultation over blacklisting in 
South America.103  
Halifax subsequently raised the issue in a meeting with Welles on 9 June. The 
unilateral decision of the US to negotiate the removal of Brazilian firms from the 
blacklist outside of the established proclaimed list committee, stated Halifax, “implied 
a certain lack of co-operation” between the US and Britain in that country. But Welles 
queried Halifax’s version of events in Brazil, suggesting that the US had been forced 
to exclude Britain from the blacklisting process in Brazil due to Brazilian resentment 
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of Britain. He therefore shrugged off Halifax’s protest and British suspicions were left 
undiminished.104 
The failure of Anglo-American cooperation in Brazil also reaffirmed British 
perceptions of its friends and enemies concerning its interests in South America. The 
different version of events concerning blacklisting policy in Brazil adhered to by 
Welles was, British officials believed, the result of him having been given a false 
picture of the situation by Jefferson Caffery, the US ambassador in Rio.105 Caffery, it 
was believed, was overstating anti-British feeling within the Brazilian government in 
order to use this as an excuse to exclude Britain from wartime activities in the 
country.106 The true source of Anglophobic sentiment, British officials believed, was 
Caffery himself. Beyond a presumption that Caffery’s Irish-Catholic heritage 
endowed him with an anti-British bias, his attempts to try to sideline Britain from 
events in Brazil added to the conviction among British officials that he was to be 
regarded as a danger to British interests in South America.107 “Twisting the British 
tail”, remarked Scott, was one of Caffery’s favourite hobbies.108  
This may not have been viewed with any great concern in London had it not 
been for Caffery’s perceived influence and autonomy in directing US policy in Brazil. 
A career Foreign Service officer who had first gained experience of Latin America 
when posted to Caracas in 1911, Caffery went on to gain great experience of the 
region. During the inter-war years he served as ambassador to El Salvador, Colombia 
and Cuba, before taking up his post in Brazil in 1937.109 By 1942 Caffery regarded 
that country, according to Mather-Jackson, as his own personal “satrapy” where he 
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would “countenance no opinion or influence but his own”.110 This belief left British 
officials with a sense of hopelessness when complaining to Washington about US 
policy in the country. As Charles put it, it was hard to influence US policy in Brazil 
when “we are not dealing with people who put their cards on the table”.111 Similarly, 
having been rebuffed in his complaints to Welles over US policy in Brazil, Halifax 
concluded that such “frontal” approaches in Washington were likely to prove fruitless 
so long as Caffery was free to act with such a degree of autonomy in Rio.112   
 
Codifying British Suspicions 
In July the broader suspicions raised by the crisis in Anglo-American relations in 
Brazil were synthesised in a paper by Gallop that was distributed widely among 
British government departments. The implications of the breakdown in cooperation 
between the US and Britain with regard to blacklisting in Brazil, Gallop believed, 
went much further than economic warfare policy in that country. Rather, the situation 
in Brazil was an example of a nascent rivalry between US and British interests in 
South America. As such, the failure of cooperation between the two countries in the 
application of a wartime measure was caused by ambitions and concerns for the post-
war era. These “first light skirmishes”, Gallop believed, were taking place in Brazil 
because the factors leading to a conflict of interest between the US and Britain were 
more fully advanced in that country than anywhere else in the region. In this sense, 
the crisis experienced in Brazil represented not an isolated incident, but rather a 
pattern that “is likely to repeat itself in other countries”.  
Gallop began his paper with the solemn warning to government departments 
that “relations with the United States constitute the biggest long-term problem facing 
us in Latin America”. He then went on to describe the separate forces from within the 
US that were influencing the country’s policy in Latin America and the net effect that 
these various factions would have on British interests in the region. The principal 
threat to British interests, Gallop believed, came from “the imperialistic pressures of 
big business” to remove their British rivals from South America. While it remained 
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improbable that the State Department shared this aim, it would be hard for them to 
wholly disregard the appeals of the business community. The resulting attitude of the 
State Department, therefore, was not an active drive to exclude British interests, but 
equally, neither was it a determined effort to protect British concerns.   
Overall, Gallop surmised, the US attitude toward Latin America was based on 
the loose assumption that the US would occupy a “special position of hegemony” in 
the region. This presumption, he sought to make clear, was not expressed in official 
US policy and was rarely stated unambiguously by US officials. Indeed, it could not 
be, as the US attitude toward Latin America seemed to “conflict with the official 
United States policy as expressed in the Atlantic [Charter]”. Instead, “the feeling that 
the United States shall be the preponderant influence in Latin America” found 
expression in a general disinclination on the part of the State Department and other 
US agencies to cooperate with Britain in that region. When looking forward to the 
post-war era, Gallop concluded, the US would regard Latin America as an area in 
which they must have a special position”. With regards to Britain’s place in South 
America, on the other hand, the US expected its “political and economic interests to 
dwindle”.113  
So by the summer of 1942, notwithstanding the limited cooperation achieved 
with the US regarding blacklisting and the supply of goods to South America, British 
suspicions of its interests being excluded from the region in the post-war era 
remained. US officials in the State Department were well aware of this. As Selden 
Chapin, Assistant Chief of the Division of American Republic Affairs put it, there 
remained among the British in South America an “underlying feeling of distrust 
which is ready to break into more active hostility at any time”.114 It was consequently 
to the task of allaying British fears that internationalists in the State Department put 
their minds. 
                     
Promoting Multilateralism 
Internationalists in the State Department viewed the disunity between Britain and the 
US in South America not only as a distraction from Anglo-American collaboration in 
the successful prosecution of the war, but also as a potential danger to the multilateral 
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trade programme that they were so determined to ensure British participation in 
during the post-war era. They fully understood that Britain’s chief fear regarding 
South America was that the war would be used as an opportunity to eradicate British 
export markets on a permanent basis. Internationalists like Herbert Feis, Economic 
Advisor for International Affairs in the State Department, recognised that Britain 
would need such markets in the post-war years in order to maintain a healthy balance 
of payments.115 Moreover, internationalists feared that British suspicions of being 
excluded from South America would dilute their calls for Britain to liberalise its 
protected markets.  
No one was more aware of this dilemma than Acheson. He personified the 
dual goals of promoting multilateral trade and attaining cooperation with the British, 
given his professional attachment to the multilateral trade programme and his personal 
affection for the British.116 He had perceived British suspicions of being excluded 
from South America as a threat to the US ambition of forcing British acceptance of 
multilateralism in early negotiations over Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement – 
the section aimed at instituting a multilateral trade system in the post-war era. In late 
1941 Acheson was presented with a revised draft of Article VII prepared by the 
British War Cabinet. In this version the US and Britain would work toward the 
“economic objectives” of the Atlantic Charter only “as part of a general plan”, aimed 
at the “attainment of a balanced international economy”. Acheson immediately 
understood these opaque references to be an attempt to ensure British access to South 
America in return for liberalising its protected markets.117 
In light of negotiations such as this, internationalists like Acheson saw it as 
imperative to try to convince Britain that the multilateral trade philosophy – exalted in 
the Atlantic Charter and being pursued in negotiations concerning Article VII of the 
Master Lend-Lease Agreement – would apply equally to Latin America as to the rest 
of the world. As Chapin put it, this would reassure the British that the US did not look 
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upon Latin America “as a closed market for American goods” and would not try to 
exclude British traders from the region in the post-war years.118  
Hawkins, also, had long been an advocate of multilateralism.119 In order to 
placate British fears of being excluded from South America he believed that the US 
should re-negotiate the existing Lend-Lease agreements with the South American 
countries to incorporate a pledge instituting a multilateral trade system in Latin 
America, similar to the one being negotiated with Britain.120 Without this, he warned 
his colleagues, suspicions could be raised that the US planned “a different kind of 
regime for this hemisphere than that which we want for the rest of the world”.121 This 
was a step too far for others in the State Department who lacked the same zeal for 
multilateralism as Hawkins, but nevertheless a circular sent to Latin American 
missions on 10 July 1942 concerning commercial relations with Britain was 
unequivocal in its conveyance of US trade principles. 
With Acheson as the author, this circular noted with concern the “mutual 
suspicion and bitter rivalry” that continued to characterise Anglo-American 
commercial relations in the region. Such acrimony, Acheson explained, while being 
“unfortunate at any time”, was “particularly harmful under present wartime 
conditions”. The remedy suggested was for US officials to emphasise the multilateral 
trade programme, currently being negotiated between the US and Britain, in all 
discussions with their British counterparts in the region, as well as with US 
businessmen. Acheson paid particular attention to Article VII of the Master Lend-
Lease Agreement that he had taken the lead in negotiating with Britain. As he 
explained:  
This Article is being recognized increasingly as a milestone in the 
development of international economic relations, providing as it does a 
framework for promoting mutually beneficial economic relations between the 
United Kingdom and the United States and ‘other nations of like mind’ based 
upon the principle of nondiscrimination [sic] and equality of treatment among 
nations.  
In this sense Acheson sought to reaffirm the universal applicability of the multilateral 
trade policy being pursued by internationalists in the State Department in their 
negotiations with Britain. Within this general policy the US had no grounds, and 
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indeed, no reason, to try to exclude British interests from South America. Put more 
simply, he advocated “a live-and-let-live policy” that “will best serve the interests of 
both countries”.122  
  Having been informed of the substance of the State Department circular, the 
Foreign Office took heart from the reassurance. Sir Ronald Campbell, the principal 
political advisor to Halifax in Washington, believed the instructions given by the State 
Department represented “a great advance in Anglo-American relations in Latin 
America”.123 With US prompting the Foreign Office sent a parallel telegram to its 
missions in the region.124 This repeated the substance of the State Department circular 
and reminded British officials that the British government “attach the utmost 
importance to … fostering … the closest possible relations between British and 
United States representatives, official and non-official, in all parts of the world”.125  
 
The Fruits of Cooperation 
Both the US and British circulars to Latin America requested that their representatives 
report back on the status of Anglo-American commercial relations in their host 
country. The replies that the State Department received throughout the summer of 
1942 included much to encourage those who hoped to foster a spirit of collaboration 
between the wartime allies in South America. A picture of mutual cooperation 
between US and British officials and businessmen throughout the region was 
conveyed, as one-time bitter rivals put their differences aside for the sake of unity in 
the war effort. As William Dawson, US ambassador to Uruguay put it, harmonious 
relations between the US and British communities had been “accentuated in the 
course of the present world conflict”. Indeed, Dawson went so far as to describe the 
collaboration in Uruguay as having reached an extent whereby “one can properly 
speak – as is often done – of a single Anglo-American community rather than two 
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separate colonies”.126 The picture painted by US officials across the region may not 
quite have mirrored this level of fraternity, but nonetheless the general impression 
conveyed throughout South America was a sense of unity brought about by the co-
belligerent status of the two countries.127   
The response from British representatives to the Foreign Office, while not as 
positive as on the US side, did portray a similar picture of improved cooperation in 
South America.128 By July this amity in relations existed even to some degree in 
Brazil – the previous locus of Anglo-American rivalry in South America. Simmons 
described a “remarkable improvement” in relations between US and British 
commercial interests in Brazil, with even some “dyed-in-the-wool Anglophobes” 
among the US community showing a willingness “to bury the hatchet and exert 
themselves to a better Anglo-American understanding”.129 Some of this improvement 
was due to the arrival in July of a new Commercial Counselor in the British embassy 
in Rio, Lyale Nosworthy. Upon arriving in Brazil, Nosworthy successfully established 
greater contact between the British and US missions in Rio.130 Indeed, by November 
1942 he was able to claim that far from the lack of cooperation that had previously 
characterised Anglo-American relations in Brazil, the two countries were now 
working together more closely than ever. Moreover, this collaboration was taking 
place, Nosworthy claimed, “on a footing of equality”.131  
The one recurring issue that US officials reported as continuing to cause 
tensions between the British and Americans in South America was the continued use 
by British exporters of the “Britain Delivers the Goods” slogan placed on its exports 
to the region.132 In response to this British propaganda, US businessmen requested 
that a similar sticker be placed on US exports to the region, emphasising their own 
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source of origin. This would ensure US exporters gained the credit for continuing to 
supply South American needs despite the hardships brought about by the war. CIAA 
was keen on this idea, suggesting that a sticker placed on US goods would “compete 
favourably with the one used by the British”.133 However, when this idea was put to 
the State Department it was vetoed for its potential to further increase tensions 
between the US and British communities in South America. Such a sticker would only 
act as “a further irritant” in so far as it would be “interpreted by the British as an 
attempt on our part to exclude them from trade in the Western Hemisphere”.134 With 
this reasoning the proposed sticker to counter British propaganda and aid US 
exporters in South America was abandoned in the name of promoting multilateralism 
in the region and thereby ensuring cooperation with the British. In this sense the 
decision was representative of the broader attempt by internationalists in the State 
Department to allay British fears of being excluded from South America in the post-
war era.   
 
Guarded Optimism 
For some British officials, US attempts to promote cooperation in South America 
amounted to little more than empty rhetoric. “Behind all the good cooperation which 
undoubtedly exists”, stated the ambassador in Caracas, there remained “a feeling on 
the American side that European countries are really intruders both politically, 
territorially, commercially and strategically in this hemisphere”.135 Such a view was 
supported by British officials throughout the region. In Chile the British ambassador 
pointed to the “instinctive feeling” among US officials in the country that “the United 
States have a special position in South America and that there is by no means the 
same necessity for British representation”.136 The British ambassador in Argentina, 
Sir David Kelly, was a prominent Foreign Service officer with substantial knowledge 
of South America.137 Writing to the Foreign Office in October 1942, he stated his 
belief that for many Americans in Argentina ‘cooperation’ did not mean working 
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together in order to achieve shared goals, but rather that Britain should stand aside and 
allow the US to direct events in the country, while neglecting to attend to British 
interests.138 “Some Americans”, Kelly contested, “quite honestly use the word ‘co-
operation’ in a different sense to ours”.139 
 Lord Davidson, who also had extensive knowledge of South America, painted 
a similarly bleak picture.140 During a tour of the region in November 1942, as part of 
his role as an informal advisor on British commercial policy in South America, 
Davidson described a situation that was generally unsatisfactory due to the feeling on 
the US side that Britain “had no future in South America and had better get out”.141 
British businessmen based in the region voiced similar opinions. In Brazil Soar 
complained that the US was “not playing the game with the old country” when it 
came to cooperating in South America. On the contrary, Soar was convinced that “the 
Yanks [would] take every advantage to put on the screw and keep Britain out of all 
the markets they possibly can”.142 Such dissatisfaction regarding relations with the US 
remained widespread among British businessmen across the region.143  
But while this was the case both among private and official British circles in 
South America, there was a more optimistic response to US attempts to enforce 
cooperation in the region among British officials both in Washington and London. 
Alongside the joint circulars sent to Latin American missions in the summer of 1942, 
British officials were reassured that the US did not intend to exclude British interests 
from South America by a series of meetings with senior US officials in Washington. 
In July the British embassy in Washington reported that following several meetings 
with State Department officials they had gained the impression that the Roosevelt 
administration was beginning to believe that Anglo-American unity would serve both 
countries’ interests in South America.144   
These signs of encouragement were bolstered by a series of meetings between 
Adolf Berle and a variety of visiting British officials throughout the summer and 
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autumn. Although perceived to be generally Anglophobic, Berle surprised those 
whom he met both with his congenial manner and his declaration that there was no 
intention on the part of the US to exclude British interests from South America. To 
the contrary, Berle claimed, he was entirely in agreement with the commitment to 
multilateralism, which would bar any such exclusive policy.145   
In making his case to British officials, Berle articulated the belief that the post-
war era would see the widespread industrialisation of Latin America, which, in turn, 
would expand the commercial opportunities in the region for both Britain and the US. 
In this vision of the post-war era, then, trade would cease to be a zero-sum game, and 
Anglo-American competition for scarce markets would become a thing of the past.146 
This argument struck a particular chord with Butler. He was convinced by the end of 
1942 that previous British fears of being excluded from South America were based on 
a backward-looking conception of the region, which failed to account for the 
increased opportunities for trade that would materialise in the post-war years.147 More 
generally, Butler counselled his colleagues in the Foreign Office that the denials of 
the Roosevelt administration of any desire to exclude British interests from South 
America should be taken at their word.148 
Others were not willing to go as far as Butler, but nevertheless, the general 
attitude in the Foreign Office by the end of 1942 was to cautiously welcome the 
stance of the State Department with regard to Anglo-American relations in South 
America. While noting that there was still “much leeway to make up”, Perowne 
pointed hopefully in October to the recent indications of a more cooperative attitude 
on the part of the Roosevelt administration.149 In a similar vein, the Washington 
embassy believed that while there was no “guarantee that the present general attitude 
of the State Department will not change again under altered circumstances”, for the 
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time being, the impulse to exclude British interests from South America was not 
perceived to be a strong one.150   
   
Conclusion 
It is important not to overstate the improvement in Anglo-American relations in South 
America which existed by the autumn of 1942. British scepticism in the region 
certainly remained strong. There may also have been a tendency for US officials 
stationed in the region to tell those hoping to engender cooperation between the 
wartime allies in South America what they wanted to hear, rather than giving a wholly 
accurate picture of the situation. But what is more significant for our purposes is the 
attempt itself by US internationalists to try to engender good relations with the British 
in South America – and, moreover, the way in which they sought to do this. 
Internationalists in the State Department took concerted actions to try to allay British 
fears of being excluded from South America by demonstrating that the multilateral 
trade system that they were promoting for the rest of the world would apply to Latin 
America also. In taking such action they demonstrated a real commitment to 
implementing a global multilateral system for the post-war world.  
They did also manage to create a sense in Whitehall that British interests in 
South America may not have been in such danger as had previously been feared. In 
this sense the situation in South America by the end of 1942 tends to confirm the 
traditional characterisation of the year following Pearl Harbor as the high point of 
Anglo-American cooperation during the Second World War.151 This action on the part 
of the internationalists in the State Department also had the effect of confirming the 
impression among British officials that this group in the Roosevelt administration 
were friendly toward British interests in South America.  
However, this knowledge did not necessarily detract from the conclusion 
drawn by British officials during the first half of 1942 that there were equally those in 
the Roosevelt administration who were hostile toward British interests in the region. 
Influential officials on the ground in South America like Caffery in Brazil and Braden 
in Colombia seemingly had no interest in the internationalists’ multilateral project and 
resented Britain’s presence in South America. Similarly, powerful figures in 
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Washington like Pierson at the Export-Import Bank, Taylor in the Commerce 
Department, and perhaps most importantly, Berle and Welles within the State 
Department, often appeared hostile toward British interests. What remained unclear 
by the autumn of 1942 was which of these two factions within the Roosevelt 
administration would ultimately be the more significant in determining the course of 
US policy toward British interests in South America.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Challenges to Multilateralism and the Return of British Suspicions 
(Autumn 1942 – Spring 1943) 
 
Throughout the autumn of 1942 and into the spring of 1943 it became clear that, 
notwithstanding the efforts of the internationalists to promote multilateralism in Latin 
America, there remained powerful forces within the Roosevelt administration and the 
broader US establishment which posed a direct challenge to this goal. This challenge 
to multilateralism in Latin America came from a wide variety of sources. 
Cumulatively, the influence of Latin Americanists within the State Department, 
temporary government agencies, and US business interests in the region represented a 
parochial faction within the US, focused on Latin America, and largely impervious to 
how this region related to broader global issues of post-war planning. While it may 
not have been their intention, the policies pursued by these groups did in fact threaten 
to exclude British interests from South America. As such, this chapter seeks to show 
that the promotion of multilateralism in Latin America that had been attempted by 
internationalists was continually undermined by the persistence of forces with 
different imperatives.  
The most important of these were the Latin Americanists in the State 
Department. This group was led by Sumner Welles and also included Laurence 
Duggan, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, and members of the Division of 
American Republic Affairs. Imbued with an in-depth knowledge of Latin America 
and a sensitivity to the politics of the region, this group were at the forefront of 
guiding US Latin American policy during World War II. In claiming this region as 
their own exclusive policy domain, they tended to formulate policy toward the region 
without reference to broader geopolitical concerns.  
Reflecting this parochial worldview, Latin Americanists were guided 
throughout World War II by an underlying desire to preserve the political integrity of 
the inter-American system constructed throughout the preceding decade.1 In pursuing 
this goal, British interests in South America and the multilateral project of the 
internationalists were not of the utmost importance. However, a more general belief 
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that European interests represented a potential threat to the unity of the inter-
American system did lead Latin Americanists to advocate policies that had the 
consequence of excluding British interests from the region. This first became clear in 
the attitude of the Latin Americanists toward hemisphere communications interests 
and was later given ideological succour by Welles’ conception of an economic 
Monroe Doctrine.  
While Latin Americanists may have been the primary group guiding US policy 
in Latin America, temporary government agencies, set up for specific wartime 
purposes, increasingly played a more important role in implementing US policy in the 
region during this period. These agencies often acted autonomously of the State 
Department and had no interest in the internationalists’ policy of winning British 
support for multilateralism in the post-war era. Moreover, these groups often worked 
in close alliance with – and were often represented by – US business interests.2 This 
group, while not necessarily hostile to the internationalists’ economic plans for the 
post-war era, had little interest in safeguarding British interests in South America in 
the service of this scheme. In looking toward post-war commercial opportunities in 
the region, while British interests were hampered by the war effort, these groups 
therefore represented a further threat to multilateralism.  
As British officials observed these tendencies, any optimism that the efforts of 
US internationalists would protect British interests and engender cooperation between 
the two countries in South America soon evaporated. British suspicions of being 
excluded from the region, which had been partially allayed by internationalists in the 
State Department, were therefore quickly re-ignited. 
 
Hemisphere Communications Policy  
Internationalists within the State Department had taken the lead in promoting 
multilateralism in Latin America, just as they advocated such an economic system in 
direct negotiations with Britain concerning the post-war world. This has led many 
authors to believe that the State Department as a whole was committed to 
multilateralism in South America.3 But it was not the internationalists in the 
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department that had primary responsibility for wartime policy in the region. Rather, 
this fell to the Latin Americanists. By the end of 1942, as the wartime policies 
initiated by the Latin Americanists started to come in to full operation, this group 
were forced to confront the fact that some of these policies posed a threat to the 
internationalists’ efforts at promoting multilateralism. This was highlighted most 
dramatically by the case of the Brazilian telecommunications consortium, Radiobras, 
and in particular, the attitude adopted toward British interests in the consortium. In 
order to fully understand US policy regarding this case it is necessary first to discuss 
the Roosevelt administration’s policy toward hemisphere communications systems 
more broadly. 
 The communications systems throughout Latin America were deemed an 
important factor affecting US national security even before Pearl Harbor, as the US 
sought to consolidate the defence capabilities of the Western Hemisphere.4 This was 
reflected in Roosevelt’s instruction to Nelson A. Rockefeller, head of CIAA, on 24 
September 1941 to form and chair an inter-departmental committee to study the state 
of inter-American communications systems and to suggest ways in which these might 
be improved.5 The committee formed to carry out this task, the Inter-departmental 
Advisory Committee on Hemispheric Communications (IACHC), painted a picture in 
its report of 30 January 1942 of a dilapidated network throughout Latin America. It 
recommended that out of necessity it would fall upon the US, with the aid of Latin 
American countries, to develop the communication systems of the Western 
Hemisphere.6 Of greater concern in the post-Pearl Harbor era, when the report was 
published, it also documented the vast interests that the Axis powers, along with other 
European countries, had in the communications systems of the region. Fearing the 
strategic benefits that control over telecommunications networks could provide the 
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Axis countries, the committee recommended the immediate elimination of Axis 
control or influence over these facilities in Latin America.7  
This policy was in accordance with general measures of economic warfare 
carried out by the US in Latin America. However, the recommendations of IACHC 
went a step further and advocated the “acquisition by Hemisphere interests” of all 
telecommunications systems “now owned, directly or indirectly, by non-Hemisphere 
interests”.8 Although not stated explicitly, this would include British interests. 
Developed throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and the early part of 
the twentieth century, Britain retained substantial interests in Latin America’s 
telecommunications systems by the time of the Second World War.9 By expanding its 
aversion to Axis ownership of telecommunications systems in Latin America to 
include “non-Hemisphere interests” more broadly, the US committee therefore sought 
to make inter-American communications systems the exclusive preserve of 
“Hemisphere interests”.  
Exactly how this goal would be achieved was left unclear in IACHC’s 
recommendations. For Rockefeller it was self-evident that US interests – be they 
private, governmental, or a combination of both – would play the dominant role in 
acquiring non-hemisphere communications concerns.10 However, this notion caused 
alarm in the State Department – which was also represented in the committee – for 
fear that it would provoke cries of ‘Yankee imperialism’ from the Latin American 
governments. These concerns led Welles to inform Rockefeller in April 1942 that the 
State Department “does not favour a monopolistic control by United States interests 
of telecommunication facilities in the other American republics”.11 These differences 
over precisely how hemisphere telecommunications interests would be divested of 
control by non-hemisphere interests remained when Roosevelt endorsed IACHC’s 
recommendations and advocated their swift implementation later that month.12  
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Welles’ objection to Rockefeller’s proposal confirms the awareness of Latin 
American sensitivities commonly ascribed to Latin Americanists within the State 
Department.13 However, when viewed from the perspective of the Roosevelt 
administration’s attitude toward European interests in Latin America, it is the 
consensus among policy-makers that is most striking. No one involved in policy 
discussions at this point – including Roosevelt – objected to the notion of eradicating 
non-hemisphere interests from the telecommunications industry of the Western 
Hemisphere. While Welles may have objected to excluding Latin American countries 
from the process, he voiced no such objection to excluding European interests from 
the region. On the contrary, he made it clear to Rockefeller that he favoured doing 
everything possible to encourage the Latin American governments to acquire 
communications concerns from their current European owners.14   
The contradiction between this exclusionary policy and the multilateral trading 
system being advocated by internationalists in the State Department apparently did 
not occur to US policy-makers at this stage. It was only when US communications 
policy in the Western Hemisphere was put in to action, and an attempt to eradicate the 
interests of a British concern in the region was made plain, that the Latin Americanists 
were forced to confront this contradiction.   
 
Radiobras 
Following Roosevelt’s acceptance of the recommendations made by IACHC he asked 
Vice President Henry A. Wallace, in his role as Chairman of BEW, to take 
responsibility for the implementation of a programme to achieve the goals set out by 
the committee.15 Subsequently, in May 1942, Wallace set up the US Commercial 
Company (USCC), as an offshoot of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to 
administer this programme.16 Muddying the waters further, Roosevelt left out any 
mention of eliminating non-Hemisphere interests from inter-American 
telecommunications systems in his instructions to Wallace, stating only that the 
purpose of the programme was to divest “enemy nationals of their present financial 
control of communication systems” and to improve “such facilities for the use of the 
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governments of all the American Republics”.17 But when this programme was put in 
to practice by USCC it logically followed the recommendations adopted by IACHC, 
including the instruction to rid inter-American telecommunications systems of all 
non-Hemisphere interests.    
 This ambition was made plain by USCC’s policy toward the principal 
Brazilian telecommunications consortium, Companhia Radiotelegraphica Brasileira – 
known by its abbreviated name, Radiobras. Owned principally by a combination of 
US, British, and German interests, USCC sent a mission to Rio in late 1942 to 
eliminate Axis interests from Radiobras.18 At the outset Hugh Knowlton, the Vice 
President of USCC, made clear to Louis Halle of the State Department’s Office of 
American Republic Affairs, his reluctance to divest the company of its German 
concerns for fear that the spoils would have to be shared with British interests. Such 
action, noted Knowlton, would be contrary to USCC’s programme aimed at “the 
acquisition of non-hemisphere interests by hemisphere interests”. USCC therefore 
advocated the nationalisation of the company by the Brazilian government. Halle 
warned Knowlton of the danger of any actions that would cause distrust between the 
British and the US, but the mission went ahead as planned.  
However, on arriving in Rio, Alexander Royce, the USCC official charged 
with this mission, informed Knowlton and Halle that Radiobras had in fact already 
been largely purged of Axis interests and was consequently owned by a combination 
of US and British concerns. On receiving this news Halle contacted Knowlton to 
enquire why USCC was still advocating the nationalisation of a company that was 
solely owned by US and British concerns. In reply Knowlton revealed that his 
ultimate aim was to get the company into Brazilian public ownership and 
subsequently get it distributed to US and Brazilian private interests. On completion of 
such action, Knowlton boasted, “we could congratulate ourselves on having very 
neatly eliminated all non-hemisphere interests from the Company”.19 The “British 
would not like it”, conceded Knowlton, but, as he made plain to Halle, such a goal 
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was wholly consistent with official US policy toward inter-American communications 
systems.  
On learning of USCC’s blatant ambition “to oust the British from Radiobras” 
Halle was concerned over the effect this would have on winning British cooperation 
with US economic warfare policy in Latin America. He reminded Knowlton that the 
US was currently seeking British cooperation in implementing its communications 
policy in Latin America and that it was “therefore important to avoid taking any 
action which would confirm whatever suspicions the British may have of our 
motives”. Moreover, Halle brought the case to the attention of others in the State 
Department, and advocated making clear to Knowlton that USCC’s programme of 
“ousting the British from telecommunications” in the Western Hemisphere “is out of 
line with our foreign policy and therefore cannot be carried out”.20  
Halle’s objections to USCC’s efforts to purge British interests from Radiobras 
centred on the effect such action would have on cooperation with the British 
government in the attainment of wartime policies in the region. But this case had 
much broader ramifications as it forced the State Department to recognise the 
contradictions between US policy toward inter-American communications systems 
during the war and its attempts to win British support for a multilateral trade 
programme in the post-war era. Moreover, it challenged the State Department to 
tackle this contradiction and bring its wartime policy into line with its post-war 
ambitions.  
 
Wartime Policy and Post-War Ambitions 
Bonsal fully understood that the case of Radiobras had raised “a matter of basic post-
war policy”, with implications “going far beyond the particular case” in question. As 
such, he believed that the issue raised by this case would be “increasingly raised with 
reference to other cases, not only in the field of telecommunications, but with regard 
to all vital public services that … bear on hemisphere defence”. He therefore 
requested guidance from his superiors in answer to the following question: “Shall it be 
our policy”, asked Bonsal, “to favour the exclusion of non-hemisphere interests, 
whether United Nations or ex-Axis, from the participation in the vital public services 
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of the hemisphere?” 21  Bonsal was well aware of the contradiction between such a 
policy and the multilateral trade programme being advocated for the post-war era. “To 
translate the political solidarity of the American republics into a commercial and 
economic exclusiveness”, as Bonsal put it, “would be wholly inconsistent with the 
general aims of our foreign policy”. So while excluding non-hemisphere interests 
from the major public services of the Western Hemisphere would undoubtedly “give 
the United States a preferred position in an area of immense economic possibilities 
during the next few generations”, such a policy, argued Bonsal, would ultimately “be 
contrary to our long-term political interests”.22 
The reply that Bonsal received from Welles was not the unequivocal rebuttal 
of an exclusionary policy that he had clearly hoped for. While Welles willingly 
asserted that the US government had “no desire to set up a closed area within the 
Western Hemisphere”, he subsequently went on to implicitly advocate just such a 
policy. “I feel very strongly”, stated Welles, “that from the security standpoint, under 
present unsettled conditions of the world, it is certainly in the interest of all the 
American Republics that aviation and communications … be in the hands of interests 
of the American Republics”.23 While this policy may have been justified as a response 
to the contingent threats created by the war, Welles wilfully ignored the obvious links 
between policy carried out during wartime and the situation that would arise 
thereafter. Put simply, it was obvious to all concerned that once excluded from Latin 
America, European interests would find it virtually impossible to regain footholds 
within that region. Such a statement of policy, then, explicitly denied any intention to 
exclude European interests from the vital public services of post-war Latin America 
and then went on to advocate a policy that would, in reality, have just that effect.    
Welles’ contradictory views were subsequently echoed in the State 
Department’s administration of economic warfare in Latin America. A couple of 
months after the Radiobras debacle, Bonsal wrote a note to those requiring guidance 
on the implementation of policy regarding communications interests in Latin 
America. In his instructions Bonsal cloaked the dualism handed down by Welles with 
evasion. Previously Bonsal had demonstrated a clear understanding of the linkage 
between the measures of economic warfare and the status of Latin America in the 
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post-war era. In stark contrast he now stated glibly that “our policy of eliminating 
Axis interests from communications companies in this hemisphere is purely a war-
time policy and … it is unnecessary and perhaps undesirable at this time to take a 
position” regarding the post-war situation.24 This doublespeak reflected the 
contradictions that existed in Welles’ own thinking about Latin America and the post-
war economic planning. 
 
Sumner Welles and the Inter-American System 
Welles advocated a global system of economic multilateralism for the post-war world 
in a similar vein to all other high-ranking State Department officials. Indeed, Welles 
had played a significant role in attempting to win British support for a commitment to 
multilateralism in the Atlantic Charter declaration of 1941. As he recalled in his 
memoirs, his goal during these negotiations was to ensure that the US and Britain 
“jointly assume leadership in the post-war world in bringing about the elimination of 
autarchic trade systems, and in abolishing … discriminatory commercial 
arrangements”.25 But Welles’ commitment to economic multilateralism was largely 
based on the part it would play in securing political stability in the post-war world, 
rather than as an end in itself.26 Moreover, while Welles was certainly involved in 
post-war planning with the British during the war, his principal focus was on Latin 
American policy.   
Welles had long been an authority on Latin American affairs. He first gained 
experience of the region while serving as commercial attaché in Buenos Aires during 
World War I and later as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in the early 
1920s. By the time Roosevelt came to power in 1933 Welles had developed a 
sophisticated understanding of the politics of the region, as well as fluency in 
Spanish.27 This expertise in Latin American affairs, alongside his friendship with 
Roosevelt, made Welles an obvious choice to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for 
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Latin American Affairs in the new administration.28 In this role, during his brief 
interregnum as ambassador to Cuba, and finally as Under Secretary of State, Welles 
became the dominant figure throughout the 1930s implementing the administration’s 
Good Neighbour policy toward Latin America.29 Throughout this period Welles’ 
overriding aim had been to forge an inter-American system, based on the principle of 
judicial equality between states.30  
As the threat of war in Europe loomed, the primary aim of US policy in Latin 
America – with Welles as the chief protagonist – was to engender sufficient unity 
among the American states to ensure the security of the Western Hemisphere.31 
Substantial progress toward this goal was made at the Buenos Aires conference in 
1936 where the principle was established that a threat to any American state was a 
threat to all.32 Welles was subsequently successful in maintaining a degree of unity 
among the American states at the Rio conference of 1942 when all agreed to a 
resolution advocating the breaking of relations with the Axis countries, following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.33 As Welles looked to the post-war era, maintaining the unity 
forged among the American states throughout the war – and therefore the integrity of 
the inter-American system – became one of his principal priorities.  
In common with most other US officials, Welles believed that the inter-
American system developed under the auspices of the Good Neighbour policy should 
serve as a model for the rest of the world to replicate in the post-war era.34 However, 
while this was certainly a valid aspiration for Welles, his opinion of Europe made it 
seem an unlikely outcome. Welles viewed the major European countries of the 1930s 
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– be they Axis or Allied – as unreformed imperialist powers.35 He therefore held out 
little hope of them replicating the kind of respect for sovereign equality among states, 
which he believed to have been established in the Western Hemisphere. Welles 
subsequently held fast to the belief throughout the war that “the cornerstone of [US] 
foreign policy” in the post-war era should be continued participation in the inter-
American system.36 
 
An ‘Economic Monroe Doctrine’ 
Welles’ dim view of the European powers, combined with his desire to preserve the 
integrity of the inter-American system, led to a natural aversion to European influence 
and interests in Latin America as he looked toward the post-war era. Echoing the 
Monroe Doctrine, first declared in the nineteenth century, Welles was concerned that 
European powers would use their influence in a particular Latin American state in 
order to disrupt the unity of the inter-American system. Welles was well aware that no 
European power was likely to achieve sufficient overt political control over any Latin 
American country in the post-war era to threaten the security of the Western 
Hemisphere. However, based on the precepts guiding US economic warfare policy in 
Latin America during the war, Welles came to the belief that economic domination of 
a Latin American country by a single European power necessarily implied a 
threatening degree of undue political influence, which could, by extension, threaten 
hemispheric security. He subsequently formulated a post-war aim of eradicating 
European economic domination of any one Latin American country.37 
During the winter of 1942-1943 it became clear to British officials that this 
ambition on Welles’ part applied equally to Britain as to a resurgent Germany or 
Italy.38 During an informal conversation between Welles and Kenneth G. Grubb, a 
prominent official in the Ministry of Information with substantial experience of Latin 
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America, the latter pushed Welles for his post-war policy toward Latin America.39 
Welles sought to reassure Grubb that “he was wrongly interpreted if it was supposed 
that he intended to make Latin America what was loosely called “an exclusive 
economic preserve for North American interests”. Nor was he “disposed to quarrel 
with the rights of free enterprise in its usual form”. However, he went on to express 
his fear that “the countries of Europe would after the war tend to build up their 
commerce in the form of virtually state controlled corporations”. “Such corporations 
in the field of foreign trade”, Welles continued, “necessarily exercised a penetrative 
political influence, although they did so under the guise of free competition and 
economic assistance”.  
In order to meet the threat of European powers using a position of commercial 
dominance to disrupt the political unity of the Western Hemisphere, it was therefore 
necessary, Welles believed, “for the sake of the peace of America”, for the US “to 
build up a position both in the political and economic fields which would enable them 
to occlude any such … activities”. Put another way, the US needed “to find some 
form of political attitude towards Latin America which maintained in a modern form 
the kind of guarantee of American invincibility contained in the Monroe Doctrine but 
advanced beyond that famous document to more positive conceptions”.40  
Welles justified extending the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine to include an 
aversion to significant European economic interests in Latin America on the basis of 
preserving the political stability of the Western Hemisphere, and by extension the 
security of the US. This concern was no doubt genuine and was indeed greeted 
sympathetically by some in the Churchill government.41 But regardless of the 
rationalisation offered for an economic Monroe Doctrine, what remained explicit was 
that such as policy would necessarily require US commercial dominance of the 
region, to the exclusion of British interests.42 Indeed, having explained his goals in 
Latin America, Welles acknowledged the dire ramifications of such a policy for 
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Anglo-American relations in the region. Britain, “because of her traditions”, Welles 
explained, “and the United States, because of its phenomenal activity through the 
good neighbour policy in Latin America, were patently becoming rivals” in the 
region.43  
Welles’ exposition of an economic Monroe Doctrine was only made in an 
informal context and no such policy was ever conveyed to London in an official 
capacity. However, the report of Welles’ views concerning Latin America seemed to 
British officials to be a new and dangerous variation of the US drive to exclude 
British interests from South America in the post-war era. As Perowne explained when 
reporting Welles’ views to Campbell, they appeared “to base on political grounds a 
claim for United States economic preponderance in Latin America”. As such, they 
were further proof of “the terrific American campaign aimed at the economic 
annexation of the sub-continent”.44 Similarly, Humphreys noted that while it was not 
the official policy of the US to exclude British interests from South America, Welles 
was seemingly “so concerned about the importance of Latin America to the United 
States that he would like to see the influence of any other power there reduced to a 
minimum”.45  
Welles’ comments elicited the strongest response from Gallop. He regarded 
the claim that US security required economic predominance in Latin America as “a 
new, dangerous, and quite indefensible argument”. The natural corollary to this 
argument, noted Gallop, was that Britain “must be prepared to consent to our own 
virtual ‘occlusion’ in order that the US for purely political reasons may secure an 
overwhelming economic preponderance in Latin America”. Gallop went so far as to 
compare such a policy to the Nazi expansionist doctrine of Lebensraum. While 
allowing that the US was not yet “as imperialist as Germany or Sumner Welles as 
ruthless as Hitler”, he nevertheless maintained that “the parallel is not inept”.46 If 
nothing else, the strength of feeling elicited by Welles’ comments is indicative of the 
sense of rivalry that existed between the US and Britain in South America by this 
point in time. And while sentiments such as Gallop’s were contained within the 
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private correspondence of the British government, such attitudes were bound to have 
an effect on Anglo-American relations in the region. 
 
Britain’s Toxic Influence in Argentina 
When expounding his theory of an economic Monroe Doctrine Welles made clear that 
the concept had particular relevance to Britain in regard to the country’s role in 
Argentina.47 Diplomacy between the US and Britain concerning Argentina during the 
war is the single topic that has received the most attention of all aspects of Anglo-
American relations in South America during this period.48 It is not the intention here 
to retrace Anglo-American diplomacy concerning Argentina in its entirety, but rather 
to show how relations between the US and Britain in that country informed Welles’ 
concept of an economic Monroe Doctrine.     
Of all Britain’s economic interests in South American by the time of World 
War II, it was the country’s ties to Argentina that most strongly echoed Britain’s past 
supremacy in the region in the nineteenth century.49 From the 1860s onwards, British 
interests dominated all substantial enterprise in Argentina.50 Building the first long 
railway in the country in 1863, British interests went on to develop an extensive rail 
system in the country, which they retained control of by the time of the Second World 
War.51 The British community in Argentina by the 1940s remained the largest and 
most prosperous outside of the Empire.52 More importantly, Britain remained 
Argentina’s principal market for its primary export, meat.53 This commercial 
dominance gave Britain exactly the kind of political influence over Argentina that 
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Welles was so averse to. For instance, British interests had been particularly effective 
in influencing the Argentine government’s labour policies in the late nineteenth 
century.54 Moreover, the US experience with Argentina since entering the war had 
seemingly confirmed Welles’ fear that Britain’s position in the country could be used 
to disrupt inter-American unity. 
US frustration with Argentina had begun during the Rio conference of January 
1942 when the Argentine regime, under President Ramón Castillo, blocked a US 
proposal that all American states immediately sever diplomatic relations with the Axis 
countries following the attack on Pearl Harbor.55 Throughout 1942, Argentina, along 
with Chile, retained diplomatic relations with the Axis countries and thereby caused a 
breach in the US policy of hemispheric unity in the face of the threat posed by the war 
in Europe.56 Argentine neutrality, in particular during this time, was a great source of 
consternation to US officials, as they believed it to be not only a breach of inter-
American unity, but also a reflection of the fascist sympathies of the Castillo regime.57 
Based on these concerns, the US deployed targeted sanctions and waged a propaganda 
campaign against the Castillo government during 1942 in the hope of replacing it with 
the pro-Allied Radical Party opposition.58 
However, US attempts in this endeavour were continually frustrated by the 
attitude of the British toward Argentina. Officially the Churchill government 
supported the US desire for Argentina to break relations with the Axis.59 However, in 
the reality the British failed to take a similarly condemnatory attitude toward 
Argentine neutrality.60 One the one hand this was due to the fact that British officials 
in Argentina genuinely failed to share the US view that Argentine neutrality was 
based on pro-Nazi sympathies.61 But the British position also reflected the 
unwillingness of the British business community in Argentina to sacrifice its interests 
in a programme of sanctions.62 On the contrary, US officials believed British 
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commercial interests were actively undermining their sanctions toward Argentina by 
offering to supply goods.63 US frustrations at the lack of British support for their 
policy in Argentina were accentuated when the Castillo government boasted of the 
disunity between the wartime allies to try to justify its stance to the Argentine 
public.64   
It was these frustrations that led Welles on 26 December 1942 to inform 
Halifax of his belief that “many of the most important figures in the commercial and 
financial life of the British [community] in Argentina were consistently and publicly 
stating that Argentina should not break relations with the Axis powers”. To the 
contrary, Welles continued, “British interests” had made clear to the Argentines that 
they “favored the position of so-called neutrality which the Argentine Government 
had up to now maintained”. In order to dispel this belief, Welles requested that the 
British government make an unequivocal statement asserting that their policy toward 
Argentina was exactly the same as the US.65 British sensitivity to US criticism 
compelled them to do as requested and a public statement condemning Argentine 
neutrality followed.66  
Shortly after Britain’s public statement, US officials sought to induce Britain 
to use its impending meat contract with Argentina as leverage to force the Castillo 
government to clamp down on Axis espionage and subversive activities. Specifically, 
the argument, which was duly conveyed by the British ambassador in Buenos Aries, 
was that German radio codes were being transmitted from Argentine territory to 
German submarines in order to aid attacks on British ships in the South Atlantic. 
Unless these were halted, the Argentines were informed, Britain would be unable to 
spare the shipping space to export Argentine meat and the impending contract would 
therefore be lost. This threat proved successful and the radio transmissions 
immediately ceased.67 
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This limited success in modifying Argentina’s behaviour, along with Chile’s 
breaking of relations with the Axis in January 1943, were perceptible shifts toward the 
unity of the American states desired by the US. But the Castillo government remained 
in power in Argentina and continued to resolutely adhere to its policy of neutrality. 
Likewise, while Britain had showed itself willing to use its commercial power to alter 
Argentine policy to an extent, Anglo-Argentine commercial ties remained strong into 
1943 and continued to provide a vital prop for the Castillo government’s hold on 
power.68  
Both the success and the limitations of the US experience of deploying British 
influence to alter Argentina’s attitude toward the Axis confirmed the more general 
belief that Britain’s commercial dominance in the country could be put to great 
political influence. While this influence may at times be put to ends favourable to US 
goals in Latin America, it could equally be utilised to threaten inter-American unity. If 
this threat to inter-American unity was to be removed for the post-war years, British 
commercial domination of Argentina – and the subsequent political influence it 
entailed – could not be permitted to remain. In this sense, the US experience of 
Anglo-Argentine relations confirmed the precepts informing Welles’ concept of an 
economic Monroe Doctrine.  
  Until his departure in September 1943, Welles was clearly an influential figure 
within the Roosevelt administration.69 Beyond his official position as Under Secretary 
of State, he was widely regarded to be much closer to Roosevelt, and able to influence 
the President’s thinking, than his boss in the State Department.70 Moreover, he was 
the principal figure guiding US policy in Latin America in the State Department. 
Because of his particular concern with the inter-American system, which he regarded 
as essential to the defence of US security, his attitude toward that part of the world 
stood at odds with the internationalists’ hopes of promoting multilateralism. 
This division within the State Department meant it was unable to take decisive 
action to protect British interests in South America, and thereby promote 
multilateralism in the region. This opened the way for other US agencies and 
individuals to influence US policy in the region. Unsurprisingly, Britain’s interests 
and the internationalists’ multilateral project were not at the forefront of these groups’ 
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concerns. This development was wholly predictable. Indeed, Bonsal, who alone 
among the Latin Americanists had proved particularly perceptive in highlighting the 
contradictions of the State Department’s policy, cautioned Welles that “unless the 
Department gives direction to the thinking of other governmental agencies, we may 
find built up a body of opinion which we may have trouble in combating later on”.71 
While Welles was largely impervious to Bonsal’s warning, British policy-markers 
viewed the presence of US agencies and individuals in Latin America, acting 
autonomously of the State Department, with increasing consternation. These concerns 
first centred on the activities of US businessmen in South America, many with ties to 
official Washington.  
 
Semi-Official Businessmen 
British officials in South America had been aware of the threat posed by US 
businessmen serving the government in the region in a semi-official capacity for some 
time. In October 1942 Kelly informed the Foreign Office that while the US 
ambassador, Norman Armour, was generally friendly toward Britain, “the attitude of a 
strong minority” of Americans in Argentina was that Britain’s day was over in the 
region and that US interests should be recognised as taking precedence.72 A similar 
situation was reported in Brazil where a plethora of US agencies were stationed by the 
end of 1942.73 Notwithstanding recent improvement in relations between the US and 
British missions in Brazil, Nosworthy warned in November that there remained many 
Americans present in the country, in a semi-official capacity, who were intent upon 
tying up the country with contracts for the post-war era. This threat, warned 
Nosworthy, remained “the most serious thing we have to face” in Brazil.74  
One report from Brazil that caused particular concern related to the restrictions 
on Britain’s exports to South America that were enforced by the Export White Paper. 
According to reports reaching London, US businessmen were spreading rumours 
among local business circles in Brazil alleging that Britain would remain dependent 
on Lend-Lease – and therefore subject to the same restrictions on its exports that came 
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with the aid – for some time after the end of the war.75 The clear implication of this 
rumour was that if Brazilians wanted to receive imported goods as soon as possible 
after the war – which was widely understood to be one of their primary concerns – 
they would be wise to place orders with US companies, which would be unhampered 
by such restrictions following the end of hostilities.76  
The potency of the rumour that British exports would remain hampered by 
Lend-Lease restrictions lay in the fact that British officials were by no means in a 
position to categorically deny this to their potential South American customers.77 The 
status of Lend-Lease following the end of hostilities was only just being broached in 
early 1943 and no firm conclusions as to what would in fact happen to the aid 
programme had been reached.78 Britain’s subsequent primary concern over Lend-
Lease would be the threat – and eventually the reality – of it being discontinued 
abruptly, thereby depriving Britain of its major source of liquidity.79 These earlier 
British concerns in South America over the implications of Lend-Lease being 
continued therefore offer an alternative perspective on British priorities concerning 
the aid.80 
 While British businessmen were convinced that there was a deliberate 
campaign being waged by their US counterparts in South America to encourage the 
belief that Britain would remain hamstrung after the war by Lend-Lease restrictions, 
British officials remained uncertain as to the extent to which this whispering 
campaign had official backing from Washington.81 Charles believed that one source 
of the rumour concerning Britain’s ability to export after the war was Americans 
attached to technical and purchasing missions sent from Washington. But while these 
figures were present in Brazil in at least a semi-official capacity, their links to official 
Washington policy were tenuous.82 Without a clear link between these rumours and 
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policymakers in Washington it was difficult for the Foreign Office to take any 
action.83 Nevertheless, they did consider it wise to enquire of their missions 
throughout South America as to whether the same rumours were being spread 
elsewhere.84  
The replies that the Foreign Office received indicated that the same rumour 
campaign was not active beyond Brazil, but several of the respondents did point to a 
separate complaint.85 This involved the collection of data on imports to South 
American countries, and, in particular, the involvement of semi-official US 
businessmen in the retrieval of this information. This situation arose from new 
arrangements set up by BEW in early 1943 to try to engender a more efficient system 
of issuing export licenses for goods supplied by US industry to Latin America. The 
decentralization plan, as it was known, entailed delegating a greater degree of 
responsibility for determining the import requirements of the Latin American 
countries to US officials based in those countries, in association with the local 
governments. The aim behind this plan was that the ‘field men’ on the ground in Latin 
America would conduct comprehensive studies of the local market in order to produce 
a more accurate picture of requirements.86 
While the rationale behind this scheme was to make more efficient use of the 
limited supply of goods sent to South America, the knowledge that US officials were 
conducting intensive studies of the trade conditions of the region caused concern 
among British officials, as it was feared that this information would be used for post-
war purposes. The British ambassador in Montevideo, expressed his view to the 
Foreign Office in March 1943 that the US trade surveys were most likely being 
undertaken “with the object of providing United States export trade with the best 
possible foundation for an overwhelming post-war drive”.87 This fear was heightened 
by the fact that many of those conducting the surveys of Latin American trade were 
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US businessmen employed for the wartime period in a semi-official capacity. The 
employment of US businessmen was understandable, given the shortages of personnel 
in wartime and the fact that industry figures would be the best qualified to undertake 
such a task. But from Britain’s perspective it was also “naïve”, as Kelly put it in a 
telegram to London, “to suppose that the result of these enquiries will be permanently 
confined to the immediate purpose of control”.88 Rather, as those collecting the data 
on South American markets would most likely return to private business after the war, 
the fear was that the knowledge gained would be used to aid post-war trade ambitions.  
When promoting the new decentralization plan to US industry, BEW officials 
certainly did emphasise post-war concerns. As Hector Lazo, Assistant Director of 
BEW explained in an address to a meeting of the Export Managers Club in December 
1942, US officials would “fight with our last breath” to ensure that the new scheme 
preserved trade channels between the US and South America for the post-war era.89 
Moreover, when requesting data on the South American countries, it was requested 
that particular attention be given to the sources of current imports, “such as the United 
Kingdom”.90 But while the employment of US businessmen in BEW’s new 
decentralization scheme was clearly of concern to British officials, they were at least 
only employed in a relatively low-ranking administrative role. The same cannot be 
said of Nelson Rockefeller in his agency in Latin America.  
 
Nelson Rockefeller and CIAA  
As a life-long Republican and a firm believer in the primacy of private enterprise and 
limited government, Rockefeller was an unlikely member of the Roosevelt 
administration.91 However, his experience of Latin America gained through business 
investments in Venezuela, along with his youthful enthusiasm, impressed Roosevelt 
and prompted the President in August 1940 to appoint Rockefeller head of the newly 
created Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs between the 
American Republics.92 The new agency’s functions were initially limited to 
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strengthening cultural ties and engendering goodwill between the American republics, 
as well as unofficial action aimed at eradicating Nazi influences from the region.93  
However, following a change of name to the Office for the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs in July 1941, the agency took on far greater responsibilities.94 
These included promoting US-Latin American trade and the development of Latin 
American economies with US capital.95 There were certainly wartime justifications 
for these functions. Increased US trade with Latin America could compensate for the 
loss of the region’s traditional European trading partners and thereby forestall any 
social unrest that could threaten inter-American security. Similarly, the development 
of Latin American industry could create goodwill for the US, as well as more tangible 
facilities that would serve strategic purposes.96  
But the growing prominence of CIAA in the economic affairs of Latin 
America had potential implications regarding the post-war era and was therefore a 
source of consternation to British observers. In December 1942 Halifax informed the 
Foreign Office of his concerns over Rockefeller’s organisation, noting that while it 
had been created as a temporary wartime agency, its increasing functions gave the 
impression “that it is being built up with an idea of permanency”. Moreover, the 
economic policies of CIAA, Halifax went on, “are bound to have very wide 
repercussions on the future economy of Latin America as well as, perhaps, the 
relations of these countries with the rest of the world”.97 Reflecting on Halifax’s 
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elucidation of CIAA’s functions, Butler noted that while its purpose may have 
originally been limited to raising the living standards of Latin America, it could in 
future be utilised as “an all-powerful machine for [the] economic domination of the 
sub-continent”.98       
On one level the British concern over the growing influence of CIAA was 
reflected in the fears of Latin Americanists in the State Department that Rockefeller’s 
agency was challenging their control of US policy in the region. In particular, Duggan 
was resentful of CIAA’s autonomy in carrying out its programmes in the region. 
Moreover, he feared that this would set a precedent for other wartime agencies to 
operate independently of the State Department in Latin America.99 Braden shared 
Duggan’s trepidation over the role of CIAA and fought hard from his post in 
Colombia to retain the State Department’s control over US policy in Latin America.100  
But to a large extent, the rivalry between the State Department’s Latin 
Americanists and CIAA was more about inter-departmental jealousies than any 
substantive divergence over policy. For the British, however, the impingement of 
CIAA into the realm of Latin American policy posed a threat to the degree of 
cooperation in the region that the Foreign Office had established with internationalists 
in the State Department. Whereas British officials had taken solace in the attempt by 
the internationalists to promote multilateralism in Latin America, CIAA’s growing 
influence in the region threatened this accord. The Foreign Office had no reason to 
believe that Rockefeller or CIAA shared the State Department’s professed 
commitment to promoting multilateralism in Latin America. On the contrary, the 
corporate make-up of Rockefeller’s agency suggested it would more likely be driven 
by the imperialistic impulses of big business and therefore prove hostile toward 
British interests in the region.101     
British fears over the role of CIAA were seemingly realised when officials in 
London became aware in late 1942 that Rockefeller had secured a pledge from the US 
Treasury ensuring that advertising costs incurred by US business in Latin America 
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during the war would be deductible for federal income tax purposes.102 This 
governmental support for US advertising in Latin America struck a particular chord 
among British officials, as they had been actively restraining British firms from 
carrying out such promotional activities, both in order to preserve scarce resources 
and to avoid inviting criticisms from the US.103 The failure on the part of the US 
government to mirror such restraint was later justified to British officials in 
Washington on the grounds that it was only by way of US advertising revenue that 
friendly newspapers in Latin America could stay in business throughout the war and 
continue to propagate pro-Allied stories.104 This reasoning was not without merit, and 
it was certainly one of the motivations that had driven Rockefeller in advocating the 
increase in US advertising in Latin America.105  
But in making the case to US business to maintain their advertising in the 
region throughout the war, Rockefeller was clear that this action would serve post-war 
purposes as well. Writing to 500 export firms in the summer of 1942, Rockefeller 
stated that “there is great need right now for foresighted planning and courageous 
effort by U.S. industry to hold for the future its well earned position in the economic 
life of our neighboring markets”.106 Writing in a US trade journal in August 1942, 
Rovensky was even more explicit about the post-war aspect of wartime advertising in 
Latin America. Rockefeller’s advertising plan, stated Rovensky, is “a dual purpose 
project – it is both part of the nation’s war effort and a plan for enabling United States 
exporters to maintain their trade positions in Latin America, now and after the war”. 
The plan, Rovensky continued, “has been conceived and is being implemented by 
realistic Government officials and businessmen, who are thinking realistically in 
terms of to-day and after the war”.107  
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The plan was received enthusiastically by US industry who vowed to increase 
advertising in Latin America in order to maintain the prestige of US products. Harold 
N. Elterich, the CIAA official in charge of the advertising programme, believed this 
positive response reflected a new awareness on the part of US business of the 
importance export markets would play in the post-war era.108 However, while 
Rockefeller and CIAA were clearly keen to promote US trade in Latin America, its 
attitude toward European interests in the region was more one of disinterest than of 
overt hostility. Of much greater concern to British officials were comments made by 
Eric Johnston.   
 
Eric Johnston and ‘Vertical Trade’   
As both head of the US Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the US Committee 
of the Inter-American Development Commission (IADC), Johnston had clear links 
both to US business and official Washington.109 Although a Republican and president 
of a body that had traditionally been hostile toward the New Deal, Johnston forged a 
close relationship with Roosevelt and gained a prominent role in the direction of Latin 
American affairs during the war.110  
In March 1943 Johnston toured South America to meet with officials and 
businessmen and discuss US-Latin American trade in the post-war era.111 On 
completion of his trip Johnston gave several press conferences where he outlined his 
thinking on Latin American trade in the post-war era. In his remarks Johnston 
endorsed the multilateral trade programme, insofar as he advocated a decrease in 
barriers to trade between the US and Latin America. But he also predicted that post-
war trade would tend to flow along “vertical lines”, with the US conducting the baulk 
of its commerce with Latin America and European trade being focused on Africa. 
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Whereas international commerce had “heretofore … been mainly an east to west 
affair”, in the post-war world Johnston believed that “there must be an increase in 
north to south development, … particularly in the Western Hemisphere”.112 Just as the 
last century in Latin America was a “British Century”, stated Johnston, the next would 
be an American Century.113   
A few days later, Johnston met with Roosevelt to discuss IADC’s plans for the 
development of post-war trade in Latin America. In his subsequent report to the press 
on the meeting Johnston once again reiterated his belief in the need to remove barriers 
to trade in Latin America. However, as previously, Johnston’s comments also 
indicated that this increase in trade would only apply within the Western Hemisphere. 
The development of Latin America, stated Johnston, would be carried out by US and 
Latin American interests “on a fifty-fifty basis”.114   
As with his earlier remarks, this picture of post-war trade in Latin America 
seemed to hold little place for Britain. It was unsurprising, therefore, that his views 
caused alarm among British officials. As Mather-Jackson noted in April 1943, while 
Johnston’s theory that post-war trade should follow vertical lines reflected a general 
fear of competition from Europe, it posed a direct threat to British interests in South 
America.115 Charles gave his reaction to Johnston’s remarks in a telegram from Rio 
that was circulated among the War Cabinet in London. While US officials in Latin 
America may have been given instructions from the State Department to work in 
harmony with their British counterparts, it was comments like Johnston’s, Charles 
believed, that revealed the true ambitions of the US in Latin America.116 Similarly, 
Gallop noted with disapproval the failure of internationalists in the State Department 
to disavow Johnston’s comments regarding the future pattern of international trade, 
despite the apparent contradiction between his views and their own policy of 
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multilateralism.117 If Johnston did indeed speak for US business interests in South 
America, this group represented a further threat to multilateralism in the region.  
 
The Voice of Business 
Prior to the war, South America was not a major focal point for US business 
interests.118 Between 1935 and 1939 only 9 percent of total US exports went to South 
America. In the same period the US received 13 percent of its imports from the 
region. However, the outbreak of hostilities in Europe changed this. On the one hand, 
the loss of European markets and resources for US business interests meant that they 
were forced to look elsewhere to make up the shortfall.119 On the other hand, the war-
induced severance of trade between South America and Europe seemingly presented 
an opportunity for US interests to replace their European competitors. As one US 
commentator put it in 1940, “ships and airplanes bound for Latin America these days 
are crowded with salesmen rushing to secure the business which the belligerents have 
been compelled to abandon”.120 These efforts brought great dividends and by the end 
of the first year of the war US exports to South America had increased by 58 
percent.121 Moreover, US business interests hoped to ensure that these wartime trends 
became permanent. As W. Latimer Gray, Vice President of the First National Bank of 
Boston predicted in 1942, “we can and will maintain first position in Latin American 
commerce”.122 
Clearly such an ambition contradicted the efforts of internationalists in the 
Roosevelt administration to promote multilateralism in South America. There was a 
tradition of hostility on the part of US business interests toward multilateralism. The 
                                               
117
 Gallop minute, 27 Apr. 1943, FO371/33908/A3834, TNA. For further concern among British 
officials following Johnston’s remarks, see Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 2 Apr. 1943, 
FO371/33907/A3215, TNA; Snow to Eden, 24 Mar. 1943, Perowne minute, 15 Apr. 1943, 
FO371/33812/A3341, TNA. 
118
 Desmond, Nelson Rockefeller, p.75; Duggan, The Americas, p.82. 
119
 Eugene P. Thomas, “The Coming Assault on the Economic Relations of the Americas”, 21 Oct. 
1940, Export Trade and Shipper, p.3; Memo of conversation between Brogan and Duggan, 22 
Mar. 1943, Box 3, Memorandums Relating to General Latin America Affairs, OARA, RG59, 
NARA.  
120
 Inman, “Planning Pan-American Trade”, p.146. See also “Who Will Get Germany’s Lost Trade 
With Argentina?”, 12 Feb. 1940, Export Trade and Shipper, pp.6-7; “War Boosts US Export 
Flow to South America”, 25 Nov. 1940, Chicago Tribune, p.1. See also Green, The Containment 
of Latin America, p.95. 
121
 “War Boosts US Export Flow to South America”, 25 Nov. 1940, Chicago Tribune, p.1. 
122
 W. Latimer Gray, “Some Long Range Aspects of Inter-American Commercial Relations”, 22 June 
1942, Export Trade and Shipper, pp.7-8. See also “War Boosts US Export Flow to South 
America”, 25 Nov. 1940, Chicago Tribune, p.1; John Abbink, “A Program for Protecting the US 
from Economic Strangulation”, 27 May 1940, Export Trade and Shipper, pp.3-6, 16.  
  
 
129
notion of freer trade had often been viewed with suspicion by various sectors of the 
business community who believed the lowering of US domestic tariffs would threaten 
their interests.123 By the time of the Second World War, however, much of this 
opposition had been broken down on the basis of the argument that multilateralism 
would offer US business greater opportunities to access foreign markets.124 In the 
specific context of Anglo-American relations, this argument carried much weight 
when applied to the commercial gains to be made by breaking into Britain’s closed 
trading regimes. For example, in the Middle East multilateralism represented a means 
for US oil companies to gain access to British concessions, previously closed to 
them.125 But when it came to South America, the same arguments could not be made. 
The lack of a closed British trading regime in South America meant that there was 
simply not the same impetus for US business to mobilise behind multilateralism in the 
way that they did in other parts of the word.  
One concept around which US business interests did rally with regard to South 
America was the anticipated industrialisation of the region during the war years. More 
specifically, it was hoped that industrialisation of South America would provide US 
exporters new markets for the post-war era. Shortly before embarking on a tour of 
South America in the spring of 1943, Franklin Johnston, editor of American Exporter, 
stated that the “wartime industrialization of Latin America is going ahead by leaps 
and bounds and will radically change the export business of the United States”.126 But 
while one potential consequence of the industrialisation of South America could have 
been expanding markets providing increased commercial opportunities for all foreign 
nations, many US businessmen hoped the industrialisation of South America would 
aid them in excluding traditional British interests in the region. In Argentina 
particularly, US businessmen hoped the conversion of the country’s agricultural 
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economy to a modern industrial society would have the effect of undercutting 
Britain’s dominance of the market for meat.127  
 
The Return of British Suspicions      
As British officials observed the various tendencies in Latin America, which 
represented a threat to British interests in South America, any previous optimism that 
an accord with the US government to collaborate in the region had been reached soon 
vanished. Unsurprisingly, this disillusionment first took hold in the South American 
department of the Foreign Office – the Whitehall department which had always been 
the most hesitant in greeting US attempts at cooperation in Latin America with 
optimism.128 While the US and Britain had sent instructions to their missions in Latin 
America to encourage cooperation between the two countries in the region, noted 
Perowne in December 1942, “these instructions have by no means invariably been 
obeyed in practice by U.S. staff” on the ground. US strategic priorities in Latin 
America, Perowne believed, meant that many US officials continued to regard Latin 
America as part of a “private hemisphere”. Such a conception of the region, he went 
on, entailed “the exclusion of European powers from the Latin American stage”.129 
 The South America department of the Foreign Office was backed up in this 
bleak appraisal of the US attitude toward Latin America by its representatives 
throughout the region. These figures, who experienced US policy in South America at 
the closest proximity, had always remained sceptical of US cooperation in the region. 
By the beginning of 1943 this scepticism had only increased. In March Kelly sought 
to impress the danger posed to British interests in South America from US 
competition by detailing the monopolisation of the important public utilities of the 
region by US concerns and the blocking of British exports to the region by vested US 
interests. “It is pure wishful thinking”, Kelly stated in something of a reprimand to 
Whitehall, “to suppose that commercial rivalry between our two countries in South 
America is an Axis-inspired rumour, to be scotched by a little goodwill on both 
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sides”.130 A similar picture was painted by the ambassador in Guatemala, who 
believed the US attempt to take advantage of the war in order “to infiltrate … every 
walk of life” was mirrored throughout Latin America.131   
 That the South American department of the Foreign Office and ambassadors 
such as Kelly should suspect the US of retaining ambitions to exclude British interests 
from South America is unremarkable given the timid reception of these groups to the 
earlier US attempts at cooperation. But by the spring of 1943 such suspicions had 
returned throughout Whitehall. Edward W. Playfair, a British Treasury official, 
sought to outline the various strands that existed in the US attitude toward British 
interests in South America in a minute that was circulated widely.  While there were 
certainly those in the Roosevelt administration for whom collaboration with Britain in 
South America was a genuine ambition, there were also far less benign elements. On 
the one hand, US business interests and the temporary agencies staffed by them, 
Playfair believed, held a “plain desire to drive British business out of South America”. 
These were joined, Playfair continued, by the Latin Americanists in the State 
Department who wished – as a by-product of their “desire to see the U.S. politically 
supreme in South America” – to exclude substantial European concerns.132 Perhaps 
most indicative of the extent of British disillusionment with US attitudes toward Latin 
America by this point in time were the views expressed by Halifax. Writing to the 
Foreign Office in April, Halifax pointed to the indications, which he now received on 
a daily basis, “of efforts on the part of United States agencies, both official and 
private, to lay the foundations [for an] undue degree of economic predominance in 
Latin America”.133  
 
Conclusion 
By the spring of 1943, then, British fears of being excluded from South America had 
returned as strongly as ever. The problem was not that they had any reason to doubt 
that the internationalists within the State Department – who had sought to reassure 
British officials concerning their interests in the region – had altered their views. 
Rather, what was plain by this point in time was that there remained influential forces 
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in South America who did not share the concern of the internationalists that 
multilateralism be applied to this region, as to the rest of the world. “The trouble”, as 
Playfair put it, “is that there is no one American policy, but several”.134     
The challenges to multilateralism manifested in US policy in Latin America 
stemmed from a variety of sources, each with varying motivations. For the Latin 
Americanists in the State Department, political considerations converged with 
economic policy.135 Particularly in the case of the leader of this faction, Sumner 
Welles, political concerns over the continued integrity of the inter-American system 
dictated economic policy toward European interests in Latin America. Political 
concerns also motivated agencies like CIAA and IADC. But these organisations also 
represented much baser commercial ambitions.  
Whatever the motivations, what is of importance in the context of Anglo-
American post-war economic planning, is that the economic policies advocated by 
these various groups represented a threat to multilateralism in Latin America. While 
Latin Americanists in the State Department occasionally acknowledged this threat, 
their immediate concerns in Latin America always overrode longer-term plans and 
broader geographical implications. British recognition of these challenges to 
multilateralism therefore restored fears of being excluded from South America. This 
in turn brought a reconsideration of British policies toward the region and an attempt 
to recast Anglo-American relations in South America. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Quest for a Self-Denying Ordinance 
(Spring 1943 – Winter 1944-1945) 
 
With British fears of the country’s interests being excluded from South America 
firmly re-established by the spring of 1943, government departments in London 
embarked on a lengthy reformulation of British policy toward Latin America in the 
broader context of Anglo-American relations. Eventually, the policy pursued by the 
Churchill government was to call on the US to agree to a self-denying ordinance in 
Latin America, which would ensure that neither country secured commercial 
advantage at the expense of the other while wartime conditions prevented free and fair 
competition.  
Furthermore, in making its case to the Roosevelt administration, the British 
government framed its call for a self-denying ordinance in the context of the 
multilateral trade programme, which had been continually advocated by the Roosevelt 
administration as the basis for the post-war economic order. Specifically, the Foreign 
Office made the argument that continued British access to the markets of South 
America – which a self-denying ordinance would be essential in preserving – must be 
a constituent part of an economic world order based on free and equal access to 
markets and resources. Without access to such markets, Britain would lack the 
necessary balance of payments to be able to participate in a multilateral system. In this 
sense, the British call for a self-denying ordinance in Latin America demonstrates that 
with regard to this region it was Britain that took the lead in promoting the successful 
establishment of a multilateral economic system for the post-war era. 
 The US response to the British request for a self-denying ordinance, while 
pledging agreement to the principle in theory, was in fact conditioned by a number of 
factors, which cumulatively exerted countervailing forces against US adherence to the 
principle. Among these were the nature of the US governmental bureaucracy, which 
tended to work against the implementation of broad principles; a lack of leadership in 
the direction of Latin American policy in the State Department; and more substantive 
developments in Anglo-American relations in South America – particularly regarding 
Argentina – which made support for collaboration with the British in the region less 
likely.  
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The consequence was that important US policies in Latin America, initiated 
prior to the agreement with Britain, continued with limited reference to the application 
of a self-denying ordinance. Chief among these was the Axis replacement programme 
and the associated strategic aims of the US in Latin America, which militated against 
the retention of significant European economic concerns in the region. More 
importantly, when rivalry surfaced between US and British interests, which explicitly 
raised the principle of a self-denying ordinance, US officials failed to enforce the 
principle. This chapter therefore demonstrates that when it came to Anglo-American 
relations in South America, the quest for a self-denying ordinance – which had been 
requested by the British in order to ensure the successful implementation of 
multilateralism in the region – ultimately proved to be a fruitless one.          
 
Electrification of the Central Brazilian Railway 
The question of the US adopting a self-denying ordinance in Latin America first came 
to light with regard to a case that would subsequently define Anglo-American 
relations in the region: the electrification of the central Brazilian railway. Despite the 
acknowledgement among officials on both sides of the Atlantic at the time that 
negotiations concerning this enterprise acted as a test case for Anglo-American 
relations in South America and beyond, reference to it has been entirely absent from 
the literature on Anglo-American relations until recently.1  
 The central Brazilian railway was a government owned utility within the 
Ministry for Transportation and Public Works. Stretching over 1,500 kilometres from 
the interior states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro on the coast, the 
railway was the country’s principal mode of transport for both people and goods.2 In 
particular, it transported iron ore and manganese from a mine at Minas Gerais to Rio, 
where it could be shipped for export. The Director of the railway, Major Napoleão de 
Alencastro Guimarães, went so far in his estimation of its magnitude to claim that “by 
virtue of the extent and position of its system the Central is unquestionably the most 
important railway not only in Brazil but also in South America”.3 While not a wholly 
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impartial observer, Guimarães’ statement did reflect the significance of the railway 
for Brazil’s infrastructure.  
The conversion of the central railway from steam to electric operation was part 
of the broader industrialisation of the country administered by Getúlio Vargas, the 
President of Brazil since 1930.4 Foreign interest in the contract to carry out the work 
went back even further to 1908, when the US firm General Electric sent a team of 
experts to Brazil to draw up plans for the project. World War I interrupted the 
implementation of these proposals, but in 1922 the US firm gained a contract to carry 
out the project. However, the funds supplied by a US bank to finance the scheme were 
mysteriously diverted to other purposes and the contract was shelved. When in 1932 
the Brazilian authorities again called for tenders for the project, General Electric was 
outbid by their British competitors, the Manchester-based manufacturing firm, 
Metropolitan-Vickers.5  
During the negotiations over the contract that followed, Metropolitan-Vickers 
and the Brazilian authorities decided to divide the project into an initial section of 35 
kilometres, stretching from Rio to Nova Iguassu, and a further section of 73 
kilometres, extending the line to Barra do Piraí. From 1935 to 1937 the British 
company successfully completed the electrification of the first section and looked 
toward the completion of the line. However, disagreements over prices and the exact 
nature of the materials to be provided delayed conclusion of the project. In 1940 the 
Brazilian authorities therefore issued a new tender for contracts to complete the 
second section of the railway.6 Securing this contract took on significance beyond the 
sum total of its parts, as it was widely predicted that whichever company established 
the technical standards and specifications for this section of the line would likely be 
guaranteed work on the remainder of the railway system, and possibly the bulk of 
Brazil’s railway infrastructure for the foreseeable future.7  
It was with these factors in mind that the Foreign Office backed Metropolitan-
Vickers’ tender for the contract and urged the Treasury and Board of Trade to 
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guarantee the necessary financial support and supplies for the project.8 The British 
ministries were originally forthcoming in this support. However, world war again 
disrupted the electrification scheme and in April 1941 the British government 
withdrew its backing for the enterprise due to a war-induced lack of raw materials and 
manpower.9 The failure of a successful tender for the new contract meant 
Metropolitan-Vickers’ option to complete the electrification of the line contained in 
the original contract remained valid. However, having lost the support of the British 
government to complete the work, the company was well aware of the vulnerability of 
their contract; more specifically, they were immediately alive to the danger posed by 
US competition.10 
These fears were seemingly realised when on 4 September 1942 the New 
York-based Electrical Export Corporation – an export consortium composed of 
General Electric and Westinghouse International – submitted a proposal to undertake 
the work previously contracted to Metropolitan-Vickers.11 By the end of November a 
judging commission had given favourable consideration to the proposal and 
negotiations between the Brazilian authorities and the US company were well under 
way.12 The chief fear of Foy, Metropolitan-Vickers’ representative in Rio, was that 
the US firm would gain the contract on the pretence that it could carry out the work 
during the war, only to postpone it for post-war completion. What the company 
therefore requested of the Foreign Office was that they ask the State Department to 
restrain US industrial interests from intriguing after the contract.13  
The realisation that Metropolitan-Vickers might permanently loose this 
important enterprise to their US competitors prompted the Foreign Office to approach 
the State department with regard to this case.14 But in choosing to adopt this course of 
action, Mather-Jackson had much greater aspirations in mind than the Brazilian 
railway alone. As he explained in a letter to Ronald Fraser, his counterpart in the 
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Board of Trade, the broader goal he hoped to achieve with this case was “an 
understanding with the United States authorities that … United States industries 
should not receive any encouragement from their Government to take away business 
which we are prevented from undertaking because of the war”.15 In this sense, 
Mather-Jackson hoped to use the case of the electrification of the central Brazilian 
railway to extract a self-denying ordinance from the State Department that would 
protect British commercial interests generally for the post-war era.16  
Halifax subsequently took the matter up with the US authorities in November 
1942, enquiring both whether BEW would be able to release the necessary supplies 
for the work and whether the Export-Import Bank was planning to finance the 
project.17 On the first point BEW noted the strategic value of the iron ore and 
manganese transported on the railway, but did not consider electrification of the line a 
war necessity and therefore thought it unlikely that any application for the project 
would gain approval at the present time.18 Moreover, the State Department agreed to 
make this supply situation clear, both to the Electrical Export Corporation and the 
Brazilian authorities.19 On the second point it was denied that any loan from the 
Export-Import Bank had been guaranteed for the project, but it was confirmed that 
Pierson had given verbal undertakings that the bank would be willing to support the 
scheme in the future.20   
While this may have been a more sympathetic reply than British officials had 
expected, the US response to the protest focused narrowly on the specifics of the case 
in hand. The State Department was well aware of the broader question raised by the 
British request: would it prevent a US company from taking a contract that would 
have been held by their British competitor, had it not been for the war.21 The failure 
on their part to address this broader question reflected an unwillingness to take a firm 
position on the matter at this time. In a telegram concerning the contract for the 
Brazilian railway sent to Caffery in November it was made clear that whereas:  
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the British … take the position that we should not press for such contracts 
when they are holding back their own firms from working for such postwar 
business, … the [State] Department is at present taking no position with 
respect to this contention.22 
Considering the British protest in December, Emilio G. Collado, Special 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, admitted that it seemed impossible that the 
Electrical Export Corporation would be able to complete the work during the war, but 
insisted that it was legitimate for them to “line up projects for immediate execution 
after the war”. He further maintained the right of “the Export-Import Bank to enter 
into arrangements looking forward to such a period”.23 Such an attitude within the 
State Department made it impossible to give any firm commitment that the US 
company would not benefit from the dislocations affecting British commerce. 
While the broader significance of the British approach concerning the central 
Brazilian railway had certainly been appreciated by US officials and those in the 
Foreign Office most familiar with the case, it was not until later that the British 
government as a whole came to see the case as being intrinsically linked to the 
principle of a self-denying ordinance. However, by the spring of 1943 there was a 
general recognition in Whitehall that a new policy toward Latin America was 
required.  
 
The Need for Publicity 
In formulating a new policy toward South America the British government was 
guided by two fundamental considerations. On the one hand, all government 
departments were firmly convinced of the need to defend existing British interests in 
the region during the war in order that they would serve national interests in the post-
war era. On the other hand, the Foreign Office, in particular, was continually aware of 
the need to avoid a rupture in relations with the US that could result from rivalry 
between the two countries in South America.24 This, the Foreign Office believed, was 
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vital both to continuing collaboration in the war effort and for longer-term 
cooperation between the two nations in the post-war years.25       
 Initially, the tension between these two objectives caused a division between 
the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office. The Ministry of Information, 
increasingly concerned over the growing publicity by US business in South America 
by the end of 1942, wished to embark on a propaganda campaign in the region to 
mirror US activities. These concerns were expressed clearly in a paper sent by the 
ministry to Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs. This articulated the Ministry of Information’s belief that the lack of a strong 
British publicity campaign – contrasted with an increasingly clear desire by US 
interests to dominate the region in the future – was leading to an impression among 
South Americans that Britain intended to give up its interests in the region.26 In order 
to counter this impression, the ministry wished to send instructions to its press 
attachés, attached to British missions throughout the region, to embark on a publicity 
drive aimed at creating the impression that Britain was determined to retain its 
interests in the region in the post-war era.27  
The urgency of such a campaign, the Ministry of Information believed, was 
increased when Rovensky approached Halifax in March 1943 to discuss US 
advertising in Latin America in the hope of allaying British concerns over such 
activities. This approach, Halifax informed the ministry, should be taken as an 
opportunity to increase British advertising in the region in collaboration with the 
US.28  
The Foreign Office, however, opposed the prospect of a publicity drive by 
British press attachés in South America without a prior approach to the State 
Department on relations between the two countries in the region, for fear that 
unilateral action could cause a serious breach in relations between the wartime 
allies.29 However, at the time of the Ministry of Information’s call for a publicity 
drive, the Foreign Office was unwilling to approach the State Department on this 
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subject, as it was still uncertain as to the precise policy it wished to advocate in Latin 
America.30 This uncertainty was fuelled by a frustration among the lower rungs of the 
Foreign Office bureaucracy about the lack of knowledge of the status, and more 
importantly, the content, of high level negotiations between the US and Britain 
concerning post-war economic policy.31 Without a clearly defined policy, the Foreign 
Office informed the Ministry of Information, instructions to British press attachés 
would have to wait.32 The Ministry of Information therefore reluctantly informed 
Halifax that while they were interested in the approach from Rovensky, they were 
unable to engage in talks concerning joint publicity until agreement on policy among 
departments in London had been reached.33   
Despite this set back, the Ministry of Information continued to push the 
Foreign Office to settle on a policy toward Latin America, which would allow a 
British publicity campaign in the region to get under way.34 And while the Foreign 
Office had certainly been keen to establish the principle that the policy must precede 
the publicity, it did appreciate the urgency of countering the ever-increasing 
promotion of US business in Latin America.35 As Halifax explained, the danger of 
“continued passivity and silence” on the part of the British in the region could be to 
“so greatly handicap British enterprise in Latin-America that it may never be able to 
retrieve its position”.36 Despite the lack of clear guidance from the highest levels of 
government regarding post-war economic planning, then, the Foreign Office, along 
with other interested government departments, sought throughout the spring of 1943 
to redefine British policy in Latin America. 
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Formulating a Policy 
An initial idea developed among British officials was that Britain could forge a role 
for itself in Latin America as an ‘honest broker’. Developed in correspondence 
between Campbell in Washington and Perowne in London, this concept held that 
Britain could simultaneously convince the Latin American governments of their worth 
as a counterweight against unfettered US dominance in the region, while at the same 
time convincing the US that British influence could be put to beneficial ends by 
promoting cooperation between the American states.37 But the idea of Britain acting 
as an honest broker between the US and the Latin American states was soon 
dismissed, both on the grounds that it would portray Britain in an “undignified” light, 
and, more importantly, for being insufficient to the task of preserving British interests 
in South America.38 As Perowne put it when reversing his previous support for such a 
policy, Britain could not be an “honest broker” in Latin America and at the same time 
remain “a ‘principal’ – and a ‘principal’”, he went on, “is exactly what we are and 
must remain failing a decision to abdicate our whole position in Latin America”.39   
Building on this theme, another suggestion was that the British government 
should simply inform the State Department what they considered to be their legitimate 
interests in Latin America and that they intended to take action to defend those 
interests.40 This approach was advocated by the Board of Trade, which suggested 
informing the State Department that the British government were “alive to what is 
going on” regarding the promotion of US interests in Latin America, and that in 
response, the British intended “to keep the flag flying … as we cannot afford after the 
war to be driven out of our traditional markets”.41  
Influential British ambassadors throughout South America encouraged this 
belligerent attitude. In March Kelly informed London of his belief that “the time has 
come to stand up to [US] competition which tends more and more to become sheer 
intimidation”. In order to stem this flow, Kelly believed the British government 
should simply place before the US “a picture of what we consider to be our legitimate 
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share in the future trade of this continent” and then take vigorous action to defend 
those interests.42 Taken to the extreme, this approach could subsequently have 
entailed pursuing bilateral trade with South American states, regardless of the wishes 
of the US.43 But while this approach may have made sense from a purely commercial 
perspective, it failed to account for the political considerations surrounding Anglo-
American cooperation in Latin America and beyond.  
Alongside these various conceptions of promoting British interests in Latin 
America that tended to take a combative attitude toward the US, there was also a 
strain of thought positing that collaboration with the US in the region would prove the 
most effective means of preserving British interests. Specifically, collaboration in the 
promotion of multilateralism in Latin America was conceived of as the surest way to 
protect British interests in the region, without endangering cooperation with the US.    
The belief that the best hope of preserving British interests in South America 
lay in the multilateral project that guaranteed free and equal access to markets and 
resources had been present in official British thinking for some time. In September 
1942 Campbell had sought to temper fears of British interests being excluded from 
South America by pointing out that “in the long run” British concerns should be 
protected by the multilateral project, which, he pointed out, “is universal and not 
sectional”. “In the economic sphere”, Campbell continued, British interests in South 
America would be “covered by Article 7 of the [Lend-Lease] Consideration 
Agreement”.44 Similarly, Perowne noted in the same month that cooperation in 
relations between the US and Britain in Latin America – in place of rivalry – would 
most likely “have a chance of survival in the incubator of the Atlantic Declaration and 
the [Lend-Lease] Consideration Agreement”.45 But at this stage the belief that 
multilateralism would protect British interests in South America existed primarily as a 
vague hope, rather than an outcome to be actively pursued. During the formulation of 
British policy toward Latin America in first half of 1943, however, this notion took on 
more concrete form. 
 The suggestion that Britain should explicitly advocate multilateralism in Latin 
America first came from the Ministry of Information, when pushing for a publicity 
                                               
42
 Kelly to Eden, 25 Mar. 1943, FO371/33907/A2855, TNA. See also Buenos Aries to Foreign Office, 
19 May 1943, FO371/33908/A4701, TNA. For a similar view from Central America, see Leche 
to Eden, 8 Mar. 1943, FO371/33907/A2942, TNA. 
43
 Humphreys paper, undated [Mar. 1943], FO371/33903/A2213, TNA. 
44
 Campbell to Perowne, 4 Sept. 1942, FO371/30516/A8580, TNA. 
45
 Perowne to Campbell, 31 Oct. 1942, FO371/30516/A8581, TNA. 
  
 
143
drive in the region. As explained in a Ministry of Information paper on future British 
trade relations with Latin America, the substance of British propaganda in the region 
should emphasise that “the United Nations are fighting for the liberty of all peoples”. 
Moreover,  “that liberty”, the paper went on, “includes national freedom in commerce 
– the right of every country to sell its goods to any other country that can pay for 
them, and to buy in whatever market it chooses”. In this conception of post-war trade, 
the implication was clearly that the South American countries would be free to trade 
with Britain, and other non-American powers, as well as the US.46  
Another advocate of multilateralism in Latin America in this period was 
Humphreys, the principal academic expert informing Foreign Office thinking on Latin 
America. In a paper written in March 1943 he outlined the need for continued British 
access to the markets of South America and noted that in order to maintain these 
markets Britain had a “certain protection in the [multilateral] trading policy, in Article 
7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement and in the Atlantic Charter”. Cumulatively, 
Humphreys went on, these agreements were representative of the fact that “the United 
Nations are in fact committed to a postwar policy which guarantees to all equal access 
to trade and to raw material resources of the world”. In terms of concrete policy, 
Britain could, therefore, “without being ‘starry eyed’, … insist that as far as Latin 
America is concerned this is our policy no less than the United States and that we 
intend to pursue it”.47    
Separately to the idea that Britain should promote multilateralism in Latin 
America was the growing sense that if the State Department were approached in a 
spirit of collaborating for the common good in the region, it may be possible to 
request that they restrain US officials and business interests from promoting US trade, 
while Britain was prevented from doing so by wartime restrictions. Playfair believed 
that having explained to the State Department that “their people are going hell-for-
leather for post-war trade”, while the British were remaining “discreet”, an ultimatum 
should then be given. Either the State Department take “some steps to offset the all 
out tactics of their most enthusiastic people” in South America, or British interests 
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would abandon their previous restraint and join their US counterparts in “going all 
out” for post-war trade in the region.48  
By the end of April these separate strands of British policy came together in an 
inter-departmental meeting with representatives from the Foreign Office, the Board of 
Trade, and the Treasury. The policy paper produced by this meeting recorded the 
consensus that had now been reached between government departments that British 
publicity in South America would have to be increased in order “to defend our long-
term interests in Latin America”. Moreover, in order to avoid this action causing 
friction with the US government, an approach to the State Department would be 
needed to produce “some measure of at least passive good will, if not active co-
operation, on the part of the U.S. authorities”. More specifically, it was hoped that the 
State Department would issue “guidance to American agencies and individuals 
operating in Latin America” that would “restrain them” from exploiting wartime 
conditions for the advantage of US trade. Finally, it would be impressed upon the 
State Department that this request was being made by Britain “as signatories of the 
Atlantic Charter, with its promise of fuller opportunities for international trade”.49 
But while the constituent parts of an approach to the State Department 
outlining British policy had been formulated in London, it was Halifax in Washington 
who finally linked them together into a coherent whole. In a May telegram to London, 
which was copied to missions throughout Latin America, he outlined the precise terms 
in which an approach to the State Department should be made. Having outlined the 
British belief that US business interests and government agencies and officials were 
taking advantage of the situation created by the war to replace British interests on a 
permanent basis, Halifax advised impressing upon the State Department that this not 
only represented a threat to continued Anglo-American collaboration, but also to the 
“full and free development of a multilateral system of trade … which is the 
foundation of expanding production, exchange and consumption throughout the 
world”. As “the maintenance of commercial exchanges with Latin America” was vital 
to Britain’s participation in a multilateral economic system, Halifax suggested that he 
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should therefore ask the State Department “to ensure … that no advantage is taken by 
nationals of either country at the expense of the other”.50  
In formulating such an approach to the State Department, Halifax thereby 
combined the call for restraint on the part of the US with an advocacy of 
multilateralism in Latin America by Britain. More specifically, he suggested making 
the case to the Roosevelt administration that a self-denying ordinance on the part of 
the US government was not only desirable, but essential to the successful 
implementation of a multilateral economic system, which they themselves were 
promoting for the post-war era.   
 
The Call for a ‘Self-Denying Ordinance’  
The decision to approach the State Department with a call for a self-denying 
ordinance, which would ensure the successful implementation of a multilateral trade 
system for the post-war era, gained ministerial approval in a meeting of the War 
Cabinet Lord President’s Committee, held on 21 May.51 In this meeting the President 
of the Board of Trade, Hugh Dalton, and Foreign Secretary Eden presented a joint 
memorandum to the committee stating their belief in the “urgent need of an approach 
to the United States Government … if this country is to stand any chance of regaining 
its Latin American markets after the war”. They therefore proposed sending a 
memorandum to Halifax on commercial policy in Latin America, based on the policy 
paper agreed in the inter-departmental meeting of the previous month.52 The fact that 
the approach to the State Department concerning Latin America was considered at the 
highest level of government, and, moreover, that the substance of the policy to be 
presented to the US had been the subject of so much debate between Whitehall 
departments over the previous months, demonstrates the error of previous studies in 
claiming that the region was of little or no importance to Britain, and therefore 
inconsequential to Anglo-American relations during the war.53  
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Having settled on the substance of a policy that could be articulated to the 
State Department, the only remaining question for the British government was which 
US official this approach should be made to. Initially the Board of Trade believed that 
the approach should be made at a fairly low level.54 But this idea was rejected on the 
grounds that it would fail to convey the seriousness of the issues involved. Moreover, 
it was believed that if a call for self-restraint by the State Department were to 
materialise effectively, it would have to come in the form of a high-level directive or 
statement.55 The level of the approach having been settled, the remaining choice was 
whether this should be made to Welles or Hull – the two most senior officials in the 
State Department.56  
In the end this was left to Halifax to decide and practicalities alone were most 
likely a factor. But Halifax’s eventual decision to approach Hull on the issue was also 
reflective of the belief throughout the British government that it was in the figure of 
Hull that Anglo-American collaboration in the promotion of multilateralism in Latin 
America stood the greatest chance of success. Hull was not particularly pro-British in 
general, but he had long been the US official most closely associated with 
multilateralism.57As British officials had by this point come to the conclusion that 
multilateralism represented the best hope of maintaining British interests in South 
America, it was therefore Hull who was perceived as Britain’s most effective ally in 
the region. As Halifax explained, in the context of promoting multilateralism in Latin 
America, the British had in Hull, a friend “at the highest level”.58  
In the Aide-Memoire finally handed to Hull by Halifax on 10 July 1943, the 
British government declared its intention that henceforth it proposed to “make it clear 
to the countries of Latin America and to the British communities in them that they 
retain their commercial interest in these countries”. Moreover, in seeking US 
collaboration in this goal, the Aide-Memoire directly linked a request for self-restraint 
on the part of the US government to the Roosevelt administration’s own multilateral 
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project. Expressing an awareness “that the United States Government regard the 
extension of postwar trade as the common objective”, it went on to express the hope 
that the US government shared with its wartime ally, “the view that Great Britain 
should participate in this expansion in markets generally, including those in Latin 
America”. Pointing to the curtailment of British exports to Latin America entailed by 
war sacrifices, alongside US efforts to promote their own export trade in the region, 
the Aide-Memoire described “an impression, however false, that there may be some 
desire on the American side to supplant British traders in [their] established and 
traditional markets, not only for the war period, but permanently thereafter”.59 In 
order to counteract this notion Halifax asked Hull during the meeting if the US 
government would agree to “the principle that no advantage in world markets shall 
accrue to either country at the expense of the other by reason of sacrifices made in the 
interest of the effective prosecution of the war”. By linking the protection of British 
markets to the country’s ability to effectively participate in the multilateral trade 
regime that the State Department’s internationalists were so attached to, the Foreign 
Office made a request that Hull could scarcely reject. He subsequently denied there 
was any intention on the part of the US to purge British interests from Latin America 
and pledged US agreement to the principle of a self-denying ordinance.60  
 British policy-makers were well aware that by framing their request for a self-
denying ordinance in Latin America in the context of the multilateral trade 
programme, Hull – as the chief proponent of multilateralism – would scarcely be in a 
position to reject it. As Butler put it, the British approach to Hull should “include 
reference to the Open Door” precisely because this “is a consecrated American policy 
to which he is much attached”.61 But this should not lead us to believe that British 
policy-makers were merely paying lip service to multilateralism in a cynical attempt 
to win Hull’s approval for their request.  
Rather, it reflected a genuinely held belief – founded on the basis of a 
thorough review of British policy in Latin America – that the implementation of a 
global trading system based on multilateralsim would best serve Britain’s long-term 
interests in the region, while at the same time preserving a cooperative relationship 
                                               
59
 “Aide-Memoire from British embassy in Washington”, 9 July 1943, Folder 216, Box 59, Hull 
Papers, CUL; Washington to Foreign Office, 12 July 1943, FO371/33909/A6635, TNA.  
60
 Memo of conversation, 10 July 1943, Folder 216, Box 59, Hull Papers, CUL; Washington to Foreign 
Office, 10 July 1943, FO371/33909/A6498, TNA. 
61
 Butler minute, 28 Apr. 1943, FO371/33908/A3834, TNA. 
  
 
148
with the US. This support by British officials for multilateralism in Latin America 
offers an important counterweight to the dominant portrayal of British officials during 
World War II as instinctively rejecting multilateralism.62 Instead, just as US officials 
rallied to the cause of multilateralism when it seemed the surest means of securing US 
interests, British officials advocated the economic system when it seemed to serve 
their interests.   
The British government followed up the pronouncement of its reformulated 
policy in Latin America with comments in the House of Commons by Dalton. In July, 
in response to concerns about Britain’s export trade to South America, Dalton sought 
to reassure the House “that we do not intend to disinterest ourselves in Latin 
America”. Moreover, he went on, Britain would participate in the markets of Latin 
America in the post-war era as part of its commitment to “an expansive world 
economy”. “We are pledged” to such an economic system by British signature to the 
Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreement, Dalton continued, “and we mean 
it”.63 In September, in response to a query as to whether British exports to South 
America would remain hampered by the restrictions of the Export White Paper in the 
post-war era, Dalton repeated the pledge agreed with the US that “neither the United 
Kingdom nor the United States should gain any advantage in world markets at the 
expense of the other by reasons of sacrifices made in the interest of the effective 
prosecution of the war”.64 
 But while the British government could now point to the agreement with the 
US to implement a self-denying ordinance in order to facilitate multilateralism in 
Latin America, it remained far from clear whether there was the sufficient political 
will within the US polity for this to happen. As Mather-Jackson mused, all would 
hinge on the true desire of the US government “to cooperate in international post-war 
trade”. If the desire is limited to Hull and a few other individuals, he went on, the 
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British call for a self-denying ordinance “would be asking the impossible”.65 
Immediate indications following the agreement between the US and Britain did not 
bode well.   
 
Testing the New Accord 
The agreement between the US and Britain to implement a self-denying ordinance in 
Latin America provided the British government with a new framework within which 
subsequent efforts to protect Metropolitan-Vickers’ interests in Brazil could take 
place. This remained a key objective for the Foreign Office, for although they had 
been successful in winning official support for a self-denying ordinance from the US, 
the outcome of the case that had first raised the principle would now act as a 
barometer of the extent to which it would be adhered to in practice. Mather-Jackson 
made this clear, explaining that the principle had “become inseparable in the minds of 
the US authorities from the case in point”.66 The necessity to test the new Anglo-
American agreement in relation to the central Brazilian railway arose just days after 
its consummation.  
On 13 July the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, 
informed Charles that negotiations with the British company concerning the 
electrification of the second section of the railway would have to be broken due to the 
need to proceed with the work “without further delay”. Charles expressed dismay on 
receiving this news but nonetheless accepted the Brazilian’s decision, asking only that 
further work on the railway be reserved for the British company as compensation for 
losing out on the present phase.67 But while this may have been a suitable response 
when viewing the case solely through the prism of British interests in Brazil, it failed 
to take in to the account the significance the Brazilian enterprise had taken on in 
Anglo-American economic diplomacy. From the perspective of the Foreign Office, to 
accept the loss of this contract to a US firm would constitute a failure to uphold the 
new agreement with the US. As Mather-Jackson reasoned, while in the context “of the 
local Brazilian scene” the decision to accept the loss of the contract may make sense, 
“so far as the wider industrial scene is concerned”, to take this course of action “may 
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be to prejudice our position elsewhere”. London therefore deemed Charles’ 
acceptance of defeat premature and again opted to raise the case in Washington.68  
The subsequent British protest to the State Department centred on the fact that 
the Brazilians had justified breaking negotiations with Metropolitan-Vickers on the 
grounds that they needed to progress with the work on the railway “without further 
delay”. The clear implication of this was that the British company’s chief competitor 
in the country, the Electrical Export Corporation, was in a position to embark on the 
scheme immediately. This belief appeared contradictory to the previous appraisal of 
the supply situation given to the Brazilian authorities by the State Department earlier 
that year. The Foreign Office therefore requested that the State Department dispel any 
“misapprehension in the Brazilian minds” and again make clear to the Brazilian 
government, “beyond any shadow of doubt”, that the same supply conditions that 
afflict Britain also applied to the US. The Foreign Office further expressed its fear to 
the State Department that the flow of events in Brazil was leading toward the contract 
being awarded to the US firm on the pretext of it being completed during the war, but 
in actuality, for post-war execution. The promises of funding from the Export-Import 
Bank, moreover, made this outcome all the more likely. The Foreign Office therefore 
attempted to enlist the State Department’s support in preventing the Export-Import 
Bank from funding the enterprise, seeing this as a violation of the self-denying 
ordinance.69 
The State Department certainly understood the linkage between the individual 
case and Britain’s ability to participate in a multilateral trade system in the post-war 
era. For the British, as Collado put it, the Brazilian case was “was all bound up with 
the Atlantic Charter and other long range questions”.70 It was perhaps with such 
considerations in mind that Hawkins suggested that the State Department comply with 
the British request and make clear to the Brazilians that neither country would be 
likely to complete the work on the railway sooner than the other.71  
However, the course of action advocated by Hawkins was only followed to a 
degree, with Caffery merely being authorised to clarify the supply situation as it 
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applied to Britain and the US if the Brazilians raised the matter.72 Barring this, any 
misapprehensions concerning US industries’ ability to complete work on the central 
railway sooner than their British competitors, would be allowed to remain. The State 
Department’s attitude toward the activities of the Export-Import Bank was similarly 
noncommittal, stating only that no formal offer of financial assistance had been made 
by the bank.73 This glib response ignored the commitments made by Pierson to 
support the project the previous year. Early indications of the US attitude toward 
imposing a self-denying ordinance in Latin America, then, were not encouraging. The 
reasons for this, while not immediately obvious to British officials, can be discerned 
by examining the various factors shaping US policy in Latin America – and more 
specifically relations with Britain in the region – over the months that followed the 
approach to the State Department.   
 
Bureaucratic Politics and a Lack of Leadership 
Simultaneously to requesting that the US impose a self-denying ordinance with regard 
to Latin America, the British government also asked that the same principle replace 
the Export White Paper of 1941. An exchange of notes between the two countries 
affirming that neither would use the war to gain commercial advantage for the future, 
it was argued, would better reflect the joint struggle that both nations were now 
engaged in.74 This request originally received sympathetic consideration within the 
State Department.75 And while opposition from OLLA and the Treasury eventually 
overrode the adoption of this principle, the call for a self-denying ordinance was at 
least contemplated with regard to the Export White Paper.76 The link between the 
concept and US policy in Latin America, on the other hand, was not even 
considered.77 The difference between the State Department’s attitude toward a self-
denying ordinance with respect to the Export White Paper and general policy in Latin 
America reflected the fact that an exchange of notes regarding the former only 
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required US adherence to the principle in an abstract sense; no immediate action 
would be required. In order to apply the principle with respect to Anglo-American 
relations in Latin America, on the other hand, concrete steps to shape policy would be 
required.  
One reason that the US government proved unwilling, or at least unable, to 
take these steps was simply the nature of the governmental bureaucracy in the 
Roosevelt administration, which tended toward a lack of coordination and 
consistency. On first arriving in Washington in 1941, Halifax was struck by the 
“terribly disjointed” nature of the government machinery in Washington, whereby 
inter-departmental rivalry was rife and there was a lack of bureaucratic machinery for 
resolving differences. The frustrating result, from the perspective of British relations 
with the US, Halifax concluded, is “that a great deal of what we try to do … seems 
like hitting wads of cotton wool”.78 The same circumstances were discovered by 
Gallop on a trip to Washington in February 1944. “The State Department work out 
their own policy in a vacuum”, Gallop observed, and then simply try to sell it to other 
interested departments.79  
One example of the failure of the US government to coordinate policy 
between different departments was displayed by the attitude of different departments 
to the support for US exporters provided by CIAA and the Treasury. Criticism of the 
seemingly preferential status being afforded to US exporters in Latin America was 
raised in Britain during a session of Parliament in July 1943. During MP’s questions 
for Sir Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ian Hannah pointed to the 
tax break for US firms in Latin America and the competitive edge this would give US 
commerce over their British rivals.80 On hearing of these concerns in Britain there 
were those in the Roosevelt administration who questioned the wisdom of granting 
Rockefeller’s aid to US exporters. Officials in the Foreign Economic Administration 
(FEA) hoped to install someone to monitor the activities of CIAA, who, as Lazo put 
                                               
78
 Halifax to Eden, 4 Feb. 1941, A4.410.4.15, Earl Halifax Papers, CAC; Halifax to Churchill, 13 Mar. 
1941, A4.410.4, Halifax Papers, CAC. See also Earl Halifax, Fullness of Days (London: Collins, 
1957), pp.243-246; J. Gary Clifford, “They Don’t Come Out Where You Expect: Institutions of 
American Diplomacy and Policy Process” in Gordon Martel ed., American Foreign Relations 
Reconsidered, 1890-1993 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.21-25, p.21. 
79
 “Notes on a Visit to Washington and Ottawa” by Gallop, 14 Mar. 1944, FO371/35185/AS1621, 
TNA. 
80
 House of Commons Debates, 13 July 1943, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.391 (London: HMSO, 
1943), pp.26-27. 
  
 
153
it, “is seeing the export picture as a whole”.81 In this sense Lazo sought to ensure that 
CIAA’s policies in Latin America did not conflict with the broader economic goals of 
a multilateral trade programme. But due to the lack of coordination between US 
government departments, such oversight could not happen and CIAA was free to 
continue to administer its support for US advertisers largely unimpeded.82       
More worrying from the specific perspective of the implementation of the self-
denying ordinance in US Latin American policy was a lack of consistency evident in 
the US policy-making process. Rather than individual policy decisions being guided 
by established principles, there was a tendency in the Roosevelt administration to 
approach each new situation in an ad hoc manner, often viewing it without the context 
of broader objectives.83 Again, this tendency was particularly striking to Gallop who 
found the US method of governance completely at odds with the British government’s 
penchant for established guiding principles. It was “small wonder, then”, he remarked 
in his report on his visit, “that the State Department find it difficult, irksome, and in 
the long run impossible to commit themselves to any consistent policy”.84     
Beyond these general idiosyncrasies of the US government bureaucracy, a 
further impediment to the Roosevelt administration effectively implementing a self-
denying ordinance in its Latin American policy during this period was a lack of 
leadership in this area in the State Department. In September 1943 Sumner Welles, 
the leader of Latin American policy within the State Department for the last decade, 
was forced to resign from office due to impending revelations of a personal scandal.85 
As has been made clear, Welles’ attitude toward European interests in Latin America 
was far from benevolent. Indeed, his departure from office appeared a welcome 
development to British officials, hoping that someone more sympathetic to British 
interests would replace him.86  
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However, this did not turn out to be the case. Instead, in the period following 
Welles’ departure from office, there remained a void in the State Department when it 
came to taking the lead in the direction of Latin American policy.87 Welles’ 
replacement as Under Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, showed little interest in 
Latin American affairs. And while Hull was seemingly the most likely figure to 
enforce a self-denying ordinance in Latin America, both his increasingly debilitating 
illness, and his preoccupation with other matters meant he lacked the sufficient focus 
on Latin America that would have been required to successfully implement such a 
policy.88 One area in which Hull had focused on Latin America since the advent of the 
war was with regard to the renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements. Initiated in 
1934, the trade agreements with various Latin American countries were renewed by 
Congress in May 1943.89 But while hailed by their supporters as an expression of 
multilateralism, the reciprocal trade agreements were in fact a series of bilateral 
treaties with individual Latin American states, and certainly did not provide the kind 
of free and equal access to the trade of South America sought by Britain.90   
Beyond these figures, the sole official in the Roosevelt administration who 
could be said to have been leading US policy following the demise of Welles was 
Duggan. In many respects Duggan was the political heir to Welles, in terms of his 
commitment to the inter-American system.91 However, he did not display the same 
antipathy toward Britain that Welles had, and, on the contrary, expressed agreement in 
a meeting with Gallop with the policy set out by Britain in the Aide-Memoire of July 
1943.92 But Duggan lacked the seniority to really provide effective leadership. This 
lack of leadership of Latin American policy in the State Department therefore 
remained until the appointment of Rockefeller in the newly created post of Assistant 
Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs in December 1944.93 But by the 
time Rockefeller provided new leadership in US Latin American policy, relations with 
Britain in the region had come to be consumed by the ongoing problem of Argentina. 
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Frustration with Britain in Argentina 
From the summer of 1943 onwards, issues surrounding the attitude of Argentina 
toward the war, and more specifically, Britain’s stance toward altering Argentine 
policy, came to dominate Anglo-American relations in Latin America. More 
importantly, from our perspective, this issue increasingly consumed the attentions of 
Hull, who was supposedly – as the chief advocate of multilateralism – Britain’s 
closest ally in Latin America.94  
Hull had long been concerned with Argentina’s failure to break relations with 
the Axis and regarded the country as the haven of Nazism in the Western 
Hemisphere.95 This concern was heightened following a coup in Argentina in June 
1943, which brought to power the military regime led by General Pedro P. Ramírez.96 
Concern turned to sheer alarm following a coup in Bolivia in November. Hull and 
others in the Roosevelt administration were convinced this was inspired by the 
Argentine regime, and therefore represented the spread of fascist influence throughout 
Latin America.97 At this point Hull began to advocate a series of economic sanctions 
to be aimed at the Ramírez government, which, it was hoped, would force a break 
with the Axis and a clamp down on Nazi espionage and propaganda in Argentina.98  
However, Hull was convinced that these sanctions would only be effective if 
applied in concert with Britain. In particular, Hull wished Britain to again use its 
position as Argentina’s principal customer for meat as leverage to force the Ramírez 
government to alter its policies.99 Having previously suspended negotiations over a 
contract to buy Argentine meat at the request of Hull in January 1943, the British had 
resumed these discussions in the summer of that year and concluded a new contract in 
August.100 In December Hull pressed Halifax to join the US in a general embargo 
against Argentina, which, he believed, would act as a “battering ram” to bring the 
Ramírez regime into line with US demands within a month. More specifically, Hull 
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suggested that the British inform Argentina that they would be able to make do 
without Argentine meat for the next year without serious suffering by drawing on 
existing supplies.101 But Britain rejected Hull’s appraisal of the supply situation and 
refused to endanger its meat supply from Argentina.102 In January 1944, therefore, 
Halifax informed Hull, with the backing of a message from Churchill to Roosevelt, 
that Britain was unwilling to join the US in its sanctions programme against 
Argentina.103 
The potential crisis in Anglo-American relations over the Argentine issue was 
averted when on 24 January the Ramírez regime eventually broke relations with the 
Axis.104 However, of most significance from our perspective is the impact of the 
negotiations concerning the issue on Hull’s attitude toward the British in Latin 
America. Throughout the deliberations with Britain, Hull had made plain his belief 
that the reluctance on Britain’s part to risk its meat supply in Argentina had less to do 
with wartime supply concerns and more to do with Britain’s post-war ambitions in the 
country. In a conversation with Halifax, Hull pointed to the widespread impression in 
Argentina that the British were privately pleased at the trouble the US was having in 
that country, as this would eliminate competition for post-war trade.105      
Moreover, the temporary impasse in Anglo-American differences over 
Argentina, brought about by the regime’s breaking of relations with the Axis, soon 
ended when the Ramírez government was overthrown in a further coup in February 
1944. The new regime, led by General Edelmiro Julián Farrell, and in particular, the 
influential Colonel Juan Perón, was viewed as even worse than their predecessors by 
Hull and the US refused diplomatic recognition.106 Again, the British were unwilling 
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to mirror US actions for fear of jeopardising their meat supplies.107 While the British 
eventually gave way on this point, and recalled their ambassador from Argentina in 
July 1944, Anglo-Argentine negotiations over a further renewal of a meat contract 
continued, and therefore prevented effective sanctions against the regime.108  
The debates that followed over Britain’s meat contract with Argentina 
increasingly hinged on the post-war aspect of the question, a fact that has often been 
overlooked in discussion of this topic.109 Increasingly, having conceded that 
Argentine meat supplies were indeed necessary to the Allied war effort, Hull pushed 
the British to limit any contract with the Argentines to one month, rather than the 
four-year agreement being pursued by the British when the current contract was due 
to expire in September 1944.110 The clear difference between a short-term and long-
term contract was that whereas the former would serve the limited purpose of 
supplying Allied forces with needed supplies during the war, a long-term contract 
would secure Britain the market for Argentine meat well into the anticipated post-war 
era.  
The belief that it was this goal prompting Britain’s stance toward Argentina 
was stated forcefully in a note to the British government in August 1944. This pointed 
to Britain’s tendency in matters concerning Argentina “to be governed primarily by 
the possibility of postwar trade benefits”.111 Hull made a similar point in a heated 
exchange with Kelly and Campbell in July 1944 when he claimed that the British had 
“overlooked the principles at stake” involved with the dispute with Argentina and 
sought to impress that the challenges posed related to the current prosecution of the 
war, rather than the situation that would arise thereafter.112 In the months that 
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followed Hull continued to be frustrated at Britain’s failure to follow US action 
against Argentina and remained convinced that this was a product of post-war 
ambitions, rather than legitimate wartime concerns. 
By the end of 1944, when Hull retired from office, the resentment against the 
British attitude in Argentina went much further than Hull alone. The pro-British 
Armour expressed his discontent with the British attitude when surveying various 
press reports of anticipated future trade expansion between Argentina and Britain in 
the post-war era. Writing to the State Department from Buenos Aires in March 1944, 
Armour stated: 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that British trade and financial circles are 
still intent upon assuring the Argentine Government that, regardless of any 
official position the British Government may take, the British businessman 
understands Argentina’s position and has nothing of which to complain with 
regard to her foreign policy.113  
A similar picture was painted in a report prepared for Hopkins – another supposed 
friend of Britain in Latin America – prior to his trip to Brazil in February 1945. This 
described the markedly “anti-American stand” of British private interests in Argentina 
and the failure of the British government to follow the US in its desire for 
sanctions.114  
Such discontent was summarised in a State Department memorandum of 
January 1945 surveying British activities in Latin America over the past two years. 
This concluded that with regard to Argentina, “neither private British interests nor the 
British government have satisfactorily supported the pro-United Nations stand of the 
United States”. British private interests, in particular, the memorandum noted, have 
consistently supported the Argentine regime and taken an anti-American attitude. 
They have done this, it was concluded, “with the apparent double purpose of 
discrediting the United States and of enhancing the British position with reference to 
post-war Argentina”.115  
Such widespread resentment against the British produced by joint policy 
toward Argentia meant that Britain’s perceived friends in the Roosevelt 
administration were unlikely, and even disinclined, to collaborate in attaining 
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multilateralism in Latin America. Combined with the consequences of the 
bureaucratic functioning of the US government, and the lack of effective leadership 
on Latin American policy in the State Department, it was unsurprising, then, that 
many of the Latin American policies carried out by the Roosevelt administration in 
the period following the summer of 1943 failed to demonstrate a firm commitment to 
a self-denying ordinance. One such policy was the Axis replacement programme.  
     
The Axis Replacement Programme  
The Axis replacement programme was an extension of US economic warfare policy, 
centred on the aim of expropriating the most important Axis concerns in Latin 
America.116 It had long been a British concern that once divested of Nazi control, 
expropriated concerns in South America would be replaced by US interests. Initially, 
however, it appeared that the principle of a self-denying ordinance would indeed be 
adopted by US officials to pre-empt the charge that economic warfare was being put 
to the service of US commercial advantage. As early as December 1942 Acheson sent 
instructions to US representatives throughout Latin America stating that the State 
Department “does not favour participation of United States interests in any firm” 
subject to expropriation. Instead, replacement of Axis concerns by local industry was 
to be encouraged. While exception was made for cases where technical or managerial 
assistance was required, which was not available locally, even here Acheson made 
clear his opposition “to United States interests acquiring a majority ownership share 
as the basis for furnishing the necessary assistance”.117  
Such self-restraint was greeted enthusiastically by British officials who were 
well aware that in any competition to replace ex-Axis firms during the war, British 
concerns would stand little chance against their US counterparts.118 The Foreign 
Office therefore expressed its approval of the State Department’s approach to the 
replacement of Axis concerns and asked that British missions throughout Latin 
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America be kept informed of such replacement activities that did take place.119 In 
December 1943 the State Department sent further instructions to its missions in Latin 
America advising such consultation with British representatives and restating the 
principle that “it is undesirable to allow economic warfare to become economic 
penetration and to substitute domination by the U.S. for domination by the Axis”.120  
But while Washington continued to advocate self-restraint in the operation of 
the Axis replacement programme in Latin America, there were persistent forces 
throughout 1943 agitating against such a stance. US missions throughout Latin 
America periodically protested against the limitations placed on US business in the 
replacement of Axis concerns. The US embassy in Brazil, in particular, argued for 
greater participation of US firms in the replacement of Axis interests in that 
country.121 And while State Department officials were keen for US industry not to be 
seen as overtly benefiting from the programme, in reality it was well aware that it was 
only US interests that had the capital and resources to take over concerns previously 
controlled by Axis interests.  
In recognition of this fact, Acheson modified his original instructions sent to 
US missions in 1942 with less stringent advice in June of the following year. While 
still advocating avoidance of US ownership of ex-Axis firms in Latin America, he 
qualified this position by stating that “this policy cannot be applied rigidly and ... 
participation by United States private capital may in many instances be necessary and 
desirable”. More generally, Acheson went on, “the [State] Department’s policy will 
necessarily be flexible and will be applied on a case by case basis”.122 In December 
Acheson went further than this, stating bluntly that the “implementation of economic 
warfare measures at the present time requires, to a large extent, the use of United 
States companies”.123  
This modification of the principles guiding the Axis replacement programme 
was reflected in the application of the scheme on the ground throughout South 
America. Many of those administering the programme viewed it precisely as a vehicle 
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with which to advance US commercial penetration of the region. As one such official 
put it in December 1943, the Axis replacement programme was “designed to replace 
German economic interests ... with qualified American industries”.124 Similarly, John 
C. Wiley, US ambassador to Colombia, made the case bluntly, stating that “we should 
replace Axis penetration with American penetration”.125   
The gains resulting from the Axis replacement programme for US commerce 
hoped for by Wiley and others did indeed come to fruition. In the chemicals industry 
– previously a major stronghold of German commercial influence in South America – 
subsidiaries of the German firm, IG Farben, were expropriated by the US Alien 
Property Custodian. Subsequently US firms captured the Latin American market 
previously supplied by these concerns.126 “The aim”, noted a US trade journal in 
August 1943, “is to continue after the war a larger sale in the other Americas of 
pharmaceutical products manufactured in this Hemisphere”.127 According to a report 
by CIAA in the same month, considerable progress toward this goal had already been 
achieved.128  
In the telecommunications industry, following a concerted effort to rid the 
Western Hemisphere of control by non-American concerns, ITT began negotiations to 
gain control of many of the ex-Axis companies. In Argentina ITT aimed to take over 
full management and control of the Compańia Telegrafico-Telefónica del Plata.129 
Similarly, ITT began negotiations with the Brazilian government in 1944 to gain a 
virtual monopoly of the country’s telecommunications system.130 Such expansion in 
this sector led the Buenos Aries Herald to talk in July 1944 of US attempts to forge “a 
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private telegraph circuit which would encompass the whole southern part of the 
continent”.131   
Following the successful programme to rid South America of Italian and 
German airlines, US companies also looked set to dominate the civil aviation industry 
in the region in the post-war era.132 Writing in 1943, William A. Burden, Special 
Aviation Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, predicted that European 
competitors were unlikely to challenge US monopoly of the international aviation 
routes in Latin America. A system of controlled competition between two or three US 
operators, believed Burden, was the best outcome to be hoped for.133 Highlighting the 
impact of wartime conditions, John C. Cooper, Vice President of Pan-American 
Airways, noted in an address to the Foreign Policy Association in 1944 that “if war 
had not come when it did, there would have been British airlines to South 
America”.134     
 The existing literature on the various aspects of the Axis replacement 
programme has tended to focus on the tensions between government officials, 
conscious of Latin American sensitivities and therefore keen to develop local 
industries, and the corporate figures employed to carry out the programme, who were 
intent on promoting their own narrow interests.135 But the failure of State Department 
officials to enforce a self-denying ordinance on those implementing the Axis 
replacement programme is also clearly of relevance in the context of Anglo-American 
relations in Latin America.  
While on one level, the gains made by US companies in Latin America as a 
result of economic warfare policies were inevitable expressions of the dominant status 
of US business in the region, they also represented the fulfilment of the exclusivist 
conception of US security in the region, which opposed European interests in Latin 
America. Although Welles had been the chief advocate of an economic Monroe 
Doctrine, the essentials of this conception of US security – albeit in a less extreme 
form – remained after his departure. Specifically, while the US would not oppose 
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economic penetration of Latin America by European powers per se, economic 
interests that took on a political dimension would continue to be viewed as a threat to 
US security in the post-war era, and would not therefore be tolerated.  
This view was made clear to Gallop when he visited Washington in February 
1944. In a meeting with Berle it was explained that the US interest in Latin America 
was “primarily strategic”. As a result of this concern, Berle stated, “the United States 
could not allow an outside Power to establish a bridgehead there. Britain”, Berle 
stressed, “was neither explicitly excluded nor included in this formula”.136 Similarly, 
in an evaluation of the attitude of the State Department following the departure of 
Welles, Campbell stated that while “trade exchange” between “non-American 
countries” and Latin America would not be opposed by the US, these would only be 
permissible, “provided always that such exchange does not offer a danger to the 
security of the American hemisphere by assuming a political complexion”.137  
The fulfilment of an economic Monroe Doctrine by the promotion of US 
concerns in industries of a strategic importance demonstrates one way in which the 
agreement with Britain to implement a self-denying ordinance in Latin America was 
breached. But this failure on the part of the US to adhere to the agreement with Britain 
was largely due to the omission of any reference to Anglo-American relations when 
formulating Latin American policy. As such, US actions tend to confirm the view of 
MEW official, John Troutbeck, who complained at the time that the State Department 
seemed to consist “only of a right hand and a left hand without any physical 
connection between them”.138 But the State Department, along with other officials, 
was unable to avoid contemplating the issue of Anglo-American relations when 
formulating policy toward the case that had first raised the principle of a self-denying 
ordinance in Latin America. 
 
The Failure of Restraint  
The initial failure on the part of the State Department assertively to enforce the 
principle of a self-denying ordinance in relation to the case of the central Brazilian 
railway allowed negotiations ‘on the ground’ in Brazil between the Electrical Export 
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Corporation and the Brazilian authorities to continue unabated. Consequently, the 
offer by the US company to carry out the electrification scheme had been accepted by 
the end of 1943.139 Beyond drawing up a contract, the principal hurdle that remained 
for the interested parties was to gain the backing of the US government to ensure the 
necessary supplies could be released for the project with a suitable priority rating, and 
to guarantee financial assistance for the enterprise was forthcoming. Action was thus 
taken toward the attainment of these goals and on 5 January 1944 Earl C. Givens, the 
Electrical Export Corporation’s Brazilian representative, approached the Economic 
Counselor at the US embassy in Rio, Walter J. Donnelly, to request his collaboration 
in approaching the wartime agencies in Washington responsible for administering 
supplies.140 The next month Guimarães attempted to make use of Pierson’s “great 
interest” in the electrification project to ensure that he would furnish the Electrical 
Export Corporation with the necessary financial assistance for the project, should they 
approach the Export-Import Bank.141 The US embassy in Rio made a similar request 
of Pierson, outlining its support for the project.142  
The President of the Export-Import Bank needed little convincing to support 
the electrification scheme. In a memo on the subject Pierson concluded that there was 
“nothing in the history of this project which justifies the United States Government to 
ask an American firm to relinquish a desirable contract in order to permit a foreign 
concern to submit a competitive bid now or after the war”. “The Electrical Export 
Corporation”, he therefore concluded, “should have the vigorous support of all 
appropriate agencies of this Government”.143 Based on a narrow legalistic reading of 
the case’s history, Pierson’s conclusion may well have been fair. Based on a short-
term understanding of US commercial interests in Brazil, his judgment was surely 
correct. But Pierson’s reading of this case also highlights the Export-Import Bank’s 
complete lack of concern with the broader aims of the State Department concerning 
Britain and the economic shape of the post-war world. Far from wishing to restrain 
US interests in Brazil, Pierson had reportedly told an official of the British embassy in 
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Rio that Britain should give up on its commercial interests in the country and leave 
the field free for US expansion.144  
Others in Washington were far less belligerent in their attitude toward Britain, 
and subsequently more equivocal in considering the appropriate action of the US 
government in this case. D. Maynard Phelps, Associate Chief of the Division of 
Financial and Monetary Affairs in the State Department, agreed with Pierson that the 
history of the case provided no particular reason why the Electrical Export 
Corporation should not gain the contract. Nevertheless, he cautioned that “it may not 
be advisable for the Export-Import Bank to finance the orders”, or for the State 
Department “to support this project in the war agencies”. Phelps advised this restraint 
in light of the assurance given to Britain by Hull. “It is a reasonable assumption”, he 
surmised, “that Metropolitan-Vickers [were] excluded from tendering bids on the 
materials and equipment needed for electrification … because of ‘the exigencies of 
the war’”.145 For the US government actively to support the Electrical Export 
Corporation in gaining this contract, then, would appear to be a violation of the 
agreement with Britain.   
In May the necessity for the US government to provide financial support for 
the project was removed when General Electric offered to provide the funding.146 This 
removed the need for the Export-Import Bank to back the project, and thereby 
nullified one of the problems raised by Phelps. But while government agencies were 
still in control of supplies during the war, the project could not go ahead without their 
support. State Department officials were well aware that FEA and the War Production 
Board (WPB) would call on their advice once the Electrical Export Corporation 
requested supplies and an export license to carry out the work in Brazil. By the spring 
of 1944 supply conditions in the US had eased somewhat and FEA and WPB 
confidentially informed the State Department that at least some of the materials 
needed for the electrification project could probably be scheduled for production in 
the next few months, and most likely be completed by the first half of 1945. In 
Britain, conversely, even if supply conditions allowed production of the materials 
needed, US officials were well aware that the continuing White Paper restrictions on 
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British exports would prevent Metropolitan-Vickers from completing the work so 
soon.147 This situation put the State Department in a position whereby only active 
opposition would prevent the Electrical Export Corporation from gaining the contract. 
Such opposition, solely in order to adhere to the agreement with Britain, proved too 
much to ask.    
The State Department subsequently sought a means by which it could quietly 
aid the Electrical Export Corporation without openly appearing to contradict the 
pledge made to the British. The solution arrived at was to try to solicit a statement 
from a high-ranking official in the Brazilian government testifying to the importance 
of the work. In this way the State Department aimed to shift the burden of pressing 
ahead with the scheme onto the Brazilians and thereby deflect some of the anticipated 
criticism from the British. As Collado put it when instructing Donnelly to extract such 
a statement from the Brazilians, this “would be most helpful in conversations with 
representatives of the British embassy”.148 In June 1944 the State Department’s wish 
was granted when the Brazilian Minister of Transportation and Public Works, João de 
Mendonça Lima, expressed his support for the project.149  
However, the drive to secure the contract for the Electrical Export Corporation 
was thrown off kilter by an unforeseen internal rivalry from within the Brazilian 
government between Guimarães and the Brazilian Finance Minister, Artur de Souza 
Costa. Throughout the summer of 1944 it had slowly become clear to the State 
Department that the contract between the Electrical Export Corporation and the 
Brazilian authorities had not been fully cleared in Rio due to the refusal of Souza 
Costa to support it.150 But by this time the State Department was fully committed to 
seeing the contract go to the US company and was not going to let its efforts be stalled 
by the internal conflicts of Brazilian politics. It therefore sought to force the issue by 
making it known to the Brazilian authorities that while the materials for the project 
could not be guaranteed at the present time, the chances of approval would be much 
slimmer after the war when demands for post-war reconstruction would be great. The 
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clear implication was that it was in Brazil’s own interest to support the contract 
without further delay.151 
News that the contract had not in fact been fully cleared by the Brazilians was 
obviously welcomed by the British authorities. On hearing of this development, Sir 
Donald Gainer, the new British ambassador in Rio, reported that the door was once 
again open for Metropolitan-Vickers, but everything now depended on the priority of 
supplies.152 This was welcome news in London, but what Gainer’s assessment of the 
situation ignored were the continuing White Paper restrictions on British exports now 
being administered by FEA.153 The Board of Trade was pessimistic about the 
prospects of FEA granting a waiver for the necessary exports for the enterprise, for as 
they pointed out, the authorities in Washington were unlikely to loosen “their 
strangle-hold on the competition for an order which an American company” believed 
already to be their own.154 This prediction proved accurate and the “stranglehold” that 
the US authorities had on the British competition for the scheme while the war 
continued was surely a further factor fuelling the urgency with which the State 
Department now pursued the contract.  
Having failed to force the Brazilian government’s hand by forecasting the 
difficulties they might encounter in securing supplies in the post-war period, the issue 
was again pressed when a representative of the Brazilian embassy in Washington was 
summoned to the State Department on 11 October 1944. At this meeting, held to seek 
clarification of the status of the contract in Brazil, Phelps made it perfectly clear that 
the State Department was “quite willing to aid the Brazilian Government in securing 
the equipment” for the electrification work, and in all likelihood the application would 
be successful. But this could not happen, stressed Phelps, while the State Department 
remained “somewhat confused in regard to the attitude of the Brazilian Government” 
toward the contract.155 This message was relayed in Rio and a few days later the 
Brazilian Minister of Finance discounted his previous misgivings and expressed his 
full support for the contract with the Electrical Export Corporation.156 With all 
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agencies now supporting the scheme, both in Brazil and the US, the contract was 
finally signed on 29 December 1944.157 
 
Conclusion 
As the war approached its end, then, it was clear that in Latin America the US 
government had failed to adhere to the self-denying ordinance agreed with Britain in 
July 1943. At the most fundamental level, this failure on the part of the US reflected 
an unwillingness even to accept that there was any need for such a policy in the 
region. Perhaps the most telling indication of the Roosevelt administration’s attitude 
regarding Britain’s fears in South America can be gauged from a meeting a few weeks 
before the British approach to Hull between Richard Law, British Under Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and Adolf Berle. During the meeting, Law asked whether 
the State Department contemplated any discussions with Britain concerning Latin 
America. In response Berle laughed, and joked that any discussions would prove 
particularly easy, as there were no outstanding issues between the two countries in 
that region. When Law pointed to the possible exclusion of British commercial 
interests from South America, Berle simply stated that there was “no problem there at 
all”, as US policy “had never been exclusive, and was not now”.158 But as this chapter 
has demonstrated, the failure of US officials to implement a self-denying ordinance in 
the various aspects of its Latin American policy meant that exclusionary forces 
present in the region did indeed continue to shape events.  
Most significant of the ramifications of the US failure to adhere to the 
principle agreed with Britain – from the perspective of Anglo-American economic 
planning for the post-war world – is what this tells us about the attitude of the 
Roosevelt administration toward multilateralism. More broadly, this failure of the US 
to successfully promote multilateralism in its relations with Britain in Latin America 
is informative to our understanding of Anglo-American economic planning during the 
Second World War. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
The focus on Latin America, by both the US and Britain, gradually declined as the 
war came to an end. European affairs increasingly came to dominate the attentions of 
US officials, to the detriment of sustained and concerted policy formation toward 
Latin America.1 When foreign competition in Latin America was considered by US 
officials, it was increasingly the Soviet Union that was viewed as the principal 
competitor in the region, rather than Britain.2 So what conclusions can be drawn from 
the relations between the US and Britain in South America that took place during the 
Second World War?  
The basic conclusion of this paper is that Anglo-American relations in South 
America during the Second World War failed to conform to the pattern of economic 
planning whereby the US advocated multilateralism against British opposition. It was, 
in fact, Britain that eventually became the chief proponent of multilateralism in South 
America. Explaining the British promotion of multilateralism in this region is 
relatively straightforward. Following a lengthy evaluation of Britain’s short and long-
term interests in South America, government departments formed a consensus around 
the belief that it was the promotion of such a system that would best serve those 
interests. The sheer amount of time and energy that went into the process of 
formulating this consensus demonstrates the importance that British officials 
attributed to South America when planning for the post-war era. Similarly, the nature 
of Britain’s relations with the US in this region has the effect of locating in South 
America, a further significant arena of rivalry between Britain and the US during the 
Second World War. But while the Churchill government was able to form a consensus 
around promoting multilateralism in South America, the same cannot be said of the 
Roosevelt administration.  
The British government came to promote multilateralism in South America 
based on a thorough evaluation of Britain’s own interests. But this was always done in 
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the knowledge that it was with the Roosevelt administration that the concept of 
multilateralism was most closely tied. It was the US that had initiated the promotion 
of such a system in negotiations with Britain over the general structure of the post-war 
world. Similarly, US officials promoted multilateralism in other parts of the world, 
such as the Middle East. The fact that the Roosevelt administration – in contrast to the 
British government – was unable to form such a consensus around promoting 
multilateralism in South America is therefore of much greater interest in terms of 
advancing our understanding of Anglo-American post-war economic planning.  
So if not multilateralism, how can we characterise the post-war economic 
planning of the Roosevelt administration when it came to relations with Britain in 
South America? Previous debates over US economic planning during World War II 
have tended to centre around the extent to which this process was guided by US self-
interest and the extent to which US ideals were the pre-eminent factor.3 In attempting 
to characterise the Roosevelt administration’s attitude toward Britain in South 
America, then, consideration will be given to these two themes. In this way the 
conclusions drawn concerning the attitude of the Roosevelt administration in this 
particular region may shed some further light on existing debates on the broader 
process of economic planning during the Second World War.  
To a large extent, the failure of the Roosevelt administration to promote 
multilateralism in a consistent and unambiguous fashion in its relations with Britain in 
South America was caused by the presence of factions within the government, and the 
US establishment more generally, which worked against the successful 
implementation of such a system. Not least among these groups was the US business 
community. Previous debates over the role of business interests in the formulation of 
US foreign policy have tended to hinge on the relative influence that this group 
exerted on the policy-making process.4 Due to the merging of the private and public 
sectors during the war years – with much of US industry being geared toward war 
production, and the inter-changeability of personnel between business and 
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government – US business interests had an unusually direct influence upon 
government policy during the war.5  
This was particularly true in the temporary government agencies in which 
many prominent US businessmen found a home during the war. These agencies, 
although officially charged with implementing government policy, often acted with a 
large degree of autonomy. The natural consequence of this was for them to regularly 
execute policy in ways that contradicted, or worked at cross-purposes to, official US 
objectives. When applied to Anglo-American diplomacy in South America, the effect 
was for many of these agencies to pursue objectives, which had the effect – if not the 
intention – of excluding British interests, even when this was contrary to official US 
policy.   
The notion that the Roosevelt administration governed in such a way as to 
actively encourage inter-agency rivalries, rather than enforcing a strict party line on 
all elements of the government bureaucracy, has been well documented.6 But the fact 
of inter-agency rivalry was particularly important when it came to formulating – and 
more importantly executing – policy in Latin America than elsewhere. For one thing, 
there was simply a far greater amount of temporary government agencies functioning 
in Latin America. CIAA, USCC, and the Export-Import Bank, in particular, were 
highly influential in this region, but either non-existent or largely irrelevant in other 
parts of the world.7 Many of the temporary agencies operating in Latin America were 
also headed by highly powered and often stringently independent individuals. This 
fact was brought home by the outspoken remarks concerning British interests in South 
America voiced by these individuals. Both the sheer number of temporary agencies, 
as well as the autonomy with which they acted, then, meant that their attitude toward 
multilateralism in South America shaped that of the Roosevelt administration’s more 
generally to a great extent.  
In so far as business interests – both outside and inside the government – were 
a key element in shaping the Roosevelt administration’s attitude toward Latin 
America, this paper supports those studies which have emphasised US self-interest, as 
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opposed to ideals, in the formulation of policy.8 In Latin America the idealism 
enshrined in the internationalists’ belief that multilateralism would engender political 
stability and peace was counteracted by baser concerns. This is not to suggest that 
Hull and others were in any way disingenuous in their belief in the redemptive 
capabilities of multilateralism, but simply to state that in Latin America they lacked 
the constituency to successfully combine US interests and ideals.9 
 But US ideals were by no means absent from other more successful forces 
shaping the Roosevelt administration’s policy in Latin America. This was certainly 
true of the Latin Americanists in the State Department. As has been demonstrated, in 
the policies pursued by this group, commercial interests coalesced with strategic 
concerns; replacing European control of strategically important industries in Latin 
America with US control served the war effort and the commercial interests of US 
business. Strategic concerns and business interests also augmented the idealism of the 
Latin Americanists.     
The Latin Americanists believed in multilateralism. The removal of barriers to 
trade, and the consequent strengthening of inter-American commercial ties, had been 
a central component of the inter-American system that they had sought to achieve in 
the decade preceding the war.10 Moreover, the perceived success achieved toward this 
goal was widely seen throughout the Roosevelt administration as a model for the rest 
of the world to follow. So why, then, given the Latin Americanists’ benevolent 
attitude toward multilateralism – alongside their conviction that a regional model 
entailing this economic system should be replicated on a global basis – did they fail to 
ensure that multilateralism be the guiding principal in diplomacy with Britain 
concerning South America? The answer lies in their idealistic attachment to the inter-
American system. 
As has been shown, the Latin Americanists’ focus on the affairs of the 
Western Hemisphere tended to be joined by an anti-European prejudice. This 
combination of beliefs – a passionate commitment to an inter-American system and a 
deep suspicion of European motives – led to a fundamental contradiction in this 
groups’ attitude. Latin Americanists were so deeply attached to the ideal of an inter-
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American system that they instinctively opposed the infiltration of this system by 
European powers whose motives they perennially suspected. This very attempt to 
preserve the integrity – one might even go so far as to say purity – of the inter-
American system meant that it was, in effect, an exclusivist system. In their desire to 
preserve the multilateralist nature of the inter-American system, therefore, the Latin 
Americanists had, paradoxically, betrayed the central tenets of that very system.       
The fact that it was such a multitude of different forces with different 
objectives that shaped the Roosevelt administration’s attitude toward Britain in South 
America means that it is impossible to speak of a single, defined policy that was 
pursued toward the region. In this sense, multilateralism is an inadequate concept for 
understanding US economic planning when it comes to relations with Britain in South 
America. But while the Roosevelt administration as a whole was not committed to 
multilateralism during the course of Anglo-American relations in South America, can 
the same be said of the internationalists within the State Department who have 
traditionally been so closely tied to the concept?   
From the very outset of Anglo-American wartime diplomacy concerning 
South America, the internationalists in the Roosevelt administration demonstrated an 
awareness of the dangers posed to multilateralism by the various economic measures 
adopted during wartime. In a meeting with British officials in November 1940 Hull 
made this point concisely. Pointing to “all the different methods of trade that may be 
practiced during chaotic war conditions”, Hull stressed that it was “important to 
recognize [that these] must not be permitted to become permanent after the war, 
thereby undermining and destroying the integrity of a broad and sound commercial 
policy.”11  
Broadly speaking, the kind of economic measures Hull had in mind were not 
retained in South America following the end of the war. The Export White Paper, 
blacklisting, and a multitude of other wartime restrictions upon commerce were 
removed in the years immediately following the end of hostilities.12 Moreover, a 
pledge to implement multilateralism throughout Latin America was included in the 
Act of Chapultepec, a declaration produced by the inter-American conference in 
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Mexico City in the spring of 1945.13 As with previous such declarations at inter-
American conferences, the emphasis of this endorsement of multilateralism in Latin 
America was on promoting inter-American trade, rather than opening up the continent 
to commercial penetration from Europe. But nevertheless, it is certainly true to say 
that US economic policy toward Latin America in the post-war years did not progress 
along some of the more extreme exclusionary lines, which had at times been feared by 
British officials during the war.14      
 But regardless of what took place once the war was over, there was, as this 
paper has shown, an inextricable link between economic measures applied during the 
war and the situation that would arise thereafter. Put another way, actions taken 
during the war, while designed to meet a contingent need, would in fact have longer-
term effects. Moreover, officials on both sides of the Atlantic acknowledged this fact. 
In the same conversation in which Hull demonstrated an awareness of the need to 
ensure the temporary nature of economic measures implemented in wartime, he 
similarly acknowledged that “while it is extremely important to preserve the integrity 
of a liberal commercial policy, it is necessary during the war to recognize the 
complete dislocation of international finance, commerce and trade.”15 In this sense, 
Hull acknowledged that freedom of trade could not simply continue under the duress 
of war. However, he seemingly failed to take this analysis a logical step further by 
realising that in order for multilateralism to be successfully implemented in the post-
war era positive steps would need to be taken during the war to counteract the 
economic consequences of the conflict.16  
It was such a realisation that lay at the heart of the British quest for a self-
denying ordinance. British officials believed multilateralism would only be viable in 
South America if supported by binding agreements to guarantee both countries future 
access to the region. This belief was cogently expressed in the Aide-Memoire handed 
to Hull by Halifax in July 1943. This made clear the British government’s belief that 
in order for multilateralism to be successfully implemented in South America a self-
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denying ordinance would need to be applied, preventing either country from taking 
advantage of the war to displace the other’s interests.  
The ultimate failure of the internationalists in the Roosevelt administration to 
carry out this request is indicative of a subtle but fundamental difference of 
understanding on either side of the Atlantic concerning how multilateralism should be 
implemented. For the Roosevelt administration’s internationalists, multilateralism was 
primarily a negative concept, defined solely by the lack of ‘artificial’ barriers to trade. 
Understood in this way, the notion of entering into an agreement to restrain commerce 
was not only alien, but wholly antithetical to the spirit of multilateralism.17  
Could the Roosevelt administration’s attitude toward implementing 
multilateralism in South America have been any different? More specifically, could 
internationalists in the State Department have imposed the kind of self-denying 
ordinance in the region suggested by the British, and thereby improved the chances of 
successfully implementing such a system in this region? To attempt to answer such a 
question is to begin to enter the domain of counterfactual history. But nevertheless, a 
few tentative conclusions on this point may be possible by considering the nature of 
the forces that militated against such action being taken.  
In so far as these forces were generally of a structural, or at least deeply 
ingrained nature – rather than being expressions of particular individuals’ whims or 
the product of contingent factors – the answer to this question seems most likely to be 
negative. The failure of US business interests to embrace multilateralism in South 
America was based on a rational evaluation of their own self-interests. Given that this 
motivation is to be wholly expected from profit-driven organisations, it seems 
unlikely that business interests would have taken a different attitude toward 
multilateralism in South America of their own accord. Could they, therefore, have 
been coerced by the government into taking a different course of action? The 
Roosevelt administration’s ability to exercise such restraint over business interests 
was more limited than was the case in Britain.18 This relative freedom of private 
enterprise during wartime, while not impervious to change in exceptional 
circumstances, did reflect a long-standing cultural tradition in the country, based on 
an aversion to intrusive government regulation of business and the sanctity of private 
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property.19 The notion that the Roosevelt administration could have restrained the 
business community in South America in order to better promote multilateralism 
therefore seems an unlikely one.       
If unable to counter the actions of forces outside the government, could the 
internationalists in the State Department have done more to restrain those forces 
within the government from acting in such ways as to threaten the implementation of 
multilateralism in South America? Again, the deeply rooted nature of those forces 
seems to suggest that this could not have been the case. The conception of an inter-
American system – which tended toward the exclusion of non-American powers – 
was a central component of the Latin Americanists’ philosophy that both preceded the 
concrete steps made during the 1930s toward the construction of such a system and 
outlived the demise of its chief proponent in Sumner Welles.20  
Finally, the internationalists’ own understanding of multilateralism as a 
negative concept, based on the lack of regulation or agreements, represented a 
continuation of traditional US approaches to trade that went back at least as far as 
Secretary of State John Hay’s ‘open door notes’ of 1899.21 The failure of the 
Roosevelt administration to implement multilateralism in its negotiations with Britain 
in South America, then, was less a failure of will than a product of intractable 
historical pressures. Similarly, the promotion of multilateralism in South America by 
the Churchill government did not reflect the proclivities of the individuals involved in 
formulating this policy, but rather the particular circumstances in this region. But 
regardless of the factors that caused the Roosevelt administration’s failure to 
effectively promote multilateralism in its wartime relations with Britain in South 
America, the fact of this failure had serious implications for the post-war era.     
Protection of British export markets was deemed by the British government 
throughout the war to be an essential prerequisite of the country effectively 
participating in the kind of multilateral system that the US advocated for the post-war 
world. For if these markets were not retained for the post-war era, British officials 
argued, such a system would not provide Britain the means to ensure a favourable 
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balance of payments, which would be essential for the basic economic health of the 
country. 
As the war came to an end, it was less Britain’s access to foreign markets that 
constituted the country’s principal problem, than the lack of reserves to fund 
production – caused in no small part by President Harry S. Truman’s abrupt 
termination of Lend-Lease in August 1945.22 But following the post-war loan from 
the US when Britain was able to begin exporting again, its markets in South America 
had in large part been lost to US competition. Between 1938 and 1945 Britain’s 
exports to South America more than halved.23 By 1947 the US dominated the import 
markets of all the South American countries. In Brazil US exports constituted 61 
percent of the country’s total imports, compared to just 7 percent supplied by Britain. 
In Argentina, the one-time stronghold of British interests in South America, the US 
now supplied just under half of the country’s imports, whereas Britain supplied only 8 
percent. US dominance throughout the rest of the region was similar to these countries 
or even greater.24  
It is impossible to tell how much this process was the result of specific policies 
discussed in this paper and to what extent it was an inevitable result of the differing 
effects of the war on the two countries.25 British exports as a whole declined steeply 
during the war, more than halving between 1938 and 1945.26 The US economy, on the 
other hand, accounted for 50 percent of the world’s industrial output by 1945.27 Albeit 
as part of a much broader process, then, this loss of export markets in South America 
– as predicted by British officials during the war – seriously hindered the country’s 
ability to participate in a global multilateral system in the post-war era.28 The failure 
of the Roosevelt administration effectively to collaborate with Britain in the 
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protection of its export markets in South America is therefore indicative of a broader 
failure to promote a global system of multilateralism. 
Perhaps of greater long-term significance is the precedent that the Roosevelt 
administration’s failure to promote multilateralism in South America set for the post-
war era. Economic multilateralism, as defined by its proponents in the Roosevelt 
administration, was, by its very nature, a global system. As such, any regional 
exceptions from this system could not be accommodated. To the contrary, the theory 
of multilateralism stated that is was precisely the creation of closed economic spheres 
that eventually led to international conflict. As one US supporter of multilateralism 
predicted in 1943, “where policies give exclusive privileges to [Western] hemisphere 
nations, retaliatory measures by other economic blocs such as the British Empire … 
may well develop”.29 This was certainly the response hoped for by some in British 
business circles. Metropolitan-Vickers’ Brazilian representative – infuriated by what 
he perceived as the exclusion of British interests in South America by the US – 
expressed his hope that Britain would one day “be in a position to embarrass 
American business within the Empire”.30 
It was, of course, not Britain but the Soviet Union that turned out to be the 
principal rival that the US faced in the post-war era. To explore the effects of the US 
attitude toward Latin America on Soviet-American relations would take this study 
beyond its natural limits.31 It is, however, perhaps worth pointing to the remarks of the 
US Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, who reported in January 1946 that “Soviet 
current policy is to establish a Soviet Monroe Doctrine for the area under her 
shadow”.32 Certainly Churchill was not averse to citing the perceived claim by the US 
for predominance in Latin America in order to justify British freedom of action in its 
‘sphere’. In March 1944, when requesting that Britain be granted pre-eminence in 
directing policy toward Spain, he reminded Roosevelt that “we have gone along with 
you in Argentina” and therefore felt “entitled to ask you to take our views seriously … 
where our strategic and economic interests are more directly affected than are those of 
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the United States”.33 The clear insinuation behind Churchill’s reference to Latin 
America was that the US attitude toward that part of the world differed from its stated 
principles. While so much of the British wartime leader’s judgement on the Second 
World War was lacking, in this verdict he was surely correct.   
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